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LOCHNER ERA JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
STEPHEN A. SIEGEL*
Legal scholars and historians have generally depicted the
Lochner era as a deviant period during which. the Supreme
Court broke from the constitutionalism that the Marshall Court
established and the New Deal Court restored. They maintain
that the Lochner era Court, which struck down much legislation
affecting industrial regulation, strayed from the American con-
stitutional tradition by underconstruing the scope of congres-
sional power and overprotecting private property.
Several scholars have criticized this view and have presented
different theories on the Lochner era's place in American consti-
tutionalism. In this Article Professor Stephen Siegel paints an
entirely new picture, rejecting both the traditional theory and the
more recent ones. Professor Siegel argues that the Lochner era
was both similar to and different from its predecessor and succes-
sor eras: it was a transitional period in the American constitu-
tional tradition.
The Article examines the era's substantive due process cases
in terms of their jurisprudence, which was based on a form of
thinking that Professor Siegel calls "constitutional conceptual-
ism. " He argues that on the one hand, the Lochner era Court
was similar to the pre-Lochner era Court in that both based their
decisions on constitutional conceptualism; in contrast, the New
Deal Court based its decisions on pragmatic interest-balancing.
On the other hand, the Lochner era Court was similar to the
New Deal Court in that both envisioned the Constitution as
evolving with the changes in American society; in contrast, the
pre-Lochner era Court viewed the Constitution as static, deter-
mined by the unchanging norms of natural law and framer in-
tent. Thus, the Lochner era was a transitional period, bridging
America's development from early to modern constitutionalism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the standard narrative of American constitutional
development was that shortly after the nation's founding John Marshall's
Supreme Court heroically established the "correct" norms of constitu-
tional law and jurisprudence, norms that included broad power for the
new national government, protection of private property, and judicial re-
1991] LOCHNER ERA JURISPRUDENCE
straint.1 The Court, according to this story, generally adhered to these
norms until after the Civil War. Then, in the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century,2 judges concerned about protecting big business from the
nascent regulatory state departed from the norm of restraint and substi-
tuted their values for the principles that the Constitution's framers en-
shrined and John Marshall enforced. In this deviant period, known as
the Lochner era, the Court underconstrued the scope of congressional
power and overprotected private property. The final chapter in this story
is that after years of national economic collapse and threats of "court
packing,"3 the Court ceased its aberrant behavior. The Court, newly re-
constituted as the "New Deal Court," restored the founders' principles,
and (as always) truth, justice, and the American way triumphed.
Now that the political consensus surrounding New Deal constitu-
tionalism is coming apart,4 this narrative is appreciated as a myth created
by scholars wishing to justify the New Deal Court's departure from
1. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453,
457-58 (1989); Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional
Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 57-63 (1987) [hereinafter Horwitz, Republicanism];
Morton J. Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1825, 1827-30 (1987) [hereinafter Hor-
witz, History and Theory]; Sanford Levinson, Book Review, 75 VA. L. REv. 1429, 1449-50
(1989). In light of such cases as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), which
seems to go out of its way to address whether President Jefferson should have delivered Mar-
bury's commission and whether high executive branch officials are amenable to judicial pro-
cess, see William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1,
6-8, contemporary scholars may doubt that Chief Justice Marshall practiced judicial restraint.
The standard narrative, however, does not admit that Marshall was an activist justice. See,
e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REv. 129, 149, 151 (1893). Perhaps it is a measure of the distance we have moved
from the standard narrative that Marshall's activism now is more apparent.
2. The conventional wisdom dates the Lochner era from the early twentieth century,
when the Court, in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), first voided industrial regulation
legislation based upon the doctrine of "liberty of contract." Id. at 64. This view overlooks the
facts that by the 1880s the state courts had fully embraced laissez-faire principles and that the
Court clearly was moving in that direction. See infra note 9.
3. "Court packing" refers to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's proposal to expand the
Court to allow him to appoint enough new and ideologically correct justices to uphold New
Deal legislation. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTrUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT:
THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 235-36 (1990).
4. Until the 1970s, commentators usually supported the New Deal Court's decision to
legitimate the regulatory state by giving minimal scrutiny to economic legislation. See, e.g.,
Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34, 59-62. Now conservative scholars attack the New Deal
Court's stance on economic regulation and propose a return to rigorous scrutiny of legislation
affecting property rights. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 280-82 (1985). Left-liberal scholars, in turn, criticize the New
Deal Court for not going far enough in redistributing property rights. See, e.g., J.M. Balkan,
The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 275, 310-13 (1989) (criticizing the 1937 Court for not man-
dating government enactment of laws establishing economic equality among individuals).
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Lochner Court norms by picturing its rebellion as a restoration.5 A wel-
ter of new narratives presently compete to replace the old, standard
story. Scholars representing the political left and the political right say
that American constitutional law presents a story of continuity with
Marshall Court norms until the New Deal, and that the New Deal marks
a break with tradition.6 Scholars representing the liberal center offer two
different analyses. One analysis describes important continuities between
the Lochner and post-Lochner eras.7 The other, which divides American
constitutional history into three distinct periods, tells a story of multiple
breaks, not continuity.'
This Article argues for a substantially different narrative of Ameri-
can constitutional development. It does so by considering the place of
the Lochner era in the American constitutional tradition. Focusing on
the Lochner era is appropriate because it is the linchpin of all the compet-
ing narratives. Together, they frame a central question of current consti-
tutional historiography: Was the Lochner era continuous or
discontinuous with pre- or post-Lochner era development? This Article,
however, rejects the question as presenting a false choice. It shows that
the Lochner era was both similar to and different from its predecessor
and successor eras. It presents the Lochner era as a transitional era that
blended the tenets of early and modem American constitutionalism.
This Article examines the transitional nature of Lochner era consti-
tutionalism by exploring the jurisprudence of substantive due process
cases decided in the early and middle periods9 of the Lochner era. These
5. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 458; Horwitz, Republicanism, supra note 1, at 61-63; Hor-
witz, History and Theory, supra note 1, at 1827-30; Levinson, supra note 1, at 1449.
6. See, ag., Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of.1937, GEO. MASON U. L. REv., Winter
1988, at 1, 5 (libertarian scholar); Horwitz, Republicanism, supra note 1, at 57-63 (Critical
Legal Studies scholar); Levinson, supra note 1, at 1449-50 (discussing Richard Epstein's and
Bernard Siegan's libertarian constitutionalism). The right portrays the New Deal Court as a
break with tradition by characterizing the Warren Court's liberalism as unwarranted and un-
precedented judicial legislation. The left portrays the Court as a break with the past by casting
the Warren Court as a long-needed defender of constitutional liberties.
7. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner' Legacy, 87 CoLUM.L. REV. 873, 883-902 (1987).
8. See Ackerman, supra note 1, at 453-61.
9. The Lochner era is divided into three periods: early (1870-1900), middle (1900-1920),
and late (1920-1937). In the early phase, Lochner era principles gestated in scholarly commen-
tary and appeared in state court decisions and Supreme Court dissents. See, e.g., In re Jacobs,
98 N.Y. 98, 115 (1885); Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 437, 6 A. 354, 356 (1886);
THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 351-413 (repr. ed.
1972) (1st ed. 1868); infra text accompanying notes 453-94 (discussing The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), and Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877)). In the middle
phase, a majority of the Supreme Court adopted Lochner era principles; this touched off a
dissenting scholarly tradition. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM.
L. REV. 605, 615-16 (1908); Thayer, supra note 1, at 148, 151, 156. The precedents of the
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cases exemplify Lochner era constitutionalism. They have long been de-
scribed (and decried) as attempting to resolve constitutional questions by
application of abstract concepts drawn from a blend of natural and com-
mon law.10 Thus, this Article's task is twofold: to defend discussing the
Lochner era in terms of its jurisprudence and to situate the Lochner era
in terms of its conceptualism and its use of natural and common law as
the source of its concepts.
Part II of the Article discusses the late nineteenth- and early twenti-
eth-century industrial regulation cases to show that the dominant justices
of the Lochner era were a substantively diverse, but methodologically
unified, group. By discussing the extent to which jurisprudence, rather
than substance, identifies the proponents of Lochner era constitutional
law, this part establishes jurisprudence as central to understanding the
popularity, longevity, and place in American constitutional history of
Lochner era constitutionalism.
Part III discusses Lochner era conceptualism, arguing that from the
early nineteenth century until 1937 a core facet of American constitu-
tional jurisprudence was a mode of thought that this Article calls "con-
stitutional conceptualism."'" This part defines "constitutional
conceptualism," traces it in Chief Justice Marshall's opinions in Marbury
v. Madison 1 and Fletcher v. Peck,13 and uses it to show the antebellum
state court origins of Lochner era substantive due process.' 4 Part III
maintains that Lochner era conceptualism establishes the era's consis-
tency with prior American constitutional jurisprudence. It implies that
middle period, however, were fairly liberal. See infra text accompanying notes 48-63. The
Court did not become trenchantly conservative until the late phase of the Lochner era, when it
lost its jurisprudential moorings. See Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Les-
sons from the Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REv. 187, 240-
43, 249-50, 257-58 (1984); infra note 48. But see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 10-11, 197-200 (1988) (using the year 1900 to divide the Lochner era into only
two periods). This Article draws from cases decided between 1870 and 1920. In large mea-
sure, the post-1920 Lochner era jurists carried on the precedents of the pre-1920 Lochner era
Court. Thus, an interpretation of the early and middle phases is sufficient to establish the
general nature of Lochner era constitutionalism and its place in American constitutional devel-
opment. A full understanding of the Lochner era, however, requires an understanding of the
unique late phase. Nonetheless, for brevity's, if not accuracy's, sake, this Article will speak of
Lochner era constitutionalism, not just the early and middle periods.
10. See, e-g., Pound, supra note 9, at 615-16; Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE
L.J. 454, 462-70 (1909); infra notes 392-494 and accompanying text (discussing Lochner era
jurists' blending of natural and common law).
11. "Constitutional conceptualism" is defined and described infra text accompanying
notes 101-08.
12. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), discussed infra text accompanying notes 181-229.
13. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), discussed infra text accompanying notes 230-71.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 279-320.
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the New Deal Court's shift to constitutionalism premised upon prag-
matic interest-balancing"5 was a departure from the legacy established by
the Marshall Court. The ramifications of Part III, however, are coun-
tered by Part IV, which discusses the Lochner era jurists' use of the com-
mon law as the source of their concepts.
Part IV argues that prior to the Lochner era, jurists drew their con-
stitutional concepts from traditional natural law and framer intent in an
effort to establish an essentially static body of constitutional law. By dis-
cussing late nineteenth-century social theory16 and Justice Stephen
Field's dissents in The Slaughter-House Cases17 and Munn v. Illinois,18
Part IV shows that the Lochner era jurists' version of the common law
was evolutionary. It was, in Rudolf Stammler's phrase, "natural law
with a changing content,"19 derived from history, not reason. Part IV
maintains that Lochner era common law and the constitutional law pred-
icated upon it were not static. In this way, Lochner era constitutionalism
broke with tradition and anticipated the more evolutionary jurisprudence
of modem constitutional law.
Part V extends the analysis of Parts III and IV. It depicts the Loch-
ner era as a transitional era that bridged America's passage from early to
modem constitutionalism.
II. THE THREE APPROACHES TO Lochner ERA SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS
In the late nineteenth century, the rise of large-scale enterprise and
the related creation of a regulatory state20 posed many challenges to
15. See infra text accompanying notes 35-47, 504-08 (discussing the opponents of Lochner
era jurisprudence, who established the norms that the New Deal Court adopted).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 343-91.
17. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83-111 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting), discussed infra text accom-
panying notes 453-72.
18. 94 U.S. 113, 136-54 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting), discussed infra text accompanying
notes 473-94.
19. RUDOLF STAMMLER, WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT NACH DER MATERIALISTISCHELN
GESCHICTSAUFFASSUNG § 33, at 181 (1906) ("Naturrecht mit wechselnden Inhalte"). The
phrase is quoted in English in a translation of chapter six of 2 FRANgOIS GENY, SCIENCE ET
TECHNIQUE EN DROIT PRIVft POSITIF 128 (1915), appearing in RUDOLF STAMMLER, THE
THEORY OF JUSTICE app. I, at 494 (Isaac Husik trans. 1925). See also JULIUS STONE, THE
PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAv 327 (1946) (attributing phrase to Stammler); infra text
accompanying notes 419-40 (describing the era's emergent evolutionary consciousness).
Stammler did not discuss the common law. He described the fundamental precepts of law
in general. The writings of late nineteenth-century jurists reflect Stammler's vision of law
because the jurists shared his historist presuppositions. See infra note 340 (distinguishing his-
torism from historicism); infra text accompanying notes 343-440 (discussing historism).
20. The essential link between these two institutions in liberal political theory is discussed
in Siegel, supra note 9, at 259-63.
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American constitutional law. Not surprisingly, among them was a need
to establish and delimit the regulatory power of the state, known as the
"police power."21 Previously, in an economy typified by small-scale un-
dertakings, government tended to promote and subsidize economic activ-
ity, relying on market mechanisms for its control. In a basically
nonregulatory environment, jurists did not focus much attention on the
constitutional limits of regulation.22 Early American courts protected
property from unconstitutional interference by the government. Prior to
the rise of the regulatory state, however, constitutional law generally pro-
tected private property only from seizure, not regulation.23 The effect of
a century of litigation under state and federal takings, contract, and due
process clauses was to guarantee property holders the title and possession
of their wealth, but not its use and value.24 Stated in other terms, early-
21. The police power is the authority to abridge rights of liberty and property when doing
so reasonably promotes the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, or protects other
property. See, eg., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 53 (1905); City of Aurora v. Bums, 319 IMI. 84, 92, 149 N.E. 784, 788 (1925); ERNST
FREUND, THE POLICE POWER, PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 2-3, 57-61
(repr. ed. 1976) (1st ed. 1904); 1 NORMAN WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW §§ 7.01-
.05 (1974).
22. Of course, regulation was not entirely absent during the early part of American his-
tory; seminal discussions of the police power date to the mid-1800s. See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-88 (1851); Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R.R., 27 Vt. 140, 149-
56 (1854). Nonetheless, until the last third of the nineteenth century, courts rarely discussed
the doctrine of police power, and when they did, then only in a sketchy manner. Late nine-
teenth-century jurists were well aware that they were writing on an almost blank slate:
The 1898 edition of Bouvier's Law Dictionary says that the law on this subject [police
power] is all of recent growth, and most of it is in the last half of the nineteenth
century. It could not consistently say otherwise. The work as originally published in
1839 did not define the phrase... nor even contain it .... It was only in 1883 that
this standard dictionary of law first explained the phrase.
W.G. Hastings, The Development of the Law as Illustrated by the Decisions Relating to the
Police Power of the State, 39 PROC. AM. PHIL. SoC. 359, 359-60 (1900); see also CHRISTOPHER
G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED
STATES vi-viii, 569-70 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas Law Book Co. 1886) (explaining the recent rise
of regulatory legislation). Justice Harlan, dissenting in Lochner, noted that the police power
"has doubtless been greatly expanded in its application during the past century, ow-
ing to an enormous increase in the number of occupations which are.dangerous, or so
far detrimental to the health of the employ~s as to demand special precautions for
their well-being and protection, or the safety of adjacent property."
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 66 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S.
366, 391-92 (1898)); see also Holden, 169 U.S. at 392-93 ("While [the police] power is neces-
sarily inherent in every form of government, it was, prior to the adoption of the Constitution,
but sparingly used in this country. As we were then almost purely an agricultural people, the
occasion for any special protection of a particular class did not exist.").
23. Before the eighteenth century, seizure was the traditional way for governments to
abuse property holders. Less complex" governments, it seems, must resort to less complex
means of spoliation.
24. Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
and mid-nineteenth-century constitutional law protected vested, not sub-
stantive, property rights.2 5 Wealth acquired under the law was sacro-
sanct, but the state was virtually free to make changes in the law no
matter how those changes devalued extant holdings.
By the late nineteenth century, this facet of constitutional law was
almost universally viewed as anachronistic. The rise of market-dominat-
ing industry and the creation of the regulatory state placed constitutional
jurists on the horns of a fundamental dilemma: Unless they properly
defined the police power and ascertained its appropriate limits, either the
regulatory state would strip the right of property of any meaning, or the
right of property would triumph over the just claims of society. 6
In an effort to resolve this apparent dilemma, all Lochner era ju-
rists27 joined in an effort to create a substantive right of property. None
of them believed that the courts should continue to limit the rights of
property owners to protection of title and possession without protection
from intrusive, substantive regulation.28 In implementing their common
of the Property-Privilege Distinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 75-103 (1986); Siegel, supra note 9, at 210-15.
25. See Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine ofAmerican Constitutional Law, 12 MICH.
L. REv. 247, 255-58 (1914) (describing nineteenth-century constitutional law as focused on
protection of "vested" rights). The difference between vested and substantive rights involves
the distinction between rights relating to past acts and rights relating to future acts. In this
regard, rights acquired under an existing contract seem to differ from rights to be acquired
under a contract that is not yet signed; wealth acquired through past acts seems to differ from
wealth to be acquired through acts in the future. The dichotomy, and the connections of
vested rights to possession of property and substantive rights to use and value of property, are
discussed in Siegel, supra note 24, at 80-81.
26. Just as defining the police power too broadly allowed too much governmental control
of private wealth, defining the police power too narrowly allowed government insufficient
power to prevent property holders from using their wealth to harm fellow citizens. The consti-
tutional limits of zoning laws, for example, simultaneously define the extent to which govern-
ment may control an owner's use of her land and the extent to which an owner may use her
land in ways harmful to surrounding land and residents without government interference.
27. At this point, the term "Lochner era jurists" encompasses both the proponents and
the opponents of laissez-faire constitutionalism. See infra notes 29-47 and accompanying text
(discussing the three schools of thought within Lochner era jurisprudence). In later parts of
this Article, the term will be used to refer only to the proponents. See infra note 110 (discuss-
ing the distinction between proponents and opponents of laissez-faire constitutionalism).
28. All early Lochner era jurists struggled to elaborate a doctrine of substantive due pro-
cess as the doctrinal expression of a substantive right of property. Consider, for example, that
in his Lochner dissent Justice Holmes advocated substantive limitations when "a rational and
fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental princi-
ples as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law." Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-16 (1922) (Holmes, J.) (invalidating an otherwise valid regulation
because the financial 16ss it imposed was too extreme).
It was not until the 1920s that due process began to protect substantive rights other than
the right of property. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (assuming for the
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recognition, however, the jurists fractured into three competing schools
of thought. At one extreme were strict laissez-faire constitutionalists.
These jurists limited the legislature's regulatory power to the protection
of the public's health, safety, and morals and the prevention of fraud.29
Government, they said, had no power to protect a party from the conse-
quences of his own act, except when he was subject to an incapacity, such
as infancy or lunacy, or when another party was perpetrating a fraud
against which he could not protect himself.30 These were the jurists who
found paternal government "odious" 31  and argued for the
"nightwatchman" state.32 They approached constitutional law concep-
tualistically,33 and drew their constitutional concepts from a blend of
sake of argument that free speech is a protected right); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing parents' right to direct their children's upbringing); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923) (protecting parental control of children's education).
Although Justice Brandeis objected to the doctrine of substantive due process, he urged its use
in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969), to protect speech. With regard to the right of
property, Brandeis indicated that the police power has limits. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at
416 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. Strict laissez-faire constitutionalists required that legislation meet stringent standards
of equality; they believed that all individuals except those laboring under legally cognizable
incapacities should be accorded similar treatment. See infra note 47.
30. In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 426-31, 58 P. 1071, 1075-77 (1899); State v. Loomis, 115
Mo. 307, 314, 22 S.W. 350, 351 (1893); Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 437, 6 A. 354,
356 (1886); A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENT 15-16 (1892 & reprint 1968);
TIEDEMAN, supra note 22, at vi, 150-51, 178-88, 194-98, 301-07, 569-72; 1 CHRISTOPHER G.
TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN
THE UNITED STATES 325-26 (repr. ed. 1975) (lst ed. 1900). Some strict laissez-faire constitu-
tionalists exempted those interferences with private contract, such as usury laws, that were
sanctioned by continuous use up to and including the time of the Constitution's adoption. See
People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1, 45-48, 22 N.E. 670, 686-87 (1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting); State
v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 181-82, 10 S.E. 285, 287 (1889), overruled by White v. Raleigh
Wyoming Mining Co., 113 W. Va. 522, 523-24, 168 S.E. 798, 799 (1933); TIEDEMAN, supra
note 22, at 238-41 ("[E]nactment [of usury laws] has so long been recognized... and the fact
that they become dead letters as soon as enacted, render[s] it very unlikely that the courts will
pronounce them unconstitutional, however questionable legal writers and authorities may con-
sider them.").
31. Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting); see also
Godcharles, 113 Pa. at 437, 6 A. at 356 (criticizing paternal legislation); Goodwill, 33 W. Va. at
186-87, 10 S.E. at 288 (same); see generally Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and
Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW & HIST.
REV. 249 (1987) (exploring critically the Lochner era's animus against paternalism).
32. For an example of a jurist advocating a "nightwatchman" state limited to minimal
functions such as protecting citizens from crime and nuisance, see TIEDEMAN, supra note 22,
at vi-vii, 148-53, 299-307, 569-72.
33. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Conscious-
ness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. L. & Soc. 3, 9-12
(1980) (discussing Justice Peckham's approach to the Lochner opinion); infra text accompany-
ing notes 101-08 (defining "constitutional conceptualism"). This Article describes Peckham as
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natural- and common-law principles.34
At the other extreme of the Lochner era jurists were liberal constitu-
tionalists. These jurists claimed that the Constitution allows legislatures
to enact all regulations that reasonable people think appropriate.3" They
defended this standard on substantive and jurisprudential grounds. Sub-
stantively, these jurists thought that private market ordering is neither
efficient nor just under modem industrial conditions. Corporate concen-
tration, they claimed, gives some entrepreneurs too much power over
their less organized competitors, and certainly over their employees, for
contractual agreements to represent the uncoerced choices of both par-
ties.36 Jurisprudentially, they thought law should be derived from a
pragmatic, functional analysis of contemporary society-its needs and
the operation of the law in it.37 In their view, legislatures are better
suited for determining the propriety of laws than are courts, partially
because they are more in touch with the people's wishes. Consequently,
a strict laissez-faire constitutionalist. See infra notes 56, 58, 60; infra text accompanying note
66.
34. See, eg., TIEDEMAN, supra note 22, at vii, 4 (defining police power by common-law
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which means "use your own so as not to injure
another"); Sunstein, supra note 7, at 877 (in the Lochner era, "regulatory power was largely
limited to the redress of harms recognized at common law"); infra text accompanying notes
392-440.
35. See, eg., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARv. L. REV. 495, 498-501,
508 (1908); Pound, supra note 10, at 482-87; Thayer, supra note 1, at 146-52. It is important
to note that despite their deferential approach to governmental power, liberal constitutionalists
still supported some substantive protection of property rights. Justice Holmes's majority opin-
ion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), and his support of constitutional
limits to utility rate regulation, San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 442 (1903),
illustrate the point.
36. See, eg., JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 11-64, 283-312
(1923); John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MicH. L. REV. 253,
254-62, 282-90 (1947); Horwitz, Republicanism, supra note 1, at 61.
37. See, for example, the string of brilliant articles by Dean Pound: Roscoe Pound, The
Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 31 A.B.A. REP. 911 (1907) [hereinafter Pound, The
Need]; Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 339 (1905)
[hereinafter Pound, Philosophy of Law]; Pound, supra note 9; Roscoe Pound, The Scope and
Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. 1-3), 24 HARV. L. REv. 591 (1911), 25 HARV. L.
REv. 140 (1911), 25 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1912) [hereinafter Pound, The Scope and Purpose];
Pound, supra note 10; and his essay, ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY
151-65 (1923) [hereinafter POUND, INTERPRETATIONS]. See also Hand, supra note 35, at 498-
500 (arguing that judicial review should test a statute in the same way it reviews a discretion-
ary decision of a lower court); William D. Lewis, The Social Sciences as the Basis of Legal
Education, 61 U. PA. L. REV. 531, 532-34 (1913) [hereinafter Lewis, Social Sciences] (arguing
that since the law is an expression of social ideas, it must change with those ideas); William D.
Lewis, Civil Liberty and a Written Constitution, 41 AM. L. REG. 1064, 1070-71 (1893) [herein-
after Lewis, Civil Liberty] (arguing that while some powers are so extraordinary in nature that
they are withheld from the legislature unless expressly granted, others that seem natural and
right should be considered granted if not expressly withheld).
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these jurists argued that courts should review legislative enactments
deferentially.38 With these thoughts, the constitutionalism of the welfare
state was born.
Between these two schools of thought were moderate laissez-faire
constitutionalists. Unsympathetic to the wealth redistributions that the
liberal constitutionalists' modem welfare state required and unimpressed
by the philosophy of pragmatism, these jurists spurned the notion that
courts should fashion constitutional law by balancing interests and vali-
dating anything that "has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it."'39
Like the strict laissez-faire constitutionalists, these jurists were conceptu-
alists who drew their constitutional concepts from natural and common
law." Yet their reading of the common law was different from that of
the strict laissez-faire constitutionalists. The moderate laissez-faire con-
stitutionalists did not think common-law principles completely pro-
scribed paternalistic legislation. Instead, they thought the police power
extended to all acts tending to harm health, safety, and morals, and to
those causing fraud.41 In their view, laws could forbid individuals from
38. For example, when Massachusetts prohibited employers from fining weavers for im-
perfections in their work, Justice Holmes, who was then a judge on the state supreme court,
voted to uphold the legislation, saying:
I suppose that this act was passed because the operatives, or some of them, thought
that they often were cheated out of a part of their wages under a false pretense that
the work done by them was imperfect, and persuaded the legislature that their view
was true. If their view was true, I cannot doubt that the legislature could deprive the
employers of an honest tool which they were using for a dishonest purpose, and I
cannot pronounce the legislation void, as based on a false assumption, since I know
nothing about the matter one way or the other.
Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 124-25, 28 N.E. 1126, 1127 (1891) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). Holmes concluded his remarks by citing the majority opinion in The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80-81 (1872), in support of his position. Peny, 155 Mass.
at 125, 28 N.E. at 1128 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Slaughter-House Cases and their relation
to Lochner era constitutionalism are discussed infra text accompanying notes 453-72.
39. Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes
exempted "express prohibition[s] in the Constitution" from these remarks. Id. Such prohibi-
tions are few and, in any event, are susceptible to varying interpretations. See, e.g., JOHN H.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DiSmuST 13 (1980).
This Article maintains that the proponents of Lochner era constitutionalism did recognize
the legitimacy of public opinion in fashioning constitutional norms, but they sought to distin-
guish between the people's temporary "whims" and their permanent "will." See infra text
accompanying notes 510-33.
40. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 33, at 12-14 (discussing Justice Harlan's dissent in
Lochner); infra text accompanying notes 94-96 (discussing proponents of laissez-faire constitu-
tionalism). This Article describes Harlan as a moderate laissez-faire constitutionalist. See in-
fra notes 74, 76.
41. See, eg., New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 207 (1917), discussed infra
note 46; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 (1897), discussed infra text accompanying notes
44-46; infra text accompanying notes 59-61.
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concluding agreements that harmed their own health, safety, or morals.
Some jurists justified such regulations, at least when applied to corpora-
tions, on the ground that the "compulsory power" that corporations
have over their employees derives from corporations being "artificial
combination[s] of capital, which special State legislation has originated
and rendered possible."" With regulation, the state simply was re-
dressing an imbalance in contractual bargaining power it had created.43
Other jurists justified the regulations on more general grounds, such as
those stated by Justice Brown in Holden v. Hardy.' In upholding legis-
lation regulating the hours miners could work underground, Justice
Brown distinguished the statute from paternalistic legislation by noting
that
proprietors . . . and their operatives do not stand upon an
equality, and.., their interests are, to a certain extent, conflict-
ing. The former naturally desire to obtain as much labor as
possible from their employes, while the latter are often induced
by the fear of discharge to conform to regulations which their
judgment, fairly exercised, would pronounce to be detrimental
to their health or strength. In other words, the proprietors lay
down the rules and the laborers are practically constrained to
obey them. In such cases self-interest is often an unsafe guide,
and the legislature may properly interpose its authority.45
Justice Brown argued, moreover, that regardless of paternalism "'[t]he
State ... retains an interest in [an individual], however recldess he may
be. The whole is no greater than the sum of all the parts, and when the
individual health, safety and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the State
must suffer.' 46 Moderate laissez-faire constitutionalists envisioned, in
short, a more organic, less individualistic society than what their strict
laissez-faire colleagues sought.47
42. State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 36 W. Va. 802, 820, 15 S.E. 1000, 1005 (1892); see
generally id. at 811-14, 15 S.E. at 1002-04 (discussing the state as enabling corporations to
dominate individuals).
43. Significantly, even the strict laissez-faire constitutionalist Christopher Tiedeman ac-
cepted this position and described it as an "advanced, but apparently sound position." 2
TiEDEMAN, supra note 30, at 957. The property/privilege distinction underlies this line of
thought. See Siegel, supra note 24, at 57-66.
44. 169 U.S. 366 (1897).
45. Id. at 397.
46. Id. (author of original quotation not given); see also New York Cent. R.R. v. White,
243 U.S. 188, 207 (1917) ("It cannot be doubted that the state may prohibit and punish self-
maiming and attempts at suicide; it may prohibit a man from bartering away his life or his
personal security; indeed, the right to these is often declared in bills of rights, to be 'natural
and inalienable.' "). The language in the parenthetical directly follows the quotation in Holden
that appears in the text.
47. Another important difference between the three schools of constitutionalism is their
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Distinguishing the three approaches to Lochner era substantive due
process sheds new light on a variety of facets of Lochner era constitution-
alism and its widespread, long-lived appeal. Scholars have long noted
that until the 1920s the Supreme Court took a fairly permissive stance on
industrial regulation laws,4" upholding such paternal enactments as Sun-
position on the norm of "equality" in substantive due process litigation. All three schools
opposed laws that unreasonably burdened or benefited different segments of the public. Strict
laissez-faire constitutionalists required stringent reasons for treating groups unequally. See,
e.g., Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 188, 31 N.E. 395, 400 (1892) (voiding a law prohibiting
company stores in mining and manufacturing because it did not apply to "other branches of
industry" such as construction, transportation, agriculture, and domestic service); State v.
Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 316, 22 S.W. 350, 353 (1893) (en banc) (voiding an antiscript law appli-
cable only to manufacturing and mining concerns); Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127,
136-43, 59 N.W. 362, 364-66 (1894) (reviewing other recent decisions); In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y.
98, 104, 114-15 (1885) (voiding legislation that prohibited manufacture of cigars in tenements
in cities with more than 500,000 people because no sufficient reason existed to exempt cities
with smaller populations); FREUND, supra note 21, at 705 (observing that the ban on unequal
laws is "one of the most effectual limitations upon the exercise of the police power"); id. at
749-55 (reviewing equality principle and labor legislation).
Liberal constitutionalists required only minimal justifications for treating groups un-
equally. See, e.g., Gerard C. Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts (pt. 2), 33 HARV.
L. REv. 1031, 1056 (1920) (arguing that courts should void only those rate regulations that are
"so outrageous as to shock the common sense of justice"); Thayer, supra note 1, at 148-50
(arguing that courts should review legislation deferentially, in the same manner that they re-
view jury verdicts).
Moderate laissez-faire constitutionalists imposed a middle standard. See, e.g., Bunting v.
Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 439 (1917) (upholding differential treatment of certain employers in
setting maximum hours); St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1902)
(upholding safety regulations imposed on mines with more than five employees); Petit v. Min-
nesota, 177 U.S. 164, 168 (1900) (upholding differential treatment of barbers and other occupa-
tions in Sunday closing law).
The strict and moderate laissez-faire constitutionalists also differed in their approaches to
the problem of price regulation. Both groups of jurists allowed price regulation when a busi-
ness was "affected with a public interest." Siegel, supra note 9, at 202. The strict group
thought only businesses that exercised governmental privileges or were dejure monopolies fell
within this category. The moderate group extended the category to encompass de facto mo-
nopolies as well. See id. at 200-07.
48. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567-68 (2d ed.
1988) (Note, however, that material cited presents an inadequate explanation because it is
limited to the 1910s. See id. at 567 n.2.); Soifer, supra note 31 (discussing decisions that reveal
the paradox of the Court's paternalistic role); Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the
United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 294 (1913) (reviewing wide variety of regu-
latory laws that the Lochner era Court upheld). The Court's liberality was present from the
Lochner era's inception until the 1920s. It is inaccurate to depict the Court as aggressively
conservative before the 1920s. See, e.g., Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and
the Supreme Court, 40 HARv. L. REV. 943, 945 n. 11 (1927) (calculating the Court's rate of
voiding social and industrial legislation as six percent from 1868 to 1912, seven percent from
1913 to 1920, and twenty-eight percent from 1921 through 1927). Professor Brown, however,
calculated these statistics without providing an explanation for them. See also Siegel, supra
note 9, at 238-43 (discussing the conservative and liberal approaches to rate regulation).
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day closing laws,49 antiscript laws,5" workers' compensation acts, 51 maxi-
mum hours legislation,52 and rent control.53 These decisions, when
balanced against the Court's famous decisions voiding regulatory legisla-
tion,54 show that moderate laissez-faire constitutionalists dominated the
Court in the middle Lochner period. 5 Between 1897 and 1908, for ex-
ample, when the Court handed down its seminal substantive due process
decisions, only two justices were strict laissez-faire constitutionalists
5 6
and only one was a liberal constitutionalist.17 The eleven other justices
who served during that time were moderates; at no time were there fewer
than six moderates on the Court.58 Moderates governed, for example, in
49. Petit, 177 U.S. at 168.
50. Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 22 (1901). Antiscript laws, also known
as "truck acts," compelled employers to pay their employees in cash rather than in script
redeemable only in-goods purchased from company stores. Id. at 18.
51. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 209 (1917).
52. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426,439 (1917). This decision, in effect, overruled Loch-
ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (voiding maximum hours legislation for bakers). See
infra text accompanying notes 78-88.
53. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921).
54. See, e.g., Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 597 (1917) (voiding state law construed as
prohibiting employment agencies); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (voiding state law
prohibiting contractual agreements not to join a union); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161,
180 (1908) (voiding federal law prohibiting contractual agreements not to join a union); Loch-
ner, 198 U.S. at 64 (voiding state regulation of maximum hours in bakeries); Allgeyer v. Loui-
siana, 165 U.S. 578, 592-93 (1897) (voiding state law prohibiting out-of-state contracts to
insure property temporarily within the state made with out-of-state companies not complying
with the state's regulatory legislation).
55. See generally Warren, supra note 48, at 296-313 (providing extensive listing of regula-
tory laws that the Court upheld).
56. Justices Brewer and Peckham were the only two strict laissez-faire constitutionalists
on the Court during this period. They voted with the majority in every case employing sub-
stantive due process to void laws. In cases that upheld regulations preventing employees from
contracting in a way that injured only their health or subjected only them to fraud, Brewer and
Peckham were the only justices to dissent. Unfortunately, they did so without opinion. See,
e.g., Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 22 (1901) (upholding antiscript laws);
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898) (upholding maximum hours regulation for miners).
Brewer and Peckham dissented, again without opinion or support from any other justice, even
in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905), which upheld mandatory smallpox vac-
cinations. Brewer is the author of the famous line, "The paternal theory of government is to
me odious." Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
57. Holmes is famous for his adherence to the liberal constitutionalist view. See Lochner,
198 U.S. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 123-25, 28
N.E. 1126, 1127-28 (1891) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Pound, supra note 10, at 480-81 (com-
mending Holmes for his liberal constitutionalism).
58. Holden, a paradigmatic moderate laissez-faire constitutional opinion, see supra text
accompanying notes 44-47 and infra text accompanying notes 59-61, was decided by a vote of
seven to two, with only Brewer and Peckham dissenting. Similarly, in Adair, 208 U.S. at 161-
90, seven of the nine justices adhered to moderate principles. See infra text accompanying
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Holden v. Hardy,59 which upheld regulations preventing miners from
contracting in ways that harmed only their health, and decisively re-
jected the strict laissez-faire approach 6' that, until then, had been pre-
ferred by the state courts.61 Moderates also carried the day in Adair v.
United States,62 which voided regulations preventing railroad workers
from contracting in ways that harmed their ability to unionize, decisively
rejecting the liberal approach to constitutional law.63 In Lochner v. New
notes 62-63. In Lochner, 198 U.S. 45, six justices adhered to moderate principles. See infra
text accompanying notes 64-76.
The moderates generally prevailed in industrial regulation litigation. See supra and infra
text accompanying notes 48-93. The moderates also generally prevailed in the litigation, dis-
cussed supra note 47, over the ban on unequal laws and over what constituted a "business
affected with a public interest." See, e.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 439 (1917) (up-
holding differential treatment of certain employers in setting maximum hours); St. Louis Con-
sol. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1902) (upholding safety regulations imposed on
mines with more than five employees); Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164, 168 (1900) (upholding
differential treatment of barbers and other occupations in Sunday closing law); Atchison, T. &
S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 103-06 (1899) (upholding, in an opinion by Justice
Brewer, differential treatment of railroads in awarding of attorney fees); Siegel, supra note 9, at
200-07 (discussing "business affected with public interest").
59. 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47. Holden was decisive because it had the
support of seven of the ninejustices. Peckham and Brewer, who were strict laissez-faire consti-
tutionalists, dissented without opinion. Holden, 169 U.S. at 398. The case was so decisive that
when Peckham wrote for the majority in Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53-57, he specifically reiterated
the Court's acceptance of the moderate approach. See infra text accompanying note 67.
61. See, e.g., Vogel v. Pekoe, 157 Ill. 339, 344-45, 42 N.E. 386, 387-88 (1895) (explaining
earlier cases based on liberty of contract, not just their unequal application); Low v. Rees
Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127, 143-47, 59 N.W. 362, 366-68 (1894) (same); Godcharles v.
Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 437, 6 A. 354, 356 (1886) (voiding antiscript law). Professor Mott
implied this conclusion when he mentioned that the Supreme Court faced very few police-
power limitation cases because of the "conservatism" of the state courts. RODNEY MOTr,
DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 127, at 342 (1926); see also FREUND, supra note 21, at 749-53 (re-
viewing the application of the demand for equal laws in the labor context). In addition to state
courts, leading commentators advocated the strict laissez-faire approach. See LOWELL, supra
note 30, at 8-12; TIEDEMAN, supra note 22, at vi, 1-2, 148-51, 178-88, 194-98, 299-307, 569-72;
1 TiEDEMAN, supra note 30, at 325-26.
The decision in Holden did not end state courts' allegiance to the strict laissez-faire ap-
proach. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 426-31, 58 P. 1071, 1075-77 (1899) (voiding
maximum hours law for miners). It did have great influence on them, however. For example,
after the Supreme Court validated a maximum hours law for women in Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412, 423 (1908), the Illinois Supreme Court reversed its contrary holding. See W.C.
Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509, 529, 91 N.E. 695, 699 (1910), rev'g Ritchie v. People,
155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454 (1895). In any event, had the Supreme Court adopted the strict
laissez-faire approach, it would have precluded states from being more liberal and dramatically
altered the tenor of the Lochner era.
62. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
63. Id. at 180. Adair showed that seven of the nine justices had rejected liberal constitu-
tionalism. Justice Holmes dissented in Adair on liberal constitutional grounds. Id. at 190-92
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice McKenna was the only other dissenter. He had voted with
the majority in Lochner and Holden. McKenna dissented in Adair on the limited grounds that
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York," however, the moderates split over a problematic application of
their approach.
Constitutional historiography's singular emphasis on Lochner has
clouded the recognition not only that the proponents of laissez-faire con-
stitutionalism were split into strict and moderate camps, but also that in
Lochner a difference within the dominant moderate group allowed the
strict group temporarily to apply moderate principles in a strict manner.
In deciding that regulation of bakers' hours was beyond the police power,
the Lochner Court addressed the important but subsidiary issue of the
nexus required for the state to present an acceptable claim that legisla-
tion pursues a legitimate government purpose.65 Speaking for the major-
ity, Justice Peckham, who personally favored strict laissez-faire
constitutionalism,6 6 nonetheless wrote an opinion affirming the Court's
decision in Holden that laws preventing individuals from harming their
own health, safety, or morals are valid.67 Yet Peckham also wrote, after
railroads are quasi-public corporations and, consequently, are subject to more intrusive regula-
tion than is private property. Id. at 190 (McKenna, J., dissenting). Because Justice Moody
did not participate in the decision, Adair represents only seven justices' rejection of liberal
constitutionalism, not eight. Moody was on the Court from December 1906 to November
1910, but illness drastically limited his participation in the Court's business, and he became a
rather insignificant figure during this period. He certainly was not a strict laissez-faire consti-
tutionalist; he seems to have been a liberal member of the moderate school. See James F.
Watts, Jr., William Moody, in 3 THE JUsTIcES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1801, 1816-21 (Leon Friedman & Fred L.
Israel eds. 1969) [hereinafter THE JUSTICES].
Of course, Lochner, which was decided before Adair, already had indicated that a major-
ity of the justices rejected liberal constitutionalism. Lochner, however, was decided by a one-
vote majority. Although the holding decisively rejected liberal constitutionalism, it did not
firmly establish moderate laissez-faire constitutionalism, because three of the four dissenting
justices disagreed with the application of moderate laissez-faire principles. See infra text ac-
companying notes 74-76.
64. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
65. Unlike Holden and Adair, Lochner set no principles that defined permissible interests.
See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 877-79 (discussing importance of a means-ends analysis in ferret-
ing out governmental pursuit of impermissible ends).
66. See supra notes 56, 58, 60. Justice Brewer was the other adherent of strict principles.
Id.
67. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53-57, 61. Admittedly, the obeisance to Holden is somewhat
submerged in Peckham's text. In addition, Peckham's opinion suggests that Holden stood for
the proposition that the "character" of miners uniquely required special protection. Id. at 54.
Peckham, an adherent of the strict school, see supra notes 56, 58, 60, probably was doing the
least he could to hold the moderate votes he needed for his majority. Peckham would have
liked the principle to be that the hours legislation at bar had to promote the public's health by
making the bread more healthful. See People v. Lochner, 177 N.Y. 145, 181-82, 69 N.E. 373,
387 (1904) (O'Brien, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905),
for a jurist who objected to the law on this ground.
Interestingly, the remark in Peckham's opinion implying the unique incompetence of min-
ers to protect themselves is even more submerged than his remarks admitting a broader read-
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allowing that working excessive hours at any occupation inevitably af-
fects health,68 that statistics and common knowledge failed to support
the claim that long working hours sufficiently affect the health of bakers
to support legislative concern.69 That the legislation trenched on a legiti-
mate concern "in a remote degree,"7 ° Peckham said, was insufficient.
Otherwise,
[s]carcely any law but might find shelter under such assump-
tions .... Not only the hours of employes, but the hours of
employers, could be regulated, and doctors, lawyers, scientists,
all professional men, as well as athletes and artisans, could be
forbidden to fatigue their brains and bodies by prolonged hours
of exercise, lest the fighting strength of the State be impaired.71
Consequently, Peckham concluded, "[t]he act is not, within any fair.
meaning of the term, a health law."72
These arguments convinced three moderate laissez-faire constitu-
tionalists to join Peckham and Brewer, the Court's two proponents of
strict laissez-faire principles, to void the law.73 The Court's three other
ing of Holden. Yet, liberal constitutionalists have long emphasized the former remark and
overlooked the latter. See, eg., TRIBE, supra note 48, at 569-70, 574. This common reading
reflects a failure to realize that moderate constitutional principles, which governed both cases,
found nothing improper with paternal legislation protecting traditional common-law police-
power subjects. Also, not by coincidence, Peckham's remark helps liberal constitutionalists to
lampoon the entire line of early substantive due process decisions for involving ridiculous judg-
ments about real world facts. Of course, liberal constitutionalists could read Holden correctly
when it suited their interests. See infra note 85.
68. Peckham wrote that
there are [no occupations] . . -which might not come under the power of the legisla-
ture to supervise and control the hours of working therein, if the mere fact that the
occupation is not absolutely and perfectly healthy is to confer that right upon the
legislative department of the Government. It might be safely affirmed that almost all
occupations more or less affect the health. There must be more than the mere fact of
the possible existence of some small amount of unhealthiness to warrant legislative
interference with liberty.
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 57.
71. Id. at 60-61.
72. Id. at 61.
73. The three moderates were Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Brown and McKenna, all
of whom had voted with the majority in Holden. Indeed, Justice Brown had written the opin-
ion in that case, vigorously expressing moderate principles. See supra text accompanying notes
44-46. It seems more reasonable to assume that Justice Brown and the others maintained their
moderate principles and genuinely agreed with the nonhealth rationale-especially given
Peckham's concessions to them in the text, see Lochner, 198 U.S. at 54-55 (acknowledging the
rationale in Holden)-than to assume that they shifted allegiances to the strict laissez-faire
camp.
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moderates were not convinced. 74 Significantly, they did not join in Jus-
tice Holmes's liberal constitutionalist dissent 75 but issued their own opin-
ion, authored by Justice Harlan, finding enough of a nexus between long
hours and bakers' health to support the state's claim that it had enacted a
health protection law.76
Because statistics used by the Court placed bakers in the middle of
the mortality tables,77 the decision in Lochner placed most occupations
74. The three other moderates were Justices Day, Harlan, and White, all of whom voted
with the majority in Adair. Harlan wrote the Adair opinion, which clearly expresses laissez-
faire constitutionalist principles. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 173-74 (1908) (stat-
ing that the government should not interfere with the people's liberty to contract for services);
supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
75. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes was the only justice to
dissent in both Lochner and Adair, which clearly expresses his liberal constitutionalist views.
76. Id. at 65-74 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan specifically discussed the health rationale.
Id. at 69-73 (Harlan, J., dissenting). More important, he acknowledged that the statute might
have been enacted to redress the inequality of bargaining power between baking employers and
employees. He then indicated that the only relevant inquiry for the Court was whether the
statute redressed the power balance with regard to an end in which the state had a legitimate
interest, such as the protection of the employees' health. Id. at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting). On
a single page of the opinion, Harlan twice makes the point that promoting the health of the
employees is a sufficient interest, and on one of those occasions he cites Holden. Id. (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898)). Support for the statement
that Harlan's dissent is an exemplar of moderate laissez-faire constitutionalism is found in
Holmes's failure to join in the opinion (as Harlan had not joined in his). See also Kennedy,
supra note 33, at 9-14 (analyzing the jurisprudential similarities between Peckham's and
Harlan's opinions).
If we put aside the substantive differences between strict and moderate laissez-faire consti-
tutionalists, Harlan was as much a proponent of Lochner era constitutionalism as was
Peckham. Indeed, given the dominance of moderate sensibilities on the Court, Harlan,
although the dissenter in Lochner, was even more typical of Lochner era justices than was
Peckham, the author of the majority opinion.
My candidate for the most typical of all Lochner era justices, however, is Henry Billings
Brown, who sat on the Court from 1890 to 1906. Having left the Court, he did not participate
in Adair. But he not only wrote for the majority in Holden, over Peckham's and Brewer's
dissents, and voted with the majority in Lochner, over Harlan's and Holmes's dissents, he also
wrote for the Court in Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 277-88 (1897) (upholding, over
Harlan's dissent, imprisonment of merchant sailors who breached their employment con-
tracts); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540-52 (1896) (upholding, over Harlan's dissent,
segregation in public facilities), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954); and Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 135-43 (1894) (upholding, over the dissent written
by Fuller and joined by Brewer and Field, summary destruction of property of little value
constituting a public nuisance). His mentalit6 may well represent that of the typical Lochner
era jurist. Perhaps because of his ordinariness, Brown has attracted little scholarly attention.
But see CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
174-200 (1987) (discussing Brown's opinion in Plessy); Robert J. Glennon, Jr., Justice Henry
Billings Brown: Values in Tension, 44 U. COLO. L. REv. 553 (1973) (analyzing Brown's career
as a Supreme Court jurist); Joel Goldfarb, Henry Billings Brown, in 2 THE JUSTICES, supra
note 63, at 1553-63 (discussing Brown's jurisprudence during his tenure on the Court).
77. Peckham commented: "In looking through statistics regarding all trades and occupa-
tions, it may be true that the trade of a baker does not appear to be as healthy as some other
1991] LOCHNER ERA JURISPRUDENCE
beyond the reach of maximum-hours legislation and indicated that the
Court demanded a stringent means-ends nexus for police-power legisla-
tion. Thus, Lochner engendered a significant limiting application of the
Holden principle that laws could prevent individuals from contracting in
ways that harmed themselves. Yet from a moderate laissez-faire stand-
point, so clearly did Lochner involve a debatable application of an issue
subsidiary to Holden's general principle that Lochner's reversal in 1917
in Bunting v. Oregon 7 1 was a fairly insignificant event in the life of the
constitutional law era that bears the case's name.79 Felix Frankfurter,
trades, and is also vastly more healthy than still others." Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59. The statis-
tics evidently were drawn from Lochner's brief, which contains in its appendix an incipient
"Brandeis brief" compilation of medical, scientific, and statistical data. See Brief for Plaintiff
in Error at 50-61, Lochner (No. 292). Included in that material is a chart of comparative
mortality figures from England in 1890 through 1892, which gave bakers a score of 920. Id. at
54. Dock laborers scored highest at 1829, and clergymen scored lowest at 533. Id. at 53-55.
Railway engine drivers scored 810; barristers and solicitors scored 821; commercial clerks
scored 915; publishers scored 833; master musicians scored 1214; and general laborers scored
1221. Id. at 54-55. The residual category of "other occupied males" scored 847. Id. at 53-56.
Bakers, in other words, were healthier than musicians and nearly as healthy as clerks and
those in the residual category. Under this approach lawyers would be as regulable as railway
engineers. Peckham used this argument inLochner, 198 U.S. at 59-61, and until reading Loch-
ner's brief, I always regarded it as a curmudgeonous flight of fancy.
Lochner's brief also contains a variety of comments about recent changes in the baking
industry and its generally comfortable conditions. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 10-11, 19-20.
The state's brief, both by comparison and by absolute standards, is pathetic, presenting weak
or irrelevant legal arguments and no data. See Brief for Defendants in Error at 5-19. One
wonders who did the research that resulted in Justice Harlan's quotations from Professor
Hirt's treatise Diseases of the Workers and the Eighteenth Annual Report by the New York
Bureau of Statistics of Labor, Lochner, 198 U.S. at 70-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting), or Judge
Vann's snippets from a wide range of standard references, People v. Lochner, 177 N.Y. 145,
169-74, 69 N.E. 373, 382-84 (1904) (Vann, J., concurring), rev'd sub nor. Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
The New York opinion included its own comparative mortality data drawn from the 1900
U.S. Census. Id. at 173, 69 N.E. at 383-84 (Vann, J., concurring). Those statistics say that
"deaths among bakers and confectioners were three and two-tenths per cent greater than the
average of general industrial occupations." Id. (Vann, J., concurring). Judge Vann felt he
could take judicial notice of material in "such sources of information as were open to the
legislature" to determine whether or not "from common knowledge ... [baking] is an un-
healthy employment." Id. at 169, 69 N.E. at 382 (Vann, J., concurring). Adherence to "com-
mon knowledge" is a theme that runs throughout both the majority and the minority opinions
and briefs. See, eg., id. (Vann, J., concurring) (arguing that the validity of the regulation in
question depends on whether it is common knowledge that baking is unhealthy); id. at 187, 69
N.E. at 389 (Bartlett, J., dissenting) (citing "common experience").
78. 243 U.S. 426, 438 (1917) (upholding maximum-hours legislation applicable to "mills,
factories and manufacturing establishments").
79. Lochners eventual overruling was presaged by the Court's retreat, after a change in
Court personnel, from Lochners demand for a stringent means-ends nexus to uphold police-
power legislation. See Morr, supra note 61, §§ 226-27, at 569-73. The Court's shift on the
strength of the means-ends nexus was a significant event in the history of the Lochner era, for
that shift enabled the Court to establish clearly its permissive stance toward industrial regula-
tion. But Bunting did not mark that shift; it belatedly illustrated it. Although the overruling
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who argued Bunting for the State, was a leading liberal constitutional-
ist.8" Yet he fashioned arguments to show that overruling Lochner was
consistent with the Lochner era's matrix of constitutional assumptions
and doctrines. 8 Frankfurter read Lochner as reflecting the then "'com-
mon understanding'" that length of work does not affect health.82 He
argued that subsequent scientific research, amply documented in his ex-
tensive "Brandeis brief," had shown this to be untrue.83 Consequently,
he trumpeted, "judgment by speculation must yield."84
Frankfurter's was an argument with which many moderate laissez-
faire constitutionalists could agree."5 Indeed, Justice McKenna, who
voted to void the New York law in Lochner, wrote for the Court uphold-
ing the Oregon law in Bunting. 6 Many moderate laissez-faire constitu-
of Lochner's more specific holding on the validity of maximum-hours legislation was tremen-
dously significant for the labor movement, it was insignificant in terms of legal theory or con-
sciousness. The fact that Lochner was overruled only 12 years after it was decided is not
noticed by many law scholars.
80. Bunting, 243 U.S. at 430-33 (argument of Felix Frankfurter on behalf of Defendant in
Error).
81. See id.
82. Id. at 432 (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59).
83. Id. at 432-33. Louis Brandeis drafted a two-volume brief with over 1,021 pages, con-
taining only seven pages of legal argument paginated with Roman numerals to emphasize their
prefatory nature. See Brief for Defendant in Error at iv-xv, 1-1021, Bunting (No. 228). Data
and statistics from around the world began on page one. See id. at 1. Most of the data had
been published since 1905, and Frankfurter emphasized in his argument that such scientific
knowledge of the subject could not have been before the Lochner Court "because it was not
heretofore in existence. Inasmuch as the application of the contending principles must vary
with the facts to which they are sought to be applied, of course new facts are the indispensable
basis to the determination of the validity of specific new legislation." Bunting, 243 U.S. at 432-
33 (citing People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N.Y. 395, 412, 108 N.E. 639, 644 (1915), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Press v. New York, 242 U.S. 618 (1916)). Brandeis did not argue Bunting
because between the drafting of the brief and the argument of the case he was appointed to the
Court; he took no part, however, in consideration of the case.
84. Bunting, 243 U.S. at 432.
85. Frankfurter's following remark is telling of his appeal to moderate laissez-faire
constitutionalism:
This is precisely what Holden v. Hardy... looked forward to.
The insight expressed in that case has now been amply justified by experience.
What in 1898 presented a specific, and apparently, exceptional instance ... is now
disclosed to be of far wider and deeper application. It is now demonstrable that the
considerations that were patent as to miners in 1898 are to-day operative, to a greater
or less degree, throughout the industrial system.
Id. Of course, some moderates would say Frankfurter's argument artfully understated the
truth because Lochner always had been an incorrect application of principle to the facts. See,
e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65-74 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting); infra text ac-
companying note 87.
86. Bunting, 243 U.S at 433. Incredibly, McKenna's opinion did not mention or even
vaguely refer to Lochner, much less explain that the Court was overruling it.
Chief Justice White, who joined Harlan's dissent in Lochner, dissented without opinion in
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tionalists could accept that Lochner, the case, was "strikingly erroneous"
and "illogical," 87 while insisting that Lochner, the approach to constitu-
tional law, was "vital[ ]" and "based on sound legal principles."88
Distinguishing the three approaches to Lochner era substantive due
process thus affirms that, despite the close vote in Lochner, Lochner era
constitutionalism was widely popular among jurists in late nineteenth
and early twentieth century America. 9 It also confirms that laissez-faire
constitutionalists were not a monolithic bloc, but differed significantly
over matters of fundamental principles and their application.9" In addi-
tion, a study of the interplay between the three approaches to Lochner
era substantive due process establishes that Holden and Adair, more than
Lochner, set and express91 the tenor of Lochner era constitutionalism,92
and that the principles dominating Lochner era constitutionalism were
Bunting. Id. at 439. Justices Van Devanter and McReynolds joined his opinionless dissent.
Id. Van Devanter's and McReynolds's dissents are more understandable than White's, as they
later achieved fame as two of the "Four Horsemen of Reaction," the ultra-conservative justices
who led the Court into aggressive conservatism in the 1920s and early 1930s. See FRED Ro-
DELL, NINE MEN 217-21 (1955).
87. MoTr, supra note 61, §§ 127, 220, at 343, 560 (the latter remark is based on Mott's
reading of the case to say that the "health of workers is not public health").
88. Id. Mott made the latter remark with specific reference to Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1, 26 (1914), which extended to the states the ruling in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161, 180 (1908), striking down federal legislation. Inferentially, Mott was praising Adair and
distinguishing it from Lochner, as this Article does.
89. The vote in Lochner was five to four. Clearly, if the vote had been on the general
viability of Lochner era constitutionalism, the vote would have been eight to one, with Justice
Holmes dissenting. In addition, though many states pursued some variety of laissez-faire con-
stitutionalism, I am aware of no state or state court judge demonstrating liberal constitutional-
ist sensibilities much before the 1920s.
90. See supra note 47 and text accompanying notes 29-34, 39-47, 64-76. Lochner con-
cerned a further dispute among laissez-faire constitutionalists: whether legislation had to pro-
mote legitimate state interests substantially or minimally. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61, 64 (opinion
of the Court); id. at 65-74 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
These remarks are not intended to deny that strict and moderate laissez-faire constitution-
alists shared the goal of preventing the emergent regulatory state from becoming a redistribu-
tionist state. See Horwitz, Republicanism, supra note 1, at 57-60; Sunstein, supra note 7, at
874. The point is that they differed significantly on the substantive principles that this commit-
ment implied.
91. Admittedly, Coppage, which extended Adair to the states, may be an even better vehi-
cle for showing the bases of moderate laissez-faire constitutionalism because it more fully artic-
ulates the reasons for voiding the legislation. See Coppage, 236 U.S. at 9-21.
92. Perhaps the historians' focus on Lochner is something of winner's history. Because
Lochner was a controversial (and revealing) application of widely accepted principles, it was a
good target for liberal constitutionalist attacks. Compare, for example, Frankfurter's use of
Holden as a paradigm in his argument in Bunting, see supra note 85, with the usual liberal
constitutionalist dismissal of Holden as representing the laughable judgment that miners, but
not bakers, are incompetent to protect themselves (like infants and women) and therefore re-
quire special judicial protection, see supra note 67. This comparison shows that liberal consti-
tutionalists knew the true import of Lochner when it served their purposes.
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more liberal and humane than previously thought.9a Finally, studying
the judicial philosophies underlying the three competing approaches
reveals the importance of jurisprudence as a means of understanding the
Lochner era, its substantive law, and its widespread appeal among Loch-
ner era jurists.
Though substantively diverse, laissez-faire constitutionalists were ju-
risprudentially unified. With few exceptions,94 both strict and moderate
laissez-faire constitutionalists were conceptualists who claimed to draw
their abstract concepts from a blend of natural and common law.95 More
than any agreement on matters of doctrine, jurisprudence bound laissez-
faire constitutionalists into a group and distinctly separated them from
liberal constitutionalists, who argued that legal doctrine should be fash-
ioned by pragmatic interest-balancing.96
Because liberal constitutionalists were aware of the importance of
jurisprudence in justifying, unifying, and even defining laissez-faire con-
stitutionalism,97 methodological critiques of the Lochner era always were
a prominent part of their assaults on the Lochner era Court. 98 Yet in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was something unde-
93. The underlying liberality of Lochner era laissez-faire constitutionalism partially ex-
plains its general popularity. It also shows that its fundamental principles are more curious
than generally appreciated.
Holden'asserts, on the one hand, that the state may redress bargaining power and prevent
employers from extracting contracts that harm their employees' health, safety, or morals,
while Adair, on the other hand, asserts that the state may not redress bargaining power and
prevent employers from extracting contracts that harm any other of their employees' interests
(such as union organizing). Cf. Mo'r, supra note 61, § 220, at 560 (asserting that guarding
the health of workers is a legitimate end of police-power regulation but that promoting "indus-
trial efficiency" is not). To modem minds, which seem able to grasp the logic of liberal consti-
tutionalism and the logic (though frequently not the justice) of strict laissez-faire
constitutionalism, this is a baffling position. This Article indirectly explains the appeal of this
position to early Lochner era jurists: its attraction derived from the jurists' belief that the
historical process justified it. See infra text accompanying notes 392-440.
94. See George W. Wickersham, The Police Power, A Product of the Rule of Reason, 27
HARV. L. REV. 297, 315 (1914) (explaining that the exercise of police power should be subject
to a test of reasonableness and should not exceed constitutional boundaries).
95. Of course, as a reflection of their substantive disagreements, strict and moderate lais-
sez-faire constitutionalists read the common law differently. See supra note 47; supra text
accompanying notes 29-34, 39-47, 64-76.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38; infra text accompanying notes 504-08.
97. See, eg., Kennedy, supra note 33, at 9-14 (discussing Peckham's and Harlan's juris-
prudence). Jurisprudence helped express these substantively diverse justices' kinship as it
helped ground the legitimacy of their common substantive opposition to the redistributionist
state. See supra note 90.
98. See, eg., Hand, supra note 35, at 498-500, 508; Horwitz, Republicanism, supra note 1,
at 61-63 (tracing this phenomenon to liberal constitutionalists' wish to present their principles
as a restoration of pre-Lochner era constitutionalism); Pound, supra note 9, at 615-16; Pound,
supra note 10, at 462-64, 469-70.
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niably attractive about the jurisprudence that liberal constitutionalists
decried-something attractive about conceptualism and the use of com-
mon law suffused with natural law as the source of constitutional con-
cepts. The remainder of this Article attempts to account for the
popularity of Lochner era jurisprudence, 99 shows its ability to legitimate
substantive due process doctrine, and discusses the Lochner era's place in
the American constitutional tradition.1"°
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTUALISM AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
A. Constitutional Conceptualism
Scholars have long said that conceptualism was a fundamental, dis-
tinguishing aspect of Lochner era constitutional law.10' That conceptual-
ism, which this Article calls "constitutional conceptualism" to
distinguish it from the related conceptualism that dominated private law
in the same period,"0 2 rested upon three tenets. The first was that courts
could and should use fairly abstract concepts, definitions, and principles
to resolve legal disputes.'0 3 This tenet correlated with Lochner era pri-
99. "Lochner era jurisprudence" is defined as the jurisprudence of the proponents of lais-
sez-faire constitutionalism-the jurisprudence of the jurists whose substantive and method-
ological commitments dominated courts in the Lochner era. The term is something of a
misnomer because it does not encompass the jurisprudence of the liberal constitutionalists of
that era, discussed supra text accompanying notes 35-38 and infra text accompanying notes
504-08. The term "Lochner era jurisprudence" is used because the term "laissez-faire constitu-
tionalism" or "laissez-faire jurisprudence" has an inappropriate antiregulatory emphasis. See
infra note 110 (discussing term "Lochner era jurist").
100. Implicitly, the remainder of the Article will shed light on the question of how Lochner
era jurists could think it sensible to propound a substantive law that allowed the state to pre-
vent citizens from harming their own health, safety, or morals, but not their other interests.
See also supra note 93 (discussing the popularity of laissez-faire principles).
101. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 33, at 9-14; Pound, supra note 9, at 615-16.
102. On private law conceptualism during the Lochner era, see GRANT GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT 3-53 (paperback ed. 1974); Kennedy, supra note 33, at 9-14; Pound,
supra note 9, at 615-16; Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytic Jurisprudence
from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975, 1015-17.
103. See Singer, supra note 102, at 1015-17; infra text accompanying notes 11 1-18.
One way to understand conceptualism is to compare it with a modem nonconceptualist
jurisprudence, such as "balancing of interests." Compare, for example, Lochner era reasoning
with contemporary approaches to determining when government may regulate private prop-
erty. Modem constitutional analysis assumes that government has nearly plenary power to
regulate private property, except when the regulation goes "too far." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Going "too far" is determined by balancing a wide variety
of interests, including the importance and extent of the intrusion and the importance and
extent of the public interest served. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedic-
tis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-502 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
123-28 (1978). Lochner era courts, in contrast, claimed to ask only if the regulation served a
legitimate governmental goal. Governmental goals were abstract categories; the issue became
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vate-law jurisprudence, which taught that all law rests upon a few basic
concepts"° that supposedly are self-applicable or capable, more or less,
of deductive application.105 All mature legal systems, Lochner era jurists
claimed, assume a geometric shape in which the myriad rules of law are
the elaboration of a few initial concepts.106 Public law is not distinct
from private law in this regard.
The second tenet upon which constitutional conceptualism rested
was that the concepts used to resolve constitutional disputes must be
contained in the Constitution, or must so clearly effectuate goals con-
tained in the Constitution that for all intents and purposes they may be
conceived of as being contained in the Constitution.107 This tenet re-
flected Lochner era political theory, which maintained that the source of
American public law is the will of the sovereign people as expressed in
their written Constitution. Constitutional law's operative concepts,
therefore, must be given to, not chosen by, the courts. Judges were to
discover and disclose these basic concepts as a means of effectuating the
intent of the nation's founding generation in drafting and ratifying the
national covenant. Constitutional law's basic norms were not the prod-
uct of judicial will and policymaking.
The third tenet underlying constitutional conceptualism was that
the purpose of constitutional law is to separate spheres in which govern-
ment (or more specifically the branch that has acted) has untrammeled,
unreviewable discretionary power from spheres in which it has no
power.108 Judicial review entitled courts to allocate power among the
branches of government, not to scrutinize its substantive exercise. This
whether acts by their nature fit into them. See, eg., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-63
(1905) (discussing whether regulation of bakers' hours is a "health" regulation). Christopher
Tiedeman, a leading nineteenth-century constitutional theorist, asserted that regulation was
unconstitutional whenever it prevented a nontrespassory harm. TIEDEMAN, supra note 22, at
148-51. In his view, a single concept, remorselessly applied, properly adjudicated all cases.
See id.
104. "Concepts" hereinafter includes both principles and definitions.
105. See articles cited supra notes 101-02. As Dean Langdell commented,
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines.... [T]he
number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is commonly supposed; the
many different guises in which the same doctrine is constantly making its appear-
ance, and the great extent to which legal treatises are a repetition of each other, [are]
the cause of much misapprehension.
C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS viii-ix (2d ed., Bos-
ton, Little, Brown 1879) (1st ed. 1871).
106. For a review of the history of the "geometric paradigm" in law, see M.H. Hoellich,
Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95 (1986).
107. See Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth Century Constitutional Thought,
1990 Wis. L. REv. 1431, 1505-14.
108. See Thomas M. Cooley, Limits to State Control of Private Business, 1878 PRINCETON
[Vol. 70
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tenet derived from both jurisprudence and political theory. Jurispru-
dence taught that law should be determinate; political theory taught that
American courts were coordinate branches of government entitled to act
according to their understanding of the Constitution. In constitutional
cases, therefore, judges should not have discretion. Judges should deter-
mine the existence of power, which was perceived as a question of kind,
and not the reasonableness of its exercise, which was a question of de-
gree. Ideally, this was to be done through an analysis characterized by
bright-line tests.
There is little doubt that Lochner era constitutionalism was concep-
tualistic. 109 Lochner era jurists 10 perceived every organ of government
together with government as a whole as possessing distinct powers, each
defined by a determinate concept and dependent subconcepts. In ap-
proaching Commerce Clause disputes, for example, Lochner era judges
REV. 233, 243-44; Siegel, supra note 9, at 192-93, 198, 200, 204-05; infra text accompanying
notes 473-94 (discussing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)).
109. In establishing the conceptualistic foundations of Lochner era jurisprudence, scholars
have overstated the presence of conceptualism, particularly after 1910. For example, after
1910 the less formal "substantial effect" test replaced the conceptualistic "direct/indirect ef-
fect" test. See, eg., The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (holding that the
federal government may regulate aspects of intrastate commerce that have a "close and sub-
stantial relation" to interstate commerce); TRIBE, supra note 48, at 308-09 (discussing The
Shreveport Rate Case); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA.
L. REV. 1387, 1415-21 (1987). In addition, throughout the Lochner era, the Court admitted
that it had no overarching definition of due process and proceeded case by case. See, eg.,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). Decay of conceptualism was itself part of the
transitional nature of the Lochner era.
Nevertheless, judges and jurists maintained a strong commitment to conceptualism
throughout the Lochner era. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
387 (1926) (explaining growth in law as changing application of constant principles); Pierce
Butler, "Valuation of Railway Property for Purposes of Rate Regulation," 23 J. POL. ECON. 17
(1915) (future Supreme Court justice explaining that in railroad ratemaking the "value" of the
railroad is "a fact" and not a matter of choice or policy). Discussing conceptualism as the link
to the past is appropriate, on the one hand, because its decay was against the will of Lochner
era jurists, given their commitment to it. Discussing the Lochner era jurists' rejection of a
natural-law foundation, on the other hand, emphasizes the Lochner era's link to the future
because the change from a static to an evolutionary natural-law was a change Lochner era
jurists embraced.
110. The term "Lochner era jurists" refers to the proponents of laissez-faire constitutional-
ism. It embraces both the strict and the moderate laissez-faire constitutionalists; it excludes
liberal constitutionalists. Until this point I have generally avoided using the term "Lochner era
jurists" and its cognates. Part II showed that late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
lawyers, judges, and commentators were divided into three camps, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 29-47, only two of which were proponents of laissez-faire constitutionalism. The
proponents were the dominant group and they are the focus of this Article; therefore, brevity
counsels referring to them as "Lochner era jurists." I will refer to opponents of laissez-faire
constitutionalism as such. When comments apply not to the entire group of proponents of
laissez-faire constitutionalism but only to the strict or moderate camp, the text will so state.
See also supra note 99 (discussing the term "Lochner era jurisprudence").
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allocated power between the states and the national government by dis-
tinguishing the concepts of "commerce" and "manufacturing" and the
concepts of "direct" and "indirect" effects."' In Due Process Clause
disputes, the judges delimited governmental power over private property
by fleshing out the concepts of "property" and "liberty of contract." '112
Unfortunately, scholars who have described Lochner era conceptu-
alism have not noted that in fashioning constitutional law according to
these tenets, Lochner era jurists were carrying forward the jurisprudence
of their predecessors." 3 From the early nineteenth century, constitu-
tional conceptualism had been a hallmark of constitutional analysis.114
In the nineteenth century, constitutional conceptualism shaped many of
the core doctrines of the Constitution's two most litigated provisions, the
Commerce Clause and the Contract Clause. Well before the Lochner era
the Supreme Court developed, for purposes of applying the Commerce
Clause, the concept of an "original package" to determine when goods
were in interstate commerce and, therefore, immune from state taxa-
tion.115 Similarly, the Court devised the concept of "subjects [that] ... in
111. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1895); Smith v. Ala-
bama, 124 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1888).
112. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14-19 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161, 172-75 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-57 (1905). During the Loch-
ner era, jurists defined other governmental powers over property conceptualistically. A con-
ceptualistic "use by the public test" defined eminent domain. JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 415-20 (2d ed. 1900). The concept of "business affected with
a public interest" limited rate regulation. Siegel, supra note 9, at 194-207. The power of rate
regulation was itself limited by a constitutional concept of value as equivalent to the replace-
ment cost of the property. Id. at 224-32.
113. But see CRAIG R. DUCAT, MODES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 42-51
(1978) (explaining that for Chief Justice Marshall, law existed prior to the adjudication of a
matter); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 948-52 (1987) (stating that nineteenth-century constitutional cases were decided categori-
cally rather than through a balancing approach).
114. Professor Sherry contends that when discussing early American constitutional juris-
prudence it is important to distinguish between structure-of-government cases and civil liber-
ties cases. According to Sherry, shortly after the nation's founding, structure-of-government
cases were adjudicated positivistically according to the meaning of the constitutional text,
while civil liberties cases continued to be adjudicated on a natural-law foundation. See Su-
zanne Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1167-68 (1987).
In this Article I argue that nineteenth-century judges used constitutional conceptualism when
discussing governmental structure and civil liberties issues. See, e.g., infra notes 181-229 and
accompanying text (governmental structure); infra notes 230-71 and accompanying text (civil
liberties).
115. Goods in transit or held for resale by an importer in their "original package" were
immune from state taxation. This doctrine stems from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 442 (1827), as described by Chief Justice Taney
in The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 574-75 (1847). The conceptualism of the doctrine
is illustrated in several student notes, which discuss such topics as how and when a ship, built
in one state and delivered to another, leaves its original package; and whether the original
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their nature ... imperatively demand[] a single uniform rule" '1 16 to de-
cide when state commercial legislation'17 intrudes upon the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the national Congress."'
Pre-Lochner era Contract Clause analysis turned upon a particular
concept of contract that embraced executed land grants made by a state
but not by an individual.' 11 A highly conceptualistic notion of "inaliena-
ble powers," which included eminent domain and police power but not
taxation, narrowed application of the Contract Clause. 120 It was also
limited by a distinction between contract "rights" and contract "reme-
dies" that Chief Justice Marshall said "exists in the nature of things" but
which eludes modem understanding.
12
package of separately wrapped bottles of liquor that are shipped in an open box is the bottles
or the box. See E.S. Cohen, Note, Constitutional Law-Interstate Commerce--Original Pack-
age Doctrine, 21 VA. L. REv. 433, 436-42 (1935); Note, The Doctrine of Original Packages, 18
HARV. L. RIv. 530, 531 (1905); Note, Recent Case--Constitutional Law-Interstate Com-
merce-Original Package, 14 HARv. L. REv. 542, 542 (1901); Note, Recent Cases--Interstate
Commerce-Burdens Imposed by States--Application of "Original Package" Doctrine to Inter-
state Aspect of New York Milk ControlLaw, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438 (1935). The follow-
ing question further illustrates the conceptualistic nature of the doctrine: What is the original
package if the box containing the separately wrapped bottles is closed to protect its contents
during shipping?
116. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
117. The notion of state commercial, as opposed to police, legislation is another example of
nineteenth-century constitutional conceptualism that had a problematic application in a vari-
ety of cases. See, eg., The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 577-78 (1847) (holding that
state liquor regulatory scheme was commercial legislation); id. at 588 (McLean, J.) (arguing
that it was police legislation); id. at 608 (Catron, J.) (commerce); id. at 617 (Daniel, J.) (com-
merce); id. at 632 (Grier, J.) (police); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 136-
37 (1837) (holding that state tax to defray cost of examining and hospitalizing passengers for
disease was a police regulation); id. at 155-57 (Story, J., dissenting) (arguing that it was a
commercial regulation). In general, Professor (later Justice) Frankfurter wrote that the Com-
merce Clause cases after Marshall's death, but well before the Lochner era, comprised "obscur-
ing formulas." FELIx FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY
AND WAITE 31 (1937).
118. This was the area of the "dormant Commerce Clause." Professor Epstein traces the
conceptualistic commerce/manufacturing dichotomy back to Chief Justice Marshall. Epstein,
supra note 109, at 1410, 1433.
119. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), discussed infra text accompanying
notes 230-71. The pre-Lochner era concept of a contract embraced state corporate charters
but not the tenure or salaries of public officials. See Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.)
402, 416, 418 (1851); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,
630 (1819); id. at 657-59 (Washington, J., concurring).
120. See Siegel, supra note 24, at 31, 41-54.
121. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 200 (1819); TRIBE, supra note
48, at 615 (quoting Justice Cardozo in W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavenaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60
(1935)); Siegel, supra note 24, at 9, 22-25. Modem jurists believe that the distinction was
fashioned to effectuate judicial policy preferences. The Court's decision in Bronson v. Kinzie,
42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843), to void legislation that unduly burdened contract rights seems to
be an example of balancing rather than conceptualistic thinking. Id at 317-18. See, e.g.,
TRIBE, supra note 48, at 615 (stating that Bronson test was based on "reasonableness"). In
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In general, the tenets of constitutional conceptualism shaped almost
every important area of constitutional law-not only the clauses men-
tioned above, but also the law of such diverse areas as intergovernmental
tax immunities, 122  corporate diversity jurisdiction, 123 and fugitive
slaves.124 In addition, constitutional conceptualism provided fundamen-
tal assumptions in legal argument well before the Lochner era. Take, for
example, the assumption that the Court allocates power among the vari-
ous branches of government through the elaboration of bright-line tests
turning upon questions of kind and not degree. 2 This assumption con-
verts Chief Justice Marshall's observation in McCulloch v. Maryland 
12
1
that the "power to tax involves the power to destroy"' 27 from a quotable
but irrelevant comment to a potent argument for voiding Maryland's
moderate tax on the bank notes of the federally chartered Bank of the
United States. 2 ' Clearly, Marshall took for granted that if Maryland
had any power to tax those bank notes, the degree of its exercise was not
reviewable and not controllable.'
29
fleshing out this doctrine, however, the Court generally seemed to ask not whether the legisla-
tion at bar did unduly burden contract rights but whether the type of legislation could do so.
122. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 126-27 (1870) (holding state employees im-
mune from federal taxation), overruled by Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466,
486 (1939); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 432, 436 (1819) (holding federal
instrumentalities immune from state taxation).
123. Ohio & M. R.R. v. Wheeler, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 286, 296 (1861) (holding that corpora-
tions "inhabit" and, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, are citizens of their state of incorpo-
ration); Louisville, C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844) (same). The
conceptualism of this approach is evident when one contrasts it with the many considerations
involved in the principal-place-of-doing-business approach discussed in Kelly v. United States
Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 852-54 (3d Cir. 1960). Consider also the conceptualism of the
shareholder-residence approach of Justice Marshall in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86-87, 90-92 (1809).
124. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 612-13 (1842). Prigg held that any state
law that "delays" return of a fugitive slave pending adjudication of his status is a "discharge"
of the slave from his master's ownership and violates the Fugitive Slave Clause because "[t]he
question can never be, how much the slave is discharged from; but whether he is discharged
from any [obligation] .... The question is not one of quantity or degree, but of withholding, or
controlling the incidents of a positive and absolute right." Id.
125. See supra text accompanying note 108.
126. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
127. Id. at 431.
128. Maryland's tax varied between one percent and two percent depending on the face
value of the bank note. Id. at 321.
129. Id. at 430 (describing attempts to adjudicate questions of degree as "perplexing" and
"unfit for the judicial department"). Marshall adopted this argument from Daniel Webster,
counsel for the Bank, who explained it more thoroughly:
A question of constitutional power can hardly be made to depend on a question of
more or less. If the States may tax, they have no limit but their discretion; and the
bank, therefore, must depend on the discretion of the State governments for its exist-
ence. This consequence is inevitable.
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Likewise, the tenets of constitutional conceptualism make sense of
Chief Justice Waite's ruling in Munn v. Illinois'3 that since the Illinois
legislature could regulate the rates charged by Munn and Scott's grain
elevator, the legislature could set whatever rates it chose, even rates that
were unreasonable and confiscatory."' Indeed, one may say -that the ten-
ets of constitutional conceptualism shaped the argument and decision of
every major pre-Lochner era constitutional case from Marbury v.
Madison 32 at the beginning of the century, to Dred Scott v. Sandford 33
in mid-century, to Pennoyer v. Neff 134 on the eve of the Lochner era.
Id. at 327 (argument of counsel).
It is revealing of the distance separating modern constitutional jurisprudence from Mar-
shall's conceptualism that this famous part of Marshall's opinion has been the object of severe
criticism from twentieth-century jurists precisely because they assume courts not only may
allocate power but also may review the reasonableness of its exercise. Justice Frankfurter,
concurring in a case that departed from McCulloch's approach to intergovernmental tax im-
munities, described Marshall's statement as "a flourish of rhetoric," a "free use of absolutes,"
and a "seductive clich6." Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 489 (1939)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Holmes responded to Marshall's claim by saying, "[N]ot
... while this Court sits." Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes explained that in Marshall's time
it was not recognized as it is today that most of the distinctions of the law are distinc-
tions of degree. If the States had any power it was assumed that they had all power,
and that the necessary alternative was to deny it altogether. But this Court... can
defeat an attempt to ... go too far without wholly abolishing the power to tax.
Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes then gave rate regulation as an example of the Court
supervising the exercise of state power rather than denying it entirely. Id. (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). Modem constitutional law, in short, adjudicates the exercise of power as well as its
allocation, and it does this by considering questions of degree as well as questions of kind.
130. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
131. Id. at 134. For another example of this stance, see Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 419, 431-33 (1827) (argument of Roger Taney as counsel).
132. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), discussed infra text accompanying notes 181-229.
133. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Under Dred Scott, the definition of American people at
the time of the Revolution and the founding of the Constitution excluded blacks. Thus, freed
slaves and their free descendants-even those who were citizens of the state in which they
resided-were not "citizens" entitled to federal diversity jurisdiction, and Congress could not
"naturalize" them and make them "citizens" of the United States. Id. at 403-07, 410-12, 416-
27. The Court also held that under the Constitution a property interest-whether in a slave or
anything else-represented a unitary concept. This meant Congress could not prohibit slave-'
holders from bringing their slaves into the territories of the United States. Id. at 451-52; id. at
527-29 (Catron, J., concurring).
134. 95 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1877) (holding that sovereignty means a state has jurisdiction
over everything within, and over nothing without, its borders), overruled in part by Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 n.39 (1977). It is instructive, for understanding conceptualism, to
contrast the approach of Pennoyer with the functional "minimum contacts" approach of Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1945) and Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 205-09.
Pennoyer's approach deductively applies rigid concepts, while International Shoe's approach
involves practical, functional, case-by-case judgments.
For another landmark decision handed down on the eve of the Lochner era that exempli-
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One reason for the early appearance of constitutional conceptualism
as a fundamental aspect of constitutional law is that it mediated the ten-
sion produced by the developing awareness that constitutional interpreta-
tion could not adhere to the historic Anglo-American norm of
nondiscretionary adjudication. 35 Constitutional conceptualism arose as
a device to allow, yet control, judicial discretion. As the late Professor
Cover discussed in his book Justice Accused,136 nineteenth-century judges
and jurists appreciated that judicial power to declare legislation unconsti-
tutional necessarily involved judicial lawmaking. 37 Dissonance between
constitutional text and statutes was rarely self-evident. As Chief Justice
Marshall pointed out in McCulloch v. Maryland,3 ' a constitution "in-
tended to endure for ages to come" 139 could not be drafted with the de-
tail of a legal code. "Its nature," Marshall said, "requires... that only
its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated." 14
Of necessity, jurists were left to "deduce[ ] from the nature of the objects
themselves" '141 what was within and without them. Fleshing out the
structure of government contained in the federal constitution and the
various state constitutions was a creative act. Judicial creativity, and
therefore judicial discretion and lawmaking, were inescapable corollaries
of judicial review. Conceptualism, in short, functioned as a device to
confine judicial creativity. Although originating in the discretionary act
of deciding upon the fundamental concepts, it was thought that establish-
ing more or less self-applicable concepts would constrain judicial discre-
tion in later cases.
In addition to controlling judicial lawmaking, conceptualism rose to
dominate constitutional analysis for another reason that the scholarly
literature has developed insufficiently: a conceptualist approach was sup-
posed to restrain legislative omnipotence. When the American tradition
of judicial review first emerged in the 1780s,142 it was dominated by a
fies constitutional conceptualism, see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 473-94.
135. See Stephen A. Siegel, TheAristotelian Basis of English Law, 1450-1800, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 18, 51-58 (1981) (tracing the roots of the norm of nondiscretionary adjudication to at
least the late fifteenth century and finding it fully established by the mid-sixteenth century).
136. ROaiRT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975).
137. Id. at 140-43.
138. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
139. Id. at 415.
140. Id. at 407.
141. Id.
142. See, eg., The "Ten-Pound Act" cases, described in 2 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLI-
TICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 969-71 (1953); Sym-
sbury Case, 1 Kirby 444, 447 (Conn. 1785); Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor's Ct.
1784), reprinted in 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON:
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jurisprudence of extratextual limitations on legislative power, the sources
of which were natural law, custom, and usage. 143 By the 1790s, judicial
review based on natural law retreated before an emerging strict construc-
tionist version of textual positivism. 1" The famous Chase-Iredell collo-
quy in 1798 in Calder v. Bull145 is the classic expression of this
struggle. 146
Scholarly opinion of the outcome of the struggle between these two
approaches to judicial review is varied. In the early twentieth century,
Edward Corwin wrote that textual positivism had prevailed in theory
and that natural law had prevailed in fact. In Corwin's view, although
nineteenth-century American judges claimed to use judicial review to en-
force only those norms that the framers enshrined in the Constitution,
they frequently read the norms of natural law and the Anglo-American
tradition into various parts of the Constitution's text.147 More recently,
Paul Kahn has said that a "cyclical" alternation has occurred between
judicial review premised upon natural law and judicial review based upon
textual positivism. 4 ' G. Edward White has intimated that-antebellum
judges selected between the two approaches to constitutional jurispru-
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 393, 414-17 (1964); Bayard v. Singleton, I N.C. 15, 17-18,
1 Mart. 5, 7 (1787); Ham v. M'Claws, 1 S.C.L. 38, 40, 1 Bay 93, 98 (1789) (ultimately inter-
preting statute to avoid issue of constitutionality); Commonwealth v. Caton, 9 Va. 634, 635-37,
4 Call 5, 9-13 (1782).
Historians have traced the pre-Revolutionary origins of judicial review to understand its
rather quick emergence after the nation's break from England. See, eg., 1 JuLius GOEBEL,
JR., THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 1-142 (1971). There is no
doubt that John Marshall's landmark ruling in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803), crystallized, at the federal level, a facet of American constitutionalism that the states
had established in the 1780s. But see SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF
THE CONSTTUTION 3-5, 113, 172-73 (1990) (arguing that Marbury was innovative).
143. See, eg., EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT; THE RISE,
FLOWERING AND DECLINE OF A FAMOUS JUDICIAL CONCEPT 58-75 (1948); Sherry, supra
note 114, at 1155-77 (arguing that in the 1780s textual positivism, defined infra note 144, was
an emergent norm of constitutional interpretation limited to structure-of-government cases,
and that natural law, custom, and usage were the prevalent sources of constitutional argument
and decision in civil liberty cases).
144. "Textual positivism" refers to a style of constitutional analysis that limits itself to
norms explicitly manifested by the constitutional text and intended by the text's draftsmen to
limit government. It is an analogue of modern "originalism," but it does not, for example, use
the records of the Constitutional Convention to plumb the meaning of constitutional text.
145. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
146. See id. at 388-89 (Chase, J.); id. at 398-400 (Iredell, J., concurring in judgment); see
also CORWIN, supra note 143, at 59-64 (discussing the importance of this colloquy).
147. CORWIN, supra note 143, at 63-68.
148. Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1, 1
(1989) (stating that periods of constitutionalism based on natural law have alternated with
periods of jurisprudence based on framer intent).
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dence according to the demands of the issue at hand. 149
These scholars are correct in their view that the outcome of the
struggle in the early Republic between judicial review premised upon
natural law and judicial review based on textual positivism was the tri-
umph of neither approach. Yet the struggle resulted in the persistence of
simultaneous commitments to both approaches and the development of a
third style of constitutional interpretation-"constitutional conceptual-
ism"-to resolve the tension between America's contradictory commit-
ments to higher law and textual positivism.
There is, of course, no necessary conflict between natural law and
textual positivism. Societies may draft constitutional texts to reflect fully
the values that they believe are the eternal verities of social order. But
early American constitutions were not so well or fully crafted. Many
early American constitutions contained little text protecting civil liberties
or property rights.150 The federal Bill of Rights applied only to the
rather inactive national legislature. 1 ' The more active state legislatures
were prohibited only from adopting a few types of laws, such as "any Bill
of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts." 152 Many state constitutions provided little more express protec-
tion of personal or property rights.
A survey of state constitutions shows that in 1800153 five of the six-
149. 3 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL
CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 745-46, 838 (1988). Professor Sherry has described Chief Justice
Marshall's approach as "ultimately rei[ying] on some unfathomable combination of unwritten
law and the written Constitution." Sherry, supra note 114, at 1171. I hope this Article ex-
plains the "unfathomable" combination Professor Sherry acutely observes in Marshall's ap-
proach. See supra text accompanying notes 101-21.
150. Civil liberties and property rights are separated here only for purposes of exposition.
Until the twentieth century, civil liberty included, indeed emphasized, property rights. From a
nineteenth-century perspective, the term "civil liberty" should encompass property rights.
151. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833) (holding the
Bill of Rights inapplicable to the states and asserting that this holding reflects long-felt public
sentiment).
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
153. In 1800 the Union consisted of Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia. The remarks in these
paragraphs apply to these 16 states for the period from 1800 through 1818. Connecticut in
1818 and New York in 1821 adopted new constitutions that substantially increased their pro-
tection of civil liberties. See CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, §§ 1-17, 19, 21 (guaranteeing equal
rights among men, the right of the people to alter the government as necessary, freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to a jury trial, freedom from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, rights of the criminally accused, the writ of habeas corpus, the
right to assembly, the right to bear arms, and the prohibition of uncompensated takings and
excessive bails and fines); N.Y. CoNsT. of 1821, art. VII, §§ 1-3, 6-8 (guaranteeing due process
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teen states had virtually no civil liberties 154 protection drafted into their
constitutions.1 55 Legislative omnipotence was subject to only minor tex-
tual checks in these states. In the eleven states15 6 whose constitutions
contained extensive bills of rights, five provided, little or no protection of
property rights, 157 despite the importance of private property in that
era's scheme of civil liberty."5 8 In all, ten of the sixteen states had no
clause barring uncompensated takings of property; 5 9 six states did not
even have a clause guaranteeing the absolutely basic norm of due process
protection of property rights."6 Only five states had significant textual
of law, the right to a jury trial, freedom of religion, the writ of habeas corpus, the right to a
grand jury in trials for capital or infamous crimes, rights of the criminally accused, freedom of
speech, and freedom of the press).
154. Civil liberties encompass both personal and property rights. Indeed, in nineteenth-
century America, property was considered among the most important civil liberties. See, e.g.,
Siegel, supra note 9, at 187; Siegel, supra note 24, at 57-66; Mark Tushnet, The Politics of
Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Claus Dr. Du Bois, and Charles H-amil-
ton Houston, 74 J. AM. HisT. 884, 884-90 (1987) (discussing nineteenth-century differentiation
between civil, political, and social rights). It was not until the twentieth century that legal
scholars began to contrast civil liberties with economic liberties.
155. The five states were Georgia, Rhode Island, and the major states of New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut. Connecticut had only a due process provision. CONN. CONST. of
1776, para. 2. Rhode Island was governed by its colonial charter and guaranteed only the
right to jury trial and religious freedom. R.I. CHARTER of 1663. New Jersey guaranteed a
jury trial, access to counsel in criminal trials, freedom of worship, and no escheat to the crown
for estates of persons who committed suicide. N.J. CONST. of 1776, arts. XVI-XIX, XXII.
New York guaranteed jury trial, freedom of worship, voting, and access to counsel in criminal
trials, and it proscribed bills of attainder. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. VII, XXXIV, XXXVIII-
XXXIX, XLI. New York also had a vague due process provision. Id. art. XIII. In compari-
son, Georgia protected a moderate number of rights, including jury trial, freedom of worship,
freedom of the press, the right to seek habeas corpus relief, the right to vote, and proscription
of contract impairment and imprisonment of debtors. GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, §§ 1, 5, 7,
9, 10. Georgia did not, however, protect property from uncompensated takings or guarantee
persons or property due process.
156. These states were Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia.
157. Maryland, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and South Carolina had no provision
against uncompensated takings of property.- Virginia had no provision against uncompensated
takings and no due process protection of property. Maryland, North Carolina, and South
Carolina had no provision whatsoever on takings. New Hampshire and Virginia each had a
provision that limited eminent domain to public use takings but did not mention compensa-
tion. N.H. CONST. of 1784, Bill of Rts., art. XIII; VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rts., § 6.
Virginia also had a due process clause that mentioned liberty but not property. Id. § 8.
158. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
159. The ten states were Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia. New Hampshire and
Virginia had clauses limiting takings to public uses, but with no express requirement of just
compensation. See supra note 157.
160. Georgia, New Jersey, and Rhode Islarid had no due process clause. Vermont and
Virginia each had a due process clause that spoke only of liberty, not property. See VT.
CONST. of 1793, ch. 1, art. X; VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rts., § 8. New York had a due
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protection of both persons and property. 161
Moreover, the state constitutions with elaborate bills of rights had
no sufficient textual provisions to enforce those rights. The problem was
not that these constitutions failed to provide for the power of judicial
review. Judicial enforcement of the constitutional text may well have
been expected even without express textual authority.162 Rather, the
problem stemmed from the power of early American legislatures to act as
courts of last resort. The celebrated controversy of Calder v. Bull 63 il-
lustrates this point. In Calder the Supreme Court upheld the right of the
Connecticut Legislature to order a new trial when it was dissatisfied with
the outcome of litigation.1" The Supreme Court pointed out that the
English Parliament had the power to act judicially, that the Connecticut
legislature had always exercised the power, and that there was no text in
the state constitution separating legislative from judicial powers. 6
Hence, at the least, a state legislature that had exercised judicial powers
before the Revolution could continue to do so unless the state constitu-
tion denied -the practice. By implication, perhaps all state legislatures
had judicial power unless the power was denied expressly. In only half of
the state constitutions was there an express provision indicating that one
process provision that prohibited the deprivation "of any of the rights or privileges secured to
the subjects of this State by this constitution, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of
his peers." N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIII. The constitution did not, however, secure the
right of property.
161. The five states that constitutionally protected both persons and property were Dela-
ware, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. This list includes those consti-
tutions that had significant protection of personal liberties and a provision proscribing
uncompensated takings. See, eg., DEL. CoNsT. of 1792, art. I, §§ 1, 6-8, 11, 13 (guaranteeing
the right to trial by jury, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, rights of the crimi-
nally accused, and the writ of habeas corpus; and prohibiting double jeopardy, takings for
public use without just compensation, and cruel punishment); PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IV,
§§ 1, 6, 8-10 (guaranteeing the right to a jury trial, freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures, due process of law, and rights of the criminally accused; prohibiting double jeopardy
and takings for public use without just compensation; and recognizing that "all men.., have
certain... rights, among which are those of enjoying life and liberty, [and] of acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property").
162. See, eg., THE FEDERALiST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); RAOUL BERGER, CON-
GRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 335-37 (1969). In the early republic, controversy regarding
judicial review was over how, not whether, to conduct judicial review. See supra text accom-
panying notes 142-46 (discussing struggle between constitutionalism premised upon natural
law and textual positivism).
163. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (Chase, Paterson, Iredell, Cushing, JJ., seriatim).
164. Id. at 395, 398, 401.
165. Three of the four justices who rendered separate opinions relied on this analysis. Id.
at 395-96 (Paterson, J.); id. at 398 (Iredell, J.); id. at 401 (Cushing, J.). The fourth, Justice
Chase, did not express any opinion on the point because he believed it was a matter of state
constitutional law, which the federal courts had no power to review. Id. at 387, 392-93 (Chase,
J.).
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branch of government must never exercise the powers of another.166
In the other half of the states, therefore, the emergent tradition of
judicial review, which was the bedrock of all other American constitu-
tional norms, was of doubtful utility since neither constitutional text nor
common-law tradition barred the legislature from acting as the court of
last resort. 167 Only four states had constitutions containing both a signif-
icant catalogue of provisions protecting civil liberties and a provision that
spoke to judicial independence.
1 68
In other words, the texts of early American constitutions, both state
and federal, were inadequate to protect values that either initially were,
or by 1800 had become, central to American society. 69 The rising norm
166. GA. CONST. of 1798, art. I, § 1; Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. I, §§ 1-2; MD. CONST. of
1776, Dec. of Rts., art. VI; MASS. CONST. of 1780, Dec. of Rts., art. XXX; N.H. CONST. of
1784, Bill of Rts., art. XXXVII; N.C. CONST. of 1776, Dec. of Rts., art. IV; VT. CONST. of
1793, ch. 2, § 6; VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rts., § 5. An express provision is one that explic-
itly indicates that one branch of government may not exercise the powers of another. See e.g.,
MD. CONST. of 1776, Dec. of Rts., art. VI ("[tihat the legislative, executive and judicial powers
of government, ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other"). An introductory
provision to an article structuring a branch of government saying only that legislative (or
executive or judicial) power is vested in that branch is not considered an express provision. See
infra text accompanying note 285.
167. This was true in perhaps more than half of the states. The New Hampshire legislature
exercised judicial powers despite its constitution's explicit separation-of-powers provision. See
Merrill v. Sherburne, I N.H. 199, 271 (1818) (ruling the practice of legislative adjudication
unconstitutional). There is also evidence of interference with the judicial process by the Mas-
sachusetts legislature, another legislature laboring under an express separation-of-powers pro-
vision. See Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 398-405 (1814). Indiana, a state not included in
this study because it was admitted to the Union in 1816, had an express separation-of-powers
provision. See IND. CONST. of 1816, art II. Yet its legislature also interfered with judicial
processes. Thus, legislatures in states with explicit separation-of-powers provisions in their
constitutions nonetheless interfered with adjudicative processes. See RoscoE POUND, THE
FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 39-40 nn.8-10 (2d prtg. 1939).
In sum, the absence of a tradition of separation of powers substantially threatened the
entire enterprise of judicial protection of civil liberties through judicial review. The point of
this Article, however, is more limited: assuming constitutional text would have been
respected, the extent to which the text protected rights was quite minimal.
168. These states were Kentucky, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Virginia. "Civil liberties"
encompass both personal and property rights. A state is considered to have had extensive
protection of personal and property rights if it had an extensive bill of rights that included a
provision against uncompensated takings. Due process protection of property was not re-
quired; otherwise, Vermont and Virginia would be excluded from the list of protective states
because their due process clauses addressed only personal liberty. See VT. CONST. of 1793, ch.
1, art. X; VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 8.
169. Other scholars recently have addressed directly and indirectly the question why early
American constitutions were so bereft of textual protection of civil and property rights. One
commentator stated that early American constitutions expressed the norms of Republican
communitarianism rather than liberal individualism. William Treanor, Note, The Origins and
Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J.
694, 694 (1985); see also Horwitz, Republicanism, supra note 1, at 68 (discussing and ex-
panding on Treanor's analysis). Professor Sherry points to the then-prevalent assumption that
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of textual positivism may have had wide appeal because it reflected the
democratic view that American law was grounded in the will of the pop-
ular sovereign, which courts (as well as all organs of government) served.
Given the paucity of constitutional text protecting individual liberties
and property rights, however, textual positivism's appeal was tempered
by its threat to permit legislative omnipotence as thoroughgoing in the-
ory, and more so in practice, as that of the British Parliament. 170 The
result of this tension was the rise of constitutional conceptualism as the
conduit for infusing natural law into an otherwise inadequate constitu-
tional text.
171
B. Constitutional Conceptualism Illustrated in the Opinions of John
Marshall
No single individual created constitutional conceptualism. It was,
in Karl Llewellyn's phrase, a "period style."' 72 Focusing on John Mar-
shall's conceptualism, however, is important to an understanding of the
significance of constitutional conceptualism because of his preeminence
in establishing and exemplifying early American constitutional jurispru-
dence. That constitutional conceptualism was a significant strand in
Marshall's judicial philosophy strongly supports the view that constitu-
tional conceptualism was well established long before the Lochner era.
John Marshall's commitment to constitutional conceptualism al-
ready has been demonstrated partially. His opinions in Brown v. Mary-
land 173 and Sturges v. Crowninshield 174 authoritatively established the
"original package" doctrine in Commerce Clause cases and the right/
remedy distinction in Contract Clause jurisprudence. 171 Similarly, his
the judiciary would draw from extra-textual norms founded in custom or natural law to void
inappropriate legislation. See Sherry, supra note 114. The purpose of this Article is not to
explain the early constitutions' textual shortcomings. Rather, it is to note them in order to
show the development of the American constitutional tradition.
170. Blackstone's classic discussion of the English Parliament described it as legislatively
omnipotent yet totally respectful of property rights. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES *160-61.
171. This reason for constitutional conceptualism's rise complements the reason previously
discussed: the specification of useful meaning in an ambiguous text. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 135-41.
172. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALs 36
(1960).
173. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
174. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 115-21; see also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 213, 350-53 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (clarifying that while contractual obli-
gations are created by an act of the contracting parties, contractual remedies are created by the
government through its enforcement powers).
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opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland176 not only depended on constitu-
tional conceptualism for its claim that the "power to tax involves the
power to destroy,"' 7 7 but also contained a general explanation of the
need for a conceptualistic style of analysis in American constitutional
law.1
78
An extended analysis of two landmark opinions, Marbury v.
Madison 179 and Fletcher v. Peck, 8' best illustrates the role of constitu-
tional conceptualism in Marshall's thought. These opinions are Mar-
shall's earliest constitutional pronouncements-one adjudicates the
structure of government, the other demarcates civil liberties. Together,
the opinions initiated these two branches of American constitutional ju-
risprudence and placed constitutional conceptualism at the founding of
the American constitutional tradition.
1. Marbury v. Madison: Conceptualism in a
Structure-of-Government Case
Marshall's conceptualist approach in Marbury is seen in his analysis
of the case's two most important constitutional issues: the amenability of
high executive officials to legal process and the judiciary's power of judi-
cial review.' Marshall confronted the problem that the Constitution's
text addresses neither of these important structure-of-government issues.
His response illustrates his general approach to legal analysis. For both
controversies, Marshall had historical grounds and prudential arguments
for reaching his conclusions. With respect to subjecting high executive
officials to legal process, English tradition held that although the King is
immune from suit, he must act through officials who are suable.' A
wealth of discussion on judicial review surrounded the drafting and rati-
fying of the Constitution, and state and federal court opinions provided
176. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 126-29.
178. 'See supra text accompanying notes 138-41.
179. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
180. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
181. Whether high executive officials are amenable to legal process may well have been the
more controversial issue in Marshall's day, especially since the Court's ruling on the issue of
judicial review had a variety of antecedents. See Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 11, 16 n.28, 38-
45.
In Marbury Marshall discussed a variety of other issues, including whether Marbury's
appointment to office was complete, whether mandamus is the appropriate remedy for viola-
tion of Marbury's right, whether the Judiciary Act authorizes the Supreme Court to issue that
remedy, and whether the Act violates the Constitution for doing so. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 153-80. It is tedious and unnecessary to review all these issues to show Marshall's
conceptualism.
182. See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 170, at *254-55.
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precedents for the practice."8 3 Rather than draw and rely on these
materials, Marshall argued from the nature of things-the nature of civil
liberty 84 and the nature of written constitutions.1 85 Previous scholars
have noticed this fact and discussed it as an illustration of Marshall's
general practice of ignoring precedent. I8 6 It does evidence that, but it
also shows his preference for constitutional conceptualism as a form of
analysis.
a. The Amenability of High Executive Officials to Legal Process
Marshall's discussion of whether high-level officials of the executive
branch are subject to legal process begins with the claim that "[tihe very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury,"'8 7 and
the legal principle implied by this claim: "'[E]very right when withheld
must have a remedy, and every injury it's [sic] proper redress.' "188 To
Marshall, these propositions established that high executive officials, no
less than other persons, are amenable to legal process unless their cases
fit within recognized exceptions to the "remedy for every right"
principle.
In analyzing whether Marbury's case fit within exceptions to the
general rule, Marshall discussed two categories of exceptions. One is
"that class of cases which come[s] under the description of damnurn ab-
sque injuria-a loss without an injury."189 Marshall summarily rejected
this exception because it never applies to losses involving "offices of trust,
of honor or of profit."1 9 ' Losses may be irremediable due to the "worth-
lessness of the thing pursued," '191 but Marbury's position as justice of the
183. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465-72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
paperback ed. 1961); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 69-70 (1985); Sherry, supra note 114, at 1135-55.
184. See infra text accompanying note 187.
185. See infra text accompanying notes 210-11. Marshall argued from the text of the Con-
stitution, but as more of an afterthought to support his conclusions derived from general rea-
soning. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 178-80. In any event, his textual arguments are
conceptualistically handled. No requirement exists that conceptualists not argue from text,
history, or any other source. Indeed, this Article maintains that late nineteenth-century jurists
argued conceptualistically from history. See infra text accompanying notes 381-84. Conceptu-
alism may organize material from a variety of sources; conceptualism arises from the way
sources are handled, not from the sources themselves.
186. See, eg., CURRIE, supra note 183, at 70.
187. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 163.
188. Id. (quoting 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 170, at *109).





peace was inherently "worthy of the attention and guardianship of the
laws."
192
The other category of exceptions is executive acts that are "polit-
ical" rather than "ministerial." 193 Through examples, Marshall showed
that some executive acts are amenable to legal process;1 94 but he posited
that some are not. 95 Given this dichotomy, he assumed "there must be
some rule of law to guide the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction,"' 196 a
rule that courts may have some "difficulty in applying... to particular
cases," but which there is not "much difficulty in laying down.' 197 In-
deed, the rule is so free from difficulty that Marshall simply announced it
without further discussion: Parties aggrieved by executive decisions in-
volving the exercise of discretion may not complain to the courts; parties
aggrieved by executive decisions involving mere peremptory duties affect-
ing their vested rights may complain.' 98 Marshall ended his discussion
of the amenability of high executive officials to legal process by showing
that Marbury's right to his commission as justice of the peace clearly is
of the latter type. Consequently, Marbury could compel the commis-
sion's delivery through legal process, even though that process runs
against a member of the cabinet of the United States.199
Marshall's analysis is thoroughly conceptualistic. The discussion
begins and turns upon first principles and mutually exclusive categories
governed by principles that comprehend all possible cases. These general
principles and categories are not just window dressing; they resolve the
issue at bar. The principle that for every right there is a remedy settles
the important issues of sovereign immunity and separation of powers. It
decides the general rule that high executive officials are amenable to legal
process. It compels those officials to come within recognized exceptions
to the general rule to escape legal process in particular cases. Similarly,
the postulate that damnum absque injuria applies to cases in which the
objective sought is "worthless" decides the inapplicability of this excep-
tion to Marbury's suit. The premise that "discretion" underlies the polit-
192. Id.
193. Id. at 166. Marshall described the latter as "peremptory," rather than "ministerial,"
as the category has come to be known. Id.
194. Id. at 164-65 (citing creation of pension lists by the Secretary of War and issuance of
patents for land sales by the Secretary of State).
195. Id. Regrettably, Marshall gave no specific instances of executive acts that are immune
from legal redress.
196. Id. at 165.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 166.
199. Id. at 167-68.
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ical/ministerial dichotomy determines its applicability.200 A century
later, Justice Holmes would opine that "[g]eneral propositions do not
decide concrete cases, ' 20 1 but Marshall evidently disagreed.
In addition, Marshall's analysis creates mutually exclusive catego-
ries, in which all possible cases may be located, of total liability and no
liability. Acts within the damnum absque injuria or political discretion
categories are never remediable, while acts involving ministerial duties
are wholly remediable. Marshall never conceived that an act might be
partially remediable or that some officials with statutorily defined tenures
might be immune from presidential removal while others might not.
20 2
Similarly, he never conceived that the multiplicity of considerations in-
volved in separation-of-powers cases might suggest that officials improp-
erly removed by the President receive damages but not reinstatement.
20 3
On both these issues, Marshall's entire approach is to create water-tight
categories of all or nothing, which are entailed by abstract first principles
and concepts. That post-Lochner era justices overturned Marshall on
these points demonstrates the distance between his jurisprudential as-
sumptions and theirs.2 4
b. The Judiciary's Power of Judicial Review
Marshall's discussion of the Court's power of judicial review also
shows his conceptualist jurisprudence. The discussion consists of two
arguments. First, Marshall established that a law contrary to the Consti-
tution is void; then, he concluded that courts must follow the Constitu-
tion, not the void law. Both issues, Marshall observed, are important but
not difficult to resolve. In his view, "[i]t seems only necessary to
recognise [sic] certain principles, supposed to have been long and well
200. The last element in the ministerial duty category, that the official's decision also affects
private vested rights, implicitly establishes the "private rights" model of judicial review in
preference to the "public law" model. See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 227, 276-304, 318-19 (1990) (discussing private- and public-law models). Thus, Mar-
shall's categories are debatable policy preferences rather than undebatable truths.
201. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
202. Current constitutional law does not treat all officials alike. It balances a variety of
functional considerations including whether the official is primarily executive, legislative, or
judicial; whether the official's term is long or short; and whether provisions by which the office
was created indicate that its occupant serves at the President's pleasure. See TRIBE, supra note
48, at 249-51; Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 10 n.16.
203. No "improper removal" case has yet resulted in reinstatement, although it remains a
possibility. See TRIE, supra note 48, at 250 n.20.
204. See id. at 249-50; Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 10 n.16. Modem law takes a func-
tional, balancing approach to jurisprudence, which stands in stark contrast to Marshall's abso-
lute reliance on static concepts.
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established, to decide [them]. 2 °5
The first principles of Marshall's discussion of the validity of a law
contrary to the Constitution are the unlimited sovereignty of the people
and their ability to establish a government with either limited or unlim-
ited powers.2"6 Both types of governments have constitutions but, in
Marshall's view, "it is a proposition too plain to be contested"2"7 that the
constitution of an unlimited government is changeable by ordinary legis-
lative acts, while the constitution of a limited government is a "superior,
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means."2 °0 "Between these
alternatives," Marshall said, "there is no middle ground. '2°
Having divided governments into mutually exclusive categories de-
pending upon whether their powers are limited or unlimited, Marshall
sought to establish that written constitutions always are associated with
the creation of a limited government. On this pivotal issue Marshall
stated, "Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions con-
template them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation .... This theory is essentially attached to a written constitu-
tion. '21 0 From these ipse dixits, Marshall's conclusion necessarily and
quickly follows: "[T]he theory of every... government [with a written
constitution] must be, that [legislation] repugnant to the constitution, is
void.",
2 11
With the conclusion that laws contrary to the Constitution are void,
Marshall turned to discuss whether they nonetheless bind courts. Courts
are not bound by such laws, he decided, for a variety of reasons. First, he
argued from general reasoning. If courts were bound by void laws, it
would subvert the principle of written constitutions and allow in practice
the legislative omnipotence that is forbidden in theory.2 12  Second, he
drew a number of arguments from the Constitution's text.213 The core of
205. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). Given the difficulty twenti-
eth-century scholars have had justifying judicial review, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1-33 (1962); LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-18, 27-
30 (1958), this statement might well serve to satirize conceptualistic thought.
206. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
207. Id. at 177.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. Marshall also asked a series of rhetorical questions designed to show that written
constitutions are wholly useless-indeed "absurd"-instruments that no one would adopt un-
less they are meant to create limited government. Id. at 176-77.
211. Id. at 177.
212. Id. at 177-78.
213. Id. at 178-80. These specific arguments are described, and their weaknesses lucidly
explained, by Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 16-29 (concluding that the whole of Marshall's
argument is stronger than the sum of its parts).
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these arguments is the existence of constitutional provisions that the
Court "must" '214 consider; 215 indeed, some provisions are addressed spe-
cifically to courts. 21s Evidently, judges must regard the Constitution "in
some cases." 217 To Marshall, this meant that judges must regard the
Constitution in all cases.218
The conceptualism of Marshall's analyses of whether laws repug-
nant to the Constitution are void and whether they still bind the courts is
evident. Both analyses proceed from first principles that are said to re-
solve the concrete disputes.21 9 Both analyses also proceed in terms of
mutually exclusive dichotomies that cover the universe of possible
cases. 220 Finally, both Marshall's analyses proceed on the theory that
conclusions follow necessarily from fundamental principles. Modem ju-
rists, in contrast, see Marshall as drawing from his premises only the
inferences that he needed in order to reach the results he desired.221 In-
deed, it is fair to say that most modem criticisms of Marshall's defense of
judicial review in Marbury arise from his seeing necessary postulates and
logical entailments where modem commentators see multiple possibili-
ties and preferences.222 Marshall's arguments in Marbury are conceptu-
214. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 179 ("In some cases then, the constitution must be
looked into by the judges.").
215. Id. at 179-80. An example includes the provision that "[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid
on Articles exported from any State." U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 5.
216. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179. Marshall instanced the provision requiring two
witnesses or a confession in open court in treason trials. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
217. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179.
218. Id. ("Mf [the judges] can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read, or
obey?"); see also id. at 179-80 (concluding that because the Constitution is "a rule for the
government of courts, as well as of the legislature" in some cases, it is a rule for the courts in all
cases). Marshall also argued from the Constitution's Oath and Supremacy Clauses. Id. at 180.
Ironically, these clauses do not necessarily support Marshall's conclusion. See Van Alstyne,
supra note 1, at 20-26.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 187-88, 205-09. Cf Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (giving a modernist admonition that "general pro-
positions do not decide concrete cases").
220. See supra text accompanying notes 189-98, 202-03, 206-09.
221. See supra notes 213, 218. As Professor Powell wrote concerning Marshall's view of
intergovernmental tax immunities, discussed supra text accompanying notes 122, 126-29,
"[s]uch a political theory may or may not have been wise judicial statesmanship .... It
nevertheless was not an imperative but a preferential postulate." Thomas R. Powell, The
Waning of Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REv. 633, 652 (1945).
222. See, eg., CuRRE, supra note 183, at 73; Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 17 (describing
one argument as presenting a "false dilemma"); id. at 20-21 (recognizing alternative interpreta-
tions of the Constitution's text); id. at 24 (depicting another argument as "only partly true, and
... otherwise misleading"); id. at 25-26 (noting alternative interpretations of the Constitution's
text). See generally BICKEL, supra note 205, at 1-14 & n.2 (citing criticisms by Judge Hand,
Justice Holmes, Professor Thayer, and Professor Powell).
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alistic, and modem analysts have practiced techniques for spotting the
flaws in arguments so premised.
Consider, for example, Marshall's linchpin argument on each issue
in Marbury. With respect to the validity of laws that contravene the
Constitution, Marshall's key point is that written constitutions necessar-
ily establish limited governments.223 Modem jurists know this is not so;
constitutions have been, and in Marshall's time the French Constitution
of 1789 already had been, written as statements of political principles
subject to change through ordinary legislative acts.22" Written constitu-
tions are not entirely "absurd" or "nugatory" if they are changeable
through ordinary legislative acts. Marshall, however, saw no gray, only
black and white. He assumed that all people must conceive written con-
stitutions as statements of binding, rather than admonitory, principles.
Thus, to Marshall, the intent of the drafters and ratifiers of the national
charter is clear. On the issue regarding the power of courts to disregard
unconstitutional laws, Marshall's central argument is the notion that
since the Constitution was written as directives to the Court in some
instances, it was written as directives to the Court in all instances.22 5
Again, the logic is of dichotomous "all or nothing" categories. A com-
parison with Hamilton's famous discussion of the propriety of judicial
review in The Federalist No. 78 is informative. Scholars often say that
Marshall's discussion parallels this tract.22 6 But Hamilton argued pre-
sumptively227 and prudentially22 where Marshall argued imperatively.
In light of the Constitution's textual silence on the issue, Hamilton cate-
gorized judicial review as only a "far more rational[ ] suppos[ition],"229
not a necessary consequence.
In sum, in Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall established that high
executive officials are subject to legal process and that unconstitutional
laws do not bind the courts through analysis dependent upon constitu-
tional conceptualism. Marbury shows constitutional conceptualism as
the jurisprudence by which Marshall fleshed out Ameica's complex
structure of government from the Constitution's meager text.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 210-11.
224. See CURRIE, supra note 183, at 71; Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 17.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 214-18.
226. See, eg., CURRIE, supra note 183, at 71.
227. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ciinton Rossiter ed. 1961)
(arguing that legislative supremacy is not the "natural presumption").
228. Id. at 526 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that constitutional supremacy "ought to be
preferred").
229. Id. at 525 (Alexander Hamilton).
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2. Fletcher v. Peck: Conceptualism in a Civil Liberties Case
In 1795 four land companies corrupted the Georgia legislature into
granting them, at a bargain price, millions of acres of the state's public
domain.230 When the corruption was revealed, a newly elected legisla-
ture repealed the prior legislature's grant. Fletcher v. Peck231 arose
when, in an obvious test case,232 Fletcher purchased 15,000 acres of the
land from Peck, a remote purchaser from one of the land companies, and
sued, claiming that Peck failed to convey good title.233 Peck's title
turned upon the original sale's validity and the effect of Georgia's unilat-
eral rescission. 234 The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall,
ruled in Peck's favor.235
As in Marbury, Marshall's disposition of the case addressed a wide
variety of issues.236 Once again, Marshall's conceptualism is best re-
flected in his analysis of the case's central constitutional question:
whether the federal Contract Clause237 voided Georgia's repeal act with
regard to land resold to innocent third parties.238
Marshall commenced his discussion of the Contract Clause issue in
230. The background of Fletcher is ably retold in C. PETER MAGRATH, YAZOO: LAW
AND POLITCS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 1-19 (paperback ed. 1967).
231. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
232. See, e.g., id at 147-48 (Johnson, J., concurring); MAGRATH, supra note 230, at 54.
233. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 87-91.
234. The case was in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Fletcher was a citizen of
New Hampshire; Peck was a citizen of Massachusetts. MAGRATH, supra note 230, at 53.
235. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 142-43.
236. In addition to the Contract Clause issue discussed infra text accompanying notes 237-
70, Marshall discussed whether the Georgia Constitution prohibited the state legislature from
disposing of state lands; whether the original grant from Georgia was void because it was
procured by fraud; whether the United States, rather than Georgia, held title to the land at the
time of the original grant; and whether the Indian title to the land prevented its alienation by
the state. In addition, Marshall prefaced his Contract Clause analysis with a lengthy but spec-
ulative discussion of whether the law at bar was void because it was not in its nature a law and,
therefore, not within the competence of a legislature to enact. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
at 133-36. This argument helped crystallize the pre-Lochner era "legislative powers" doctrine,
which was the direct precursor of the Lochner era doctrine of substantive due process. See
infra text accompanying notes 279-320.
237. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the Obliga-
tion of Contracts.").
238. This part of the opinion is regarded (incorrectly) as the first case in which a state
statute was voided under the federal Constitution. Compare, eg., Levinson, supra note 1, at
1453 (implying Fletcher was the first case voiding a state law) with CURRIE, supra note 183, at
39-41 (crediting Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) as the first case to invalidate a
state statute). Nonetheless, this part of the opinion is justly famous as the first authoritative
exegesis of the Contract Clause, which in the remainder of the nineteenth century was to be at
the center of so much constitutional struggle. See Siegel, supra note 24, at 3-6 (discussing the
importance of Contract Clause cases in the nineteenth century).
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Fletcher by asking two questions: "[W]hat is a contract?" and "Is a
grant a contract?" 239 These queries are answered forthwith by the fol-
lowing assertion:
[A] contract is a compact between two or more parties, and is
either executory or executed. An executory contract is one in
which a party binds himself to do, or not to do, a particular
thing.... A contract executed is one in which the object of the
contract is performed; and this, says Blackstone, differs in noth-
ing from a grant.2"
Marshall then applied this postulated definition, without further discus-
sion, to resolve the issue at bar. "Since," Marshall wrote, "a grant is a
contract executed ... and since the constitution uses the general term
contract, without distinguishing between those which are executory and
those which are executed, it must be construed to comprehend the latter
as well as the former.
'21
The remainder of Marshall's Contract Clause argument consists of a
defense of the interpretive technique of understanding constitutional lan-
guage according to the "natural meaning of words"24 2 and an attack on
the technique of "presuming an intention to except a case, not excepted
by the words of the constitution."2 "3 Marshall also took time to connect
his definitional exegesis with the intent of the founding generation. First,
he did so rationalistically by appealing to "everyman's" (which includes
the founding generation) common sense, saying: "It would be strange if
a contract to convey was secured by the constitution, while an absolute
conveyance remained unprotected." 2" Later, he did so historically by
reminding his readers that the people adopted the Constitution "to shield
themselves and their property fromthe effects of those sudden and strong
passions to which men are exposed."245 This historical argument is un-
substantial because it presents no strong connection between the abstract
concerns of the people "to shield themselves and their property"'" and
the specific abuse at bar. Nonetheless, it is all Marshall offered.
Marshall's Contract Clause argument in Fletcher clearly illustrates
most of the norms of constitutional conceptualism. It uses an abstract
239. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136.
240. Id. at 137-38.
241. Id. at 137.
242. Id. at 138; see also id. at 137 (referring to "a fair construction"). •
243. Id. at 139. Marshall's argument consists primarily of illustrations of other constitu-
tional provisions, such as the Bill of Attainder Clause, which allow no implied exceptions. Id.
at 137-39.
244. Id. at 137.
245. Id. at 138.
246. Id.
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definition of "contract" to resolve whether Georgia's rescission of its
grant is valid or void.247 It also claims to tie its abstract definition of
contract, and the resolution of the case, to the intent of the Constitution's
framers and ratifiers.24 s Marshall presented his abstract definition of
contract not as an extratextual principle but as a principle implicit in the
constitutional text. Marshall, accordingly, presented himself not as read-
ing his policy preferences into the Constitution, but as discovering and
elaborating an abstract concept the founders placed in the nation's fun-
damental law.249
Not so manifestly, Fletcher illustrates one of this Article's claims
concerning the reasons for the turn in American constitutional jurispru-
dence to constitutional conceptualism.2 50 Marshall's use of the Contract
Clause in Fletcher illustrates the resort to constitutional conceptualism
for resolving the problem of controlling legislative omnipotence. In
Fletcher, Marshall began the arduous task of culling a sufficient compen-
dium of civil liberties from the Constitution's meager text rather than
from the copious but unwritten principles of natural law. In deciding
Fletcher, Marshall could have rested on natural-law grounds. As pointed
out repeatedly in his opinion, the actions of the Georgia legislature
amounted to an uncompensated taking of property-a retrospective di-
vesting of property rights that had vested in the land company's allegedly
bona fide purchasers."' Clearly, Georgia's legislation violated a value
that by 1810 was at the core of American society, a value thought to be
guaranteed by the natural-law tradition.
Reflecting the viability of a ruling premised on natural law, Justice
Johnson wrote a concurrence that specifically disavowed Marshall's Con-
tract Clause ratio decidendi252 and rested instead upon "general princi-
247. This is the first tenet of constitutional conceptualism, discussed supra text accompany-
ing notes 103-06.
248. This is the second tenet of constitutional conceptualism, discussed supra text accom-
panying note 107.
249. Fletcher does not explicitly illustrate the third tenet of constitutional conceptualism,
discussed supra text accompanying note 108, that government and its branches act wholly
within specifically defined spheres of power. In later Contract Clause cases, however, Marshall
tellingly illustrated his commitment to erecting mutually exclusive spheres in which states
have total power or no power over civil liberties. See, eg., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 213, 340-41, 352-53 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (struggling with problems im-
plicit in the view that states have no power over contract rights but total power over contract
remedies); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 200-01 (1819).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 142-71.
251. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 132, 134-35, 138. Justice Johnson made the same
point in his concurrence. Id. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring).
252. Id. at 144 (Johnson, J., concurring). Johnson's persuasive reasons for disagreeing
with Marshall's reasoning are discussed infra text accompanying notes 266-68.
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ple, on the reason and nature of things: a principle which will impose
laws even on the deity. '25 3 Marshall chose only to preface his Contract
Clause analysis with a lengthy disquisition suggesting Georgia's repeal
act was void for violating principles drawn from "the nature of society
and of government." '54 Exemplifying the decreasing viability of premis-
ing constitutional analysis upon unwritten principles of natural law and
anticipating (and certainly influencing) the future direction of American
constitutional law, Marshall, in the end, did not rest his constitutional
analysis upon natural law.255 Instead, Marshall turned his attention to
the Constitution's text.256
Unfortunately, the Constitution to which Marshall turned did not
vindicate clearly the fundamental norm at bar.257 The Fifth Amendment
253. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring).
254. Id. at 135. For the entirety of Marshall's discussion, see id. at 132-36.
255. For the clear turning point in the opinion, when Marshall shifts from natural law to
his Contract Clause analysis, see id. at 136. Marshall did say in his conclusion that both
natural law and constitutional text underlie the Court's unanimous ruling. Id. at 139. He may
have made this statement to incorporate the views of Justice Johnson, who specifically rested
on natural law principles. See id. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring).
256. In Contract Clause litigation, justices rested upon unwritten principles as late as 1815.
See, e.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 50-51 (1815) (Story, J.) (striking down one
law that violated natural justice and the principles of republican government and upholding
two laws that did not violate the letter and spirit of the Constitution, without specilying which
letter of the Constitution was implicated). Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518 (1819), marks an important turning point because the case was disposed of with
multiple opinions that draw from only the Constitution's text, not unwritten principles. See id.
at 625. Marshall's dissent in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827), in which he
explicitly draws from natural-rights concepts, is consistent with the claim because he uses
natural-rights to elaborate the meaning of the Contract Clause. Id at 344-48 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Ogden illustrates constitutional conceptualism's ability to infuse natural law prin-
ciples into ambiguous constitutional text.
257. The Georgia Constitution also failed to protect the norm at bar. Georgia was one of
the states whose constitutions contained minimal protection for individual liberty and no pro-
tection for property rights. See GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, §§ 3-6 (guaranteeing only free-
dom of the press, trial by jury, the writ of habeas corpus, freedom of religion, and rights of
intestate succession). Both the land grant and the repeal law were enacted under the Georgia
Constitution of 1789, which contained neither a takings nor a due process clause. In 1798
Georgia adopted a new organic law, but this charter also failed to contain either clause. Thus,
if Marshall had considered Fletcher under the Georgia Constitution and had taken a textual
approach, he would have been hard pressed to strike down the law.
Marshall, of course, did not consider Fletcher under Georgia law. Most scholars would
say that this strategy reflected the Court's approach at the time to constitutional questions
raised in diversity suits. Except for the most local matters, diversity suits were considered
under general principles of law, not the law of the state. See, e.g., WHrrE, supra note 149, at
606, 741-43, 745-46, 778-79, 833-35. Professor White shows, however, that the Court consid-
ered land titles matters of local concern and adjudicated them according to local law. Fletcher
may be thought of as a land title case. In addition, in Fletcher itself, Marshall relied entirely
on the Georgia Constitution when he discussed whether the legislature had power to make the
original grant. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 128-29. Thus, even under the prevailing view
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expressly prohibits uncompensated takings, 258 but relying on the Fifth
Amendment risked implying that most of the national Bill of Rights op-
erated as limitations on the state governments. Marshall apparently
never was willing to consider such a dramatic change in federal-state re-
lations. 259 The Constitution also contains in its original text an express
prohibition of state-enacted ex post facto laws.2 ° Although some have
argued that the framers intended this clause to bar all retrospective legis-
lation that divested vested rights, Calder v. Bull261 had limited it to ret-
rospective criminal legislation.262 Accordingly, Marshall focused on the
Contract Clause. Yet to void Georgia's uncompensated taking in
Fletcher, Marshall had to graft onto that clause a concept of "contract"
that was novel and portentous.263
Marshall's concept of "contract" took on these qualities not be-
cause, as many might think today, it brought contracts to which the state
was a party within the Contract Clause, nor because it treated a state
statute as a contract. 264 Rather, the concept's disturbing aspect was its
inclusion of executed contracts in the Contract Clause. Subjecting exe-
toward diversity cases, one might have thought Marshall would have decided Fletcher under
state principles. Marshall may have elected to ignore the validity of the repeal act in Fletcher
under the Georgia Constitution because that ground was not pleaded. Alternatively, he could
have believed that the repeal act was invalid under the federal charter and that an analysis of
state law upholding the act was therefore superfluous. By ignoring the Georgia Constitution
Marshall sidestepped the dilemma of early American jurists over whether uncompensated tak-
ings are perfectly valid under a textual approach to many state constitutions. See supra notes
153-61 and accompanying text.
258. U.S. CONST. amend V.
259. Eventually, Marshall expressly held that the Bill of Rights is not effective against the
states. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249-51 (1833).
260. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10.
261. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
262. Id. at 390. Contra Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 681-87 app. 1 (1829)
(Johnson, J., concurring) (addressing his concerns about limitations placed on ex post facto).
For an analysis of the history leading to Calder, see generally I CROSSKEY, supra note 142, at
324-51 (explaining why the Calder Court decided to limit ex post facto to criminal cases);
Oliver P. Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 MICH. L. REv. 315 (1922) (same).
263. Marshall's reading of the Contract Clause was unexpected and troubling for the rea-
sons discussed infra text accompanying notes 264-68. Whether that reading resulted from an
unanticipated definition of the term "contract" or the term "obligation" is debatable. Justice
Johnson, who objected to Marshall's reading of the clause, accepted Marshall's definition of
"contract," though his reasoning sounded more in traditional usage than in natural meaning.
Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 144 (Johnson, J., concurring). Johnson claimed that Marshall
implicitly gave an unexpected scope to the term "obligation." Id. at 145 (Johnson, J., concur-
ring). For the reason given infra text accompanying note 265, it is fair to say that Marshall's
definition of "contract" is at least a debatable rendering of the intent of the founding genera-
tion. Justice Johnson, however, would certainly have agreed that Marshall gave a problematic
reading to the Contract Clause.
264. The framers anticipated both of these holdings, but they did not clearly intend them.
See Siegel, supra note 24, at 26-28.
LOCHNER ERA JURISPRUDENCE
cuted contracts to the Contract Clause was novel because the events of
the Confederation era had focused the founding generation's concern on
state interference with debtor-creditor relations-that is, on state inter-
ference with executory contracts. 65 As Justice Johnson pointed out in
his concurrence, the Contract Clause protects only the "obligation" of
contracts, and a contract's obligation does not continue after it is per-
formed.266 Johnson justly recognized that Marshall's interpretation of
the clause guaranteed both the "'obligation and effect of contracts.' "267
This enlarged guarantee, Johnson continued, was undesirable. Mar-
shall's interpretation threatened, for example, to remove from the state
the sovereign power of eminent domain. 6 By transferring title from an
individual to the state, eminent domain necessarily interferes with rights
the condemnee acquired under an executed contract. That eminent do-
main involves the provision of just compensation for the taking altered
nothing because the Contract Clause proscribes any impairment of rights
acquired by contract, not just uncompensated impairments. The danger
with Marshall's reading of the Contract Clause in Fletcher was that it
proved too much.
Thus, Marshall's concept of "contract" and his construction of the
Contract Clause in Fletcher were problematic. His definitional treatment
of the matter certainly was not natural and necessary; the founding gen-
eration probably did not intend it. Yet future generations of lawyers
came.to celebrate the case while they strained to limit its untoward impli-
265. See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 4-
6, 8-9, 12-16 (1938).
266. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 144-45 (Johnson, J., concurring); see also West River
Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 517 (1848) (argument of counsel) (arguing that
obligation of contract refers only to executory contract; executed contract does not impose
obligation on either party); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.), 420, 573-
74 (1837) (McLean, J., concurring) (saying the Contract Clause was not intended to apply to
executed contracts). Marshall's reply to this point was the ipse dixit that a grant "implies a
contract not to reassert" the grantor's right to the land. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 137.
Even if it were true, this assertion is insufficient to meet Johnson's point because when the state
condemns land or franchises it has granted, it interferes with the same implied contract,
whether or not it pays compensation. Also, the assertion is insufficient because it does not
exempt condemnations whenever the state is in the land's chain of title, even if the condemnee
is a remote purchaser from the state. Marshall's argument is especially unavailing if we ac-
cept, as nineteenth-century lawyers did, the fiction that all property is derived mediately from
the state. See, e.g., Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 522 (argument of counsel) (arguing that all real
estate is held by grant from the state); id. at 539 (Woodbury, J., concurring) (arguing that all
property in the state derived from the state and is subject to use by the state for public pur-
poses). For the Court's eventual answer to the dilemma, see infra note 269.
267. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 144 (Johnson, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quot-
ing for emphasis to compare phrase with phrase, "'acts impairing the obligations of con-
tracts.'" See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.).
268. Id. at 145 (Johnson, J., concurring).
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cations.269 The shortcomings of Fletcher were accepted, and eventually
forgotten, because of its strength: it used a meager constitutional text to
protect the fundamental civil liberty of private property.
2 70
Fletcher v. Peck was a seminal case in the emergence of constitu-
tional conceptualism from the conflict between natural law and textual
positivism. In Fletcher, textual positivism dictated that the Georgia leg-
islature prevail; natural law dictated that the bona fide purchasers pre-
vail. Marshall used conceptualism to resolve this tension by arguing that
the Constitution's text protected the bona fide purchasers. 271 The ten-
sion between textual positivism and natural law, a tension with which
Marshall expressly toyed before moving to his Contract Clause analysis,
spurred the tradition of constitutional conceptualism.
3. Conclusion
This review of Marshall's early opinions shows that the long-held
view that Marshall exemplified a pragmatic,2 72 empiricist,2 73 or balanc-
ing274 constitutional jurisprudence is in serious need of revision.27 ' As
269. Lawyers in the first half of the nineteenth century attempted at first to limit Fletcher's
impact on eminent domain law by drawing from Marshall's argument that the state's grant
implied a contract not to reassert title. See supra note 266. Attorneys argued that Fletcher
applied only to uncompensated seizures of land that the state itself had granted. See Charles
River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 457 (argument of counsel). They also argued that Fletcher
applied to all uncompensated seizures if the state constitution required compensation. Dix, 47
U.S. (6 How.) at 523 (argument of counsel). In resolving the issue, the Court held that emi-
nent domain does not interfere with contract rights because in every land grant there is an
implied clause that the land is subject to eminent domain, id. at 532-33; because eminent do-
main acts on the property and not the contract, id. at 536 (McLean, J., concurring); and
because the power of eminent domain and the power to make and breach contracts are sepa-
rate powers, id. at 539 (McLean, J., concurring).
270. Once again, the problem Marshall faced was that Fletcher represented an uncompen-
sated takings case, not an "obligation of contract" case, and neither the federal Constitution
nor the Georgia Constitution proscribed state-initiated uncompensated takings. The texts of
all the relevant constitutions were inadequate to protect the norm at bar. See supra notes 257-
63 and accompanying text. If the Court had not read some constitutional text creatively, it
would have had to uphold Georgia's uncompensated taking.
271. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 137-39.
272. FRANKFURTER, supra note 117, at 14.
273. TRIBE, supra note 48, at 309.
274. GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 264 (10th
ed. 1980).
275. This discussion is too brief to give a full account of the massive corpus of Marshall's
constitutional opinions. It illustrates conceptualism in Marshall's thought, but is not a defini-
tive account of it. If this analysis were extended, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819), would be the next case discussed. In terms of subsequent development, one can see
constitutional conceptualism gestating in Marbury and Fletcher. As compared to the mature
style exemplified by McCulloch, Marbury contains too little focus on constitutional text, while
Fletcher contains too much focus on general principles of natural law independent of constitu-
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Professor Richard Epstein recently wrote after showing that the Lochner
era distinction between commerce and manufacturing2 76 is implicit in
Marshall's seminal ruling in Gibbons v. Ogden,2 77 "If this is true, then
Chief Justice Marshall was the great formalist, not the precursor of the
modem realists.
'2 78
More generally, this review of Marshall's opinions shows that two
forces supported the rise of constitutional conceptualism. In structure-
of-government cases the problem was to flesh out relationships that the
Constitution's text expressed only in general outline. In civil liberty
cases the problem was to find appropriate rights, or in many states, any
rights at all. In civil liberty cases a tension existed between the inade-
quacy of the constitutional text and the desire to immunize certain rights
from legislative power, especially (and in practice almost exclusively) the
right of property. In civil liberty cases constitutional conceptualism's ap-
peal was that, unlike textual positivism, it promised appropriate limits to
legislative omnipotence. Moreover, unlike natural law, it promised to
find those limits within the Constitution's text. Constitutional conceptu-
alism purported to be faithful to the framers' and ratifiers' intent; it did
not intimate that the moral musings of the judiciary were above the will
of the people expressed in their fundamental charters.
In sum, constitutional conceptualism triumphed in the early nine-
teenth century. Whether constitutional conflict focused on the structure
of government or on civil liberties, conceptualism promised a way to sup-
plement the obvious shortcomings of the constitutional text with suffi-
cient fidelity to traditional or emergent norms of Anglo-American society
and to the judicial role. Constitutional conceptualism arose from the ten-
tional text. Mature constitutional conceptualism attempts to find those principles in the text
and not mention them separate from it.
To be sure, Marshall stated in McCulloch that the Constitution was to be "adapted to the
various crises of human affairs." McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415 (emphasis omitted).
This meant only that the national government should have plenary power over the "means" by
which it pursues its allocated "ends." The way to allocate the ends could be discerned neither
from unwritten principles nor from the Constitution's sparse text. Conceptualism was the key
to allocating power. Perhaps this is but another way of saying that, as the third tenet of
constitutional conceptualism requires, the Court can review only the existence of power, not its
discretionary use. See infra note 331 (discussing Marshall's view that the Constitution's allo-
cation of power is static).
276. See supra text accompanying note 111.
277. 22 U.S (9 Wheat.) 1, 193-96, 203-05 (1824) (discussing commercial regulation and
denying that it includes inspection laws).
278. Epstein, supra note 109, at 1406; see also DUCAT, supra note 113, at 42-51 (discussing
what Ducat designated as "absolutism," a mode of constitutional interpretation similar to
Marshall's conceptualism). Indeed, can less be said of a jurist whose standard form of argu-
ment is that, as Professor Balkin pointed out to me, "it is inherent in the nature of X that it has
Y property"?
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sion between America's commitment to constitutional law predicated
upon both the sovereign will of the people and eternal moral truths.
From Marbury v. Madison and Fletcher v. Peck through the end of the
Lochner era in 1937, constitutional conceptualism flourished: American
judges and jurists used conceptualism both to ferret out a richly textured
and complex governmental structure from the Constitution's sparse
words and to discover nature's copious norms in the framers' meager
text.
C. Constitutional Conceptualism and the Origin of Substantive Due
Process
Lochner era and pre-Lochner era jurists shared not only the general
jurisprudential method of conceptualism, but also many specific con-
cepts.279 Among them was the doctrine of substantive due process. Be-
tween 1800 and 1850, American jurists developed a concept of
"legislative power" that, with minor modification, became the Lochner
era concept of substantive due process. Shared concepts, especially the
hallmark notion of legislative power-substantive due process, tellingly il-
lustrate the unity between the Lochner and pre-Lochner eras.
280
The existence, let alone the importance, of the pre-Lochner era con-
cept of "legislative power" is entirely forgotten today281 because it tended
to appear in state, not federal, controversies. Yet, the nineteenth-century
notion of "legislative power" was central to early constitutional develop-
ment, providing the foundation for the doctrines of judicial indepen-
dence, equal protection, and substantive due process.282
Current conventional wisdom teaches that state constitutions are
279. See supra text accompanying notes 111, 119; supra note 115 and accompanying text
(discussing the manufacturing/commerce distinction and the "original package" doctrine).
280. The pre-Lochner era origin of substantive due process is discussed not only because
substantive due process is a key Lochner era doctrine, but also because prior scholarship tends
to depict the doctrine as one of the most novel departures and egregious impositions of that
era.
281. See infra note 284. Progressive era scholars discussed the doctrine of "legislative
power" under different rubrics. See CORWIN, supra note 143, at 67-68, 72; Edward S. Corwin,
Due Process Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 373-80 (1911) (discussing doctrine of
"vested rights"); Charles Haines, Judicial Review of Legislation in the United States and the
Doctrines of Vested Rights and of Implied Limitations on Legislatures (pts. 1-3), 2 TEx. L.
Rav. 257, 387 (1924), 3 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1924) (discussing the doctrine of "implied limita-
tions"). These scholars treat the doctrine dismissively, as part of their claim that Lochner era
jurisprudence marked a departure from traditional norms. See CORWIN, supra note 143, at 68
(describing the "legislative power" doctrine as a ruse); CHARLES HAINES, THE AMERICAN
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 403-04 (lst ed. 1932) (presenting the doctrine as a mi-
nority position).
282. See infra text accompanying notes 294-320. For another discussion of the importance
of the concept of "legislative power" to the development of substantive due process, see Wal-
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documents of limitation, not grant; therefore, a state government pos-
sesses all the powers of sovereignty except those exclusively granted to
the national government or denied to it in its constitution.2" 3 In fact, the
opposite is the traditional doctrine of state constitutional law. Through-
out the nineteenth century, the dominant theory of American constitu-
tional law, with reference to the powers of state legislatures, was
[t]hat absolute despotick [sic] power, which it is said must, in
all governments, reside somewhere ... was, by the people, in
the formation of our [state] government[s], carefully retained.
And it is a fundamental principle, engrafted into the [state]
constitution[s], that all power is originally inherent in the peo-
ple; and that all officers of government, whether legislative or
executive, are their trustees and servants-therefore, such
power, and such only, as is delegated to them, can they
exercise.284
lace Mendelson, A Missing Link in the Evolution of Due Process, 10 VAND. L. REV. 125 (1956)
(finding its importance in the development of the notion of separation of powers).
283. See, e.g., Iowa Loan & Trust Co. v. Fairweather, 252 F. 605, 612 (S.D. Iowa 1918)
(citing Hawkeye Ins. Co. v. French, 109 Iowa 585, 588, 80 N.W. 660, 660 (1899)); Orlander v.
Hollowell, 193 Iowa 979, 984, 188 N.W. 667, 669 (1922), appeal dismissed, 262 U.S. 731
(1923); Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 6-7, 134 A.2d 1, 4 (1957); Shepherd v. San Jacinto Junior
College Dist., 363 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Trex. 1963); EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTI-
TUTION 21 (repr. ed. 1957); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 54, at 141-42 (1984). Courts and
commentators make this comment to contrast state constitutions with the federal Constitution,
which is a document that grants, as well as limits, power.
284. Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121, 127 (Vt. 1825); accord COOLEY, supra note 9, at 87-129;
THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION
AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 126-53 (2d ed., Littleton,
Clo., F.B. Rothman 1874) (1st ed. 1857). The views espoused in these materials are directly
contrary to the conventional view that nineteenth-century jurists approached state constitu-
tions not as grants but as organizations of powers. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
The inference of the conventional view is that state governments had all sovereign power ex-
cept as expressly denied in their constitutions or granted to the federal government. If sover-
eign-absolute and despotic-power resided somewhere, it resided in the legislature. Hence,
state legislatures were omnipotent but for the express limitations in their constitutions and the
express grants to the federal government.
One strand in early American constitutional thought did assert that state legislatures ex-
ercised the sovereign powers of the English Parliament, limited only by express constitutional
limitations and implications necessarily derived from them. This view was held by a distinct
minority of jurists, however, and it exercised no real effect on American constitutional devel-
opment after the second decade of the nineteenth century. In addition to Justice Iredell's
famous comments in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398-99 (1798), I have seen it voiced
only in Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 1, "19-26 (1857) (Terry, J., dissenting); Cochran v. Van Surlay,
20 Wend. 365, 381-82 (N.Y. 1838) (opinion of Sen. Verplanck); and Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7
Johns. 477, 488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (Spencer, J.). Judges Spencer and Terry later recanted
their views. See Exparte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 509-10 (1858) (Terry, J.); Dradshaw v. Rogers,
20 Johns. 103, 105-06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) (Spencer, J.). In 1825, Justice (later Chief Justice)
Gibson of Pennsylvania went beyond Justice Iredell's principle and declared that the judiciary
has no power to pronounce statutes void even for clear violations of express state constitutional
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Under the dominant nineteenth-century view of state constitutional
law, the legislature had been granted only legislative power. Any act that
was not in its nature legislative was void as ultra vires (outside the legis-
lature's authority). Part of the strength of this reasoning was its textual
basis and its general applicability. In all but three state constitutions, the
article describing the legislature began with some prefatory phrase such
as "legislative power is hereby vested in a general assembly."2 ' Under
this doctrine, therefore, nearly all state legislatures were laboring under a
limited grant of authority.
This view of limited state legislative authority, which was gestat-
ing286 in the judicial discussions in Calder v. Bull,2
87 Cooper v. Telfair,218
provisions. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 344-48 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting),
But two decades later Gibson, too, recanted and joined in voiding state legislation. See Norris
v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277, 280-81 (1845).
In general, conventional wisdom confuses this minority view with the dominant view be-
cause the minority view appears in federal Commerce Clause precedent in the second quarter
of the nineteenth century. The federal Commerce Clause cases, however, were concerned only
with the question whether state law could regulate or affect interstate commerce despite the
limitations of the dormant Commerce Clause. Because these cases did not concern the limits
of state power as a matter of state law, they assumed the state could do anything except exer-
cise power forbidden to it by the federal Constitution. This assumption was appropriate be-
cause the issue before the federal court was not whether the state violated its own constitution.
Without an awareness of these contextual differences, it is easy to misread such sentences as
"[t]he legislature of a State may exercise all powers which are properly legislative, unless they
are forbidden by the State or National Constitution." Railroad Co. v. County of Otoe, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 667, 673 (1872); see EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 67-68
(1948) (describing Thomas Cooley's treatment of state constitutional interpretation). This Ar-
ticle maintains that, in the nineteenth century, the phrase "properly legislative" was as preg-
nant with meaning, and as much a limitation on legislative power, as the phrase "unless they
are forbidden."
285. See, eg., N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. II ("supreme legislative power within this State
shall be vested in two separate and distinct bodies... the assembly [and] the senate.., who
together shall form the legislature"); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § I ("[the legislative author-
ity of this State shall be vested in a general assembly, which shall consist of a senate and house
of representatives"). The exceptions are Connecticut and Rhode Island, which operated under
their colonial charters until 1818 and 1842, respectively. CONN. CHARTER of 1662, para. 1
(establishing only a political and corporate body called the Governor and Company to govern
and oversee the needs of the colony, without establishing separate branches of government);
R.I. AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS CHARTER of 1663, para. 3 (same); see also CONN.
CONST. of 1818 (superseding CONN. CHARTER of 1662); R.I. CONST. of 1842 (superseding
R.I. AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS CHARTER of 1663). The third exception is New Jersey,
whose constitution provided only that "the government of this Province shall be vested in a
Governor, Legislative Council, and General Assembly." N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. I.
286. For example, in Calder Justice Chase stated the whole theory although he did not
base it on the grant of legislative power to the legislature. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,
387-89 (1798). For another example, see Chief Justice Marshall's discussion of the point in the
preface of his Contract Clause discussion in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133-35
(1810), discussed supra note 236 and text accompanying notes 252-56.
287. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-89 (1798).
288. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 18-19 (1800).
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Ellis v. Marshall,28 9 Fletcher v. Peck,"g° and Dash v. Van Kleeck,291 burst
into prominence in 1818 in the New Hampshire decision of Merrill v.
Sherburne.292 Merrill was the first case to present the theory shorn of its
natural law origins and based wholly in constitutional text. By 1829,
when Justice Story articulated the view in Wilkinson v. Leland,2 93 it was
a truism.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, courts employed the
concept of legislative power to establish judicial independence. Follow-
ing English parliamentary precedents, various colonial legislatures arro-
gated to themselves the power to supervise the judiciary by granting new
trials, enacting special procedural rules for particular litigants or contro-
versies, and passing declaratory acts.294 Legislatures in at least five states
carried on these practices after the Revolution. Legislative exercise of
these powers did not end until each of these states' judiciaries had de-
clared them judicial in nature and held that the power to exercise them
was not vested in the legislature by the state constitution's grant of "leg-
islative power." '295 During the same period, some courts used the delega-
tion theory to proscribe special legislation. "A law," the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court wrote, citing Blackstone's famous definition, is "'a rule of
civil conduct.'... Hence it must in its nature be general[] ... a rule for
all, and binding on all."296
289. 2 Mass. 269, 276-77 (1807).
290. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133-35 (1810), discussed supra note 236 and text accompany-
ing notes 252-56.
291. 7 Johns. 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
292. 1 N.H. 199, 206-17 (1818).
293. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 658 (1829). In addition, Chancellor Walworth of New York
stated:
But, as I have frequently had occasion to observe, an act of the legislature which
would have the effect to divest an individual of his own property and transfer it to
others for their own benefit... would be void, as being against the spirit of our state
constitution, and not within the powers delegated to the legislature by the people of
this state.
Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365, 373 (N.Y. 1838).
294. See supra text accompanying notes 163-67.
295. See Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326, 331 (1825); Merrill, 1 N.H. at 203-17; De Chastellux v.
Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18, 20-21 (1850); Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 489, 494-95 (1849); Bates
v. Kimball, 2 D. Chip. 77, 83-87 (Vt. 1824); see also POUND, supra note 167, at 73 nn.8-10
(referring to the practice in Indiana, but not indicating when the judiciary ended it).
296. Lewis, 3 Me. at 333 (quoting 1 BLACKsroNE, supra note 170, at *44). In Ward v.
Barnard, 1 Aik. 121 (Vt. 1825), the Vermont Supreme Court said:
Though... justice may, in particular cases, have been promoted, sure it is, that those
equal rights, so dear and sacred in the estimation of a free and enlightened people,
are not secured by a constitution, yielding to the legislature the high prerogative of
imposing restraints, and conferring favours not common to all.
Id. at 128. Even though it was decided on a peculiar clause in the Massachusetts Constitution
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Finally, in the eleven years between Merrill and Wilkinson, most, if
not all, courts used the concept of legislative power to build a textually
based constitutional prohibition of retrospective laws that divested prop-
erty rights.2 97 From the early years of the Republic, jurists had struggled
with the validity of retrospective laws in a "free Republican govern-
ment[ ].298 These discussions provoked the sharpest controversies over
the theory and propriety of judicial review, because the jurists arguing
against retrospective laws grounded their opinions in extratextual princi-
ples derived from natural law or "the great first principles of the social
compact."2 99 With the elaboration of the legislative power concept, reso-
lution of the controversy over retrospective laws was at hand. "We
know," Justice Story wrote, in Wilkinson v. Leland in 1829,
of no case, in which a legislative act to transfer the property of
A. to B. without his consent, has ever been held a constitutional
exercise of legislative power in any state in the union .... We
are not prepared therefore to admit that the people of [the
state] have ever delegated to their legislature the power to
divest the vested rights of property, and transfer them without
the assent of the parties.3"
and not on the general theory described here, the seminal case on judicial proscription of
special legislation is Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396 (1814).
297. Some courts employed the theory to ban all retrospective legislation. See, e.g., Ward,
1 Aik. at 128 (reasoning that since "[a],prescribed rule of civil conduct, is the correct, and
universally approved definition, of municipal law... [s]o far as an act of the legislature is
retrospective... it is not a prescribed rule of conduct"). Nevertheless, most courts found that
the sovereign people's grant of legislative power to their legislative agents did not imply a total
ban on retrospective legislation. Experience had shown the necessity and the morality of some
retrospective alterations of the law. See, e.g., Town of Goshen v. Town of Stonington, 4 Conn.
209, 221-22 (1822); Foster v. President, Directors & Co. of Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245, 252-74
(1819).
298. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis omitted).
299. Id. (emphasis omitted). In Fletcher, Justice Johnson was willing to void retrospective
legislation "on the reason and nature of things: a principle which will impose laws even on the
deity." Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143 (1810) (Johnson, J., concurring). As long
as the claim that vested rights are immune from legislative spoliation was based upon natural
law, it was an unpopular theory because it purported to bind even the sovereign people. Bas-
ing the claim on the absence of authorization in the grant of legislative power acknowledged
(1) that the ultimate power rested with the sovereign people; (2) that law was based upon will
and force, not reason; and (3) that the judiciary was empowered only to enforce positive law.
It turned the issue into one of constitutional interpretation. Legislative violation of "natural"
rights was presumptively impermissible. Thejudiciary would uphold it, however, if the consti-
tutional text clearly authorized it. See, eg., Ives v. Southern B. Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 294, 94
N.E. 431, 439-40 (1911) ("The right of property rests not upon philosophical or scientific
speculations nor upon the commendable impulses of benevolence or charity, nor yet upon the
dictates of natural justice. The right has its foundation in the fundamental law. That can be
changed by the people, but not by legislatures.").
300. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 658 (1829). Proscription of divesting prop-
erty rights was not the only substantive application of "legislative power" theory. Even before
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In terms of the protection of private property, the crystallization of
the delegation theory came none too soon. The next twenty years, from
1830 through 1850, witnessed a tremendous upsurge in legislative activ-
ity divesting vested rights of property. Legislatures accomplished divest-
iture not through the enactment of retrospective laws, but through
condemnation to build internal improvements (chiefly railroads under
private ownership) and through taxation by municipalities to subscribe
to stock or donate funds to construct these improvements. 0 1 Especially
with the economic collapse of 1837, case after case pressed on the courts
to adjudicate the validity of the legislative exercise of these two sovereign
powers. Immediately, courts elaborated their concept of legislative
power into a law of limitation on the use of eminent domain and taxa-
tion. Although no constitution in the land said so, courts barred con-
demnation or taxation for private, as opposed to public, uses or purposes.
With regard to eminent domain, as early as 1834 Chief Justice Savage of
New York voided the condemnation of land that was not needed for a
street construction project, grounding himself in natural right and the
spirit of the constitution.3 2 The following year, Chancellor Walworth
brought the thought within the constitutional text by declaring taking for
private use "an abuse of the right of eminent domain... and, therefore,
not within the general powers delegated by the people to the
legislature.
' 3 3
Judicial proscription of taxes used to raise funds for private pur-
poses began in 1837. 3° Chief Justice Black of Pennsylvania gave the
classic statement of the theory in 1853 when, in upholding taxation to
fund municipal subscription to railroad stock, he conceded:
The taxing power ... is given to [the legislature] without
any restriction whatever ....
the theory was clearly articulated, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court voided a statute
compelling someone to join a street improvement corporation. The court stated: "No appre-
hension exists in the community that the legislature has such power.... [I]t was never before
known that they have power over the person, to make him a member of a corporation, and
subject him to taxation, nolens volens, for the promotion of private enterprise." Ellis v. Mar-
shall, 2 Mass. 269, 276-77 (1807); see also Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 663
(1874) ("No court, for instance, would hesitate to declare void a statute which enacted that A.
and B. who were husband and wife to each other should be so no longer, but that A. should
thereafter be the husband of C., and B. the wife of D."); Sweet v. Hulbert, 51 Barb. 312, 318
(N.Y. App. Div. 1868) ("[un delegating to [the legislature] ... the power to make laws .... the
people did not... intend to ... invest that body with authority to make laws inconsistent with
natural right.").
301. See infra text accompanying notes 302-05.
302. In re Albany Street, 11 Wend. 148, 151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834).
303. Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige Ch. 137, 159 (N.Y. Ch. 1835).
304. See Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 375, 381 (1837).
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But I do not mean to assert that every act which the legis-
lature may choose to call a tax is constitutional.... The whole
of a public burden cannot be thrown on a single individual,
under pretence [sic] of taxing him ....
Neither has the legislature any constitutional right to cre-
ate a public debt, or to lay a tax, or to authorize any municipal
corporation to do it, in order to raise funds for a mere private
purpose. No such authority passed to the Assembly by the gen-
eral grant of legislative power. This would not be legislation.
Taxation is a mode of raising revenue for public purposes.
When it is prostituted to objects in no way connected with the
public interests or welfare, it ceases to be taxation, and becomes
plunder. Transferring money from the owners of it, into the
possession of those who have no title to it, though it be done
under the name and form of a tax, is unconstitutional for all the
reasons which forbid the legislature to usurp any other power
not granted to [it].
305
With the establishment of the proposition that divesting property
rights was not within the concept of legislation, the so-called oxymoron
of substantive due process was ready to be born. The thought is simple:
The Due Process Clause says that no one may be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law. The clause is violated if a legisla-
tive act that is not "legislation" and therefore not a "law" causes the
deprivation. 3°' Accordingly, legislative acts granting new trials, constru-
ing statutes, or in any way exercising a judicial power are not, in their
nature, laws; their enforcement creates a deprivation without due process
305. Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 167-69 (1853); see also Loan Ass'n v.
Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 665-67 (1874) (voiding tax to aid industrial construction);
Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. 124, 142 (1872) (voiding loan of credit to subsidize indus-
trial construction); Lowell v. City of Boston, Ill Mass. 454, 472-73 (1873) (voiding loan of
credit to subsidize private reconstruction from fire damage); Philadelphia Ass'n for the Relief
of Disabled Firemen v. Wood, 39 Pa. 73, 82-84 (1861) (voiding tax for donation to corporation
for charitable purposes); Curtis's Adm'r v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350, 353-56 (1869) (voiding tax to
aid private school). A few opinions, written mostly by judges who were proponents of Lochner
era jurisprudence later in their careers, even voided, or argued for voiding, taxation to aid
railroad construction. See Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28, 56-60 (1869) (Dillon, C.J.) (per
curiam); State ex reL Saint Joseph & D. C. R.R. v. Comm'rs of Nemaha County, 7 Kan. 542,
549 (1871) (Brewer, J., dissenting); People ex rel. Detroit & H. R.R. v. Township Bd. of Salem,
20 Mich. 452, 493-94 (1870) (Cooley, J.).
306. See, e.g., SEDGWICK, supra note 284, at 138 n.(a). The thought is even easier to grasp
under the alternative rendering of the Due Process Clause, a rendering that proscribes depriva-
tions not in accord with the "law of the land." Since this phrasing is more clearly focused on
substance than on process, it is easier to accept the view that an act beyond the legislature's
power to enact into law-an act that in its nature is not legislation---cannot be the law of the
land.
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of law.3"7 Similarly, partial and unequal legislative acts are not, in their
nature, laws.3 °0 Finally, legislative acts divesting vested property rights
or taking or taxing property for private purposes are in their nature
"plunder," as Pennsylvania Chief Justice Black said in 1853.309 Legisla-
tive acts taking or taxing property for private purposes are not, therefore,
laws; their enforcement creates a deprivation without due process of law.
In 1829 the Tennessee Supreme Court drew a connection between
special legislation and a denial of due process of law.310 As early as 1833,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina found a nexus between acts divest-
ing vested rights and violations of the state constitution's "law of the
land" provision.31' This view came to the legal profession's general at-
tention in 1840 when the respected Justice Bronson of the Supreme
Court of New York adopted it.3" 2 In voiding an act of condemnation for
purposes he thought private, Justice Bronson elaborated the doctrine of
legislative power and the due process theory as alternative holdings.313
The doctrine of legislative power, Bronson said, follows from the state
constitution's positive words of grant; the due process theory follows
from its words of limitation.31 '4  From there the due process theory
passed into general legal consciousness. 315 When post-Civil War legisla-
tures began to regulate private property actively, there was a well-estab-
307. This is procedural due process, perhaps, but only if civil rights are distinguished into
procedural and substantive rights. Nineteenth-century jurists did not make this distinction.
Both the right to a jury trial and the right to private property were sacrosanct constitutional
rights.
308. On the procedural-substantive cusp, perhaps.
309. See supra text accompanying note 305.
310. Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. 259, 269-71 (1829); see also Fisher's Negroes v. Dabbs,
14 Tenn. 119, 152-56 (1834) (holding that legislation that mandates striking a particular case
from a court's docket represents a denial of due process); Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10
Tenn. 599, 605-08 (1831) (holding that legislation that applies only to one bank is not "law of
the land"); Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. 554, 555-58 (1831) (holding that legislation
restricted to a small section of the state and affecting the rights of one group is void).
311. Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1, 11-28 (1833) (per curiam), overruled on other
grounds by Mial v. Ellington, 134 N.C. 131, 46 S.E. 961 (1903).
312. Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140, 146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840).
313. Id. at 143-47.
314. Id. The case concerned a taking for private use. In his opinion, Judge Bronson wrote:
"IT]he question does not necessarily turn on the section granting legislative power. The people
have added negative words, which should put the matter at rest." Id. at 145. He then cited
and argued from the constitution's "law of the land" clause. Id.
315. See, e.g., Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202, 209 (1854); Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. 256,
256-64 (1851); Norman v. Heist, 5 Watts & Serg. 171, 173 (Pa. 1843); COOLEY, supra note 9,
at 351-413; SEDGWICK, supra note 284, at 474-82. It is interesting to note that when Chief
Justice Taney rested on the Due Process Clause in the notorious case of Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 449-51 (1857), Justice Curtis accepted the notion of substantive
due process implicit in Taney's opinion but exempted slave property from the normal laws of
property. Id. at 624-27 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
lished tradition by which the text of state constitutions had been found to
protect private property from untoward exercises of the legislative pow-
ers of eminent domain and taxation. It was a foregone conclusion that
courts would limit the exercise of the power of regulation-the last of the
three great governmental powers over private property-to proper objec-
tives. Indeed, courts had occasionally done so before the Civil War."1 6
In other words, long before the rise of Lochner era jurisprudence,
conceptualism was a basic part of the American constitutional tradition.
Moreover, the concepts that underlie the Lochner era approach to gov-
ernmental regulation of private property were long-term members of that
tradition. In the first half of the nineteenth century, courts established
the tradition of thinking about governmental powers as concepts with
known boundaries. Before the Civil War, courts had held, even without
express constitutional text, that the concept of public use cabins the
power of eminent domain and that the concept of public purpose cabins
the power of taxation. In the decade prior to the Civil War, courts had
just begun to discuss the boundaries of the police power.317 It was left to
the postbellum courts to continue these discussions and, even in the ab-
sence of constitutional text, to trace out the boundaries of the police
power, the most difficult of the three great sovereign powers to define.
The notion that "due process" is violated when the legislature en-
acts substantive law infringing vested property rights was also well recog-
nized before the Civil War. The general dearth of antebellum precedents
grounded in due process resulted from the superfluity of a state court
resting on that clause when it determined that a legislative act went be-
yond the legislature's grant of power.3 '8 Because of the English tradition
of finding in the Magna Charta a textual proscription of arbitrary and
despotic government, the Due Process Clause was readily associable with
the tradition worked out under the state constitutions' granting
clauses.319 The migration of the issues addressed by the concept of "leg-
316. See, ag., Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 507-08 (1858).
317. See, ag., id.; Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-88 (1851); Thorpe v.
Rutland & B. R.R., 27 Vt. 140, 149-52 (1854).
318. See Francis W. Bird, The Evolution of Due Process of Law in the Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 44 (1913) (observing that the develop-
ment of Fourteenth Amendment due process usurped the field that this doctrine occupied).
319. As further support for the migration of issues from the Granting Clause to the Due
Process Clause, Lochner era jurists noted that to some extent medieval English courts used the
Magna Charta to void royal and Parliamentary lawmaking outside the scope of their power.
Brinton Coxe argued that in the Middle Ages the King's prerogative included some limited
area of lawmaking power. The Magna Charta voided royal decrees outside the scope of this
area, since the law of the land did not countenance them. Similarly, Parliament's legitimate
area of lawmaking authority was limited in scope. Until the Reformation, the church, not
Parliament, had jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters. Consequently, the Magna Charta
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islative power" from the state constitutions' granting clauses to their due
process clauses began before the Civil War. Enactment of the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the emasculation of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause in The Slaughter-House Cases32 only
accelerated and highlighted that migration.
D. Conclusion
In the early nineteenth century, the tension between judicial review
based on natural law and judicial review based on textual positivism re-
sulted in a jurisprudence premised upon abstract concepts whose deduc-
tive application to controversies was thought to cabin judicial creativity
while effectuating the intent of the Constitution's framers and ratifiers.
John Marshall's early constitutional opinions evidence this development,
as does the nineteenth-century concept of "legislative power." Yet the
notion of "legislative power" does more than evidence conceptualism in
pre-Lochner era constitutional law. The antebellum judges' concept of
"legislative power" limited the legislature's power to transfer property
from A to B, and controlled the legislature's exercise of the powers of
eminent domain and taxation. That concept was the origin of the notion
of substantive due process, which grew to prominence when it was ex-
tended, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, to delimit the legis-
lature's power to regulate private property. A total continuity exists
between the jurisprudence that courts used before the Civil War to cabin
the textually unlimited powers of eminent domain and taxation by the
concepts of public use and public purpose, and the jurisprudence that
courts used after the Civil War to bound the textually unlimited power of
regulation by the concepts of public health, safety, morals, and the pre-
vention of fraud.
From the early nineteenth century through the Lochner era, consti-
tutional conceptualism was a hallmark of American constitutional juris-
prudence. Indeed, until the revolution of 1937, conceptualism was
voided any Parliamentary act trenching on ecclesiastical matters as not the law of the land,
because the act was outside the scope of Parliament's limited lawmaking authority. BRINTON
COXE, AN ESSAY ON JUDICIAL POWER AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION 160-64, 178-
80 (n.p. 1893). In any event, the association of the Magna Charta with a ban on arbitrary and
despotic government may have been behind the appeals to the Magna Charta in the 1780s
when legislation was first discussed as void because it allegedly violated natural law. Once it
was established that American legislatures were delegated limited lawmaking powers, the
thought returned to the place where it had started. See also Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due
Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 941, 943-47 (arguing that Due Process Clause was in-
tended to have substantive content).
320. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), discussed infra text accompanying notes 453-72; see also
Bird, supra note 318, at 44 (stating that after adoption of Fourteenth Amendment, reliance on
the doctrine of "fundamental law" faded).
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considered a necessary condition of legitimate judicial review. In addi-
tion, the Lochner era's substantive due process doctrine, regarded as the
product of a conceptualistic jurisprudence, was itself consonant with the
course of nineteenth-century constitutional law. The Lochner era's sub-
stantive due process doctrine was so wholly a part of the American con-
stitutional tradition that the doctrine, in large measure, should be
regarded as a continuation, indeed as a fruition, of tradition. It was the
1937 Court's overturning of substantive due process precedents that
marked a break with established methodological norms.
IV. THE SOURCE OF LOCHNER ERA CONCEPTS AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
Prior to the Civil War, natural law and framer intent were the two
most important sources of American constitutional law.321 Though nat-
ural law and framer intent may, on many occasions, protect the same
substantive values,322 they are ultimately separate and conflicting sources
321. On natural law (which encompasses drawing from natural reason and natural equity),
see WHITE, supra note 149, at 595-740 (discussing Contract Clause and minority rights);
Christopher Eisgruber, Justice Story, Slavery, and the Natural Law Foundations of American
Constitutionalism, 55 U. CH. L. REv. 273 (1988) (generally discussing natural-law basis for
Justice Story's opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania and modern criticisms of approach); supra text
accompanying notes 187-88, 205-11 (discussing Marbury); supra text accompanying notes 239-
45 (discussing Marshall's concept of "contract" in Fletcher); supra text accompanying note 296
(explaining proscription of special legislation premised upon posited definition of law); supra
note 297 and accompanying text (basing proscription of retrospective laws on "universally"
received concept of law); supra note 299 and accompanying text (discussing sources of the
"legislative power" theory).
On framer intent, see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-27 (1857)
(discussing whether blacks were "citizens" and whether Congress could naturalize them); The
License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 575-76 (1847) (dealing with the original package doc-
trine); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-38 (1810) (analyzing contract issues),
discussed supra text accompanying notes 242-49. Also, the entire "legislative power" theory
that led to the substantive due process doctrine was premised on the presumed intent of the
people in vesting legislative power in the legislature. See supra notes 284-85, 300 and accom-
panying text; see also WHITE, supra note 149, at 674-740 (discussing displacement of natural
law by framer intent in constitutional construction); Paul Kahn, Reason and Will in the Ori-
gins of American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J. 449, 490-506 (1989) (discussing rise of
"framer intent" in constitutional construction); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understand-
ing of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885, 923-35, 944-48 (1985) (same); Sherry, supra
note 114 (generally discussing simultaneous appeal to framer intent and natural law).
322. The discussion of Marshall's analysis in Fletcher on the meaning of "contract," see
supra text accompanying notes 242-49, illustrates his beliefs that natural reason and framer
intent frequently coincided and that natural reason was a source of argument concerning
framer intent. The framers, after all, were aware of natural law; one may assume they rea-
soned according to the demands of natural reason. Natural law and framer intent may also be
reconciled by viewing them as theories used in separate types of cases. See Sherry, supra note
114, at 1167-68 (arguing that jurists drew from natural law in civil liberty cases and from
framer intent in structure-of-government cases).
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of law. Scholars have long noted that antebellum constitutionalism re-
flected a constant interplay and competition between the two sources.
323
Nevertheless, despite the conflict, antebellum jurists usually claimed to
draw their constitutional concepts from one or the other or both.324
These jurists established natural law and framer intent as the traditional
sources of constitutional norms.
Natural law and framer intent emerged from the Civil War and
moved into the early Lochner era with diminished ability to perform
their traditional functions. Despite its link to democratic theory, framer
intent was discredited as the constitutionalism of the advocates of state
sovereignty, nullification, secession, and slavery.325 Despite its appeal to
God's eternal verities, the allure of natural law was tarnished by the nine-
teenth century's increasingly secular, positive, and scientific outlook. Be-
cause of this outlook, some Lochner era jurists spurned natural law,
regarding it as a superannuated myth.326 Others, who maintained a per-
sonal belief in natural law, nonetheless ceased to credit it with sufficient
power to resolve disputes.32 7 This latter group thought natural law sup-
ported general norms and social institutions, such as a right of property,
the sanctity of the monogamous family, and the equality of all persons
323. See, eg., CoRWIN, supra note 143, at 59-64; WHIrE, supra note 149, at 674-740;
Kahn, supra note 321, at 490-506. Professors White and Kahn maintain that under the stress
of the slavery controversy, American judges tempered, if not abandoned, their use of natural
law as an ultimate source of constitutional concepts and norms. The triumph of antislavery
sentiment in the Civil War, however, brought to the bench many jurists who based their moral
and political beliefs upon natural law, and set the stage for a reversion to natural law constitu-
tionalism. The reversion was muted. Cf. William Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Move-
ment upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513,
558-66 (1974) (noting shift to legal formalism in private law). This Article implies that histor-
ism's ability to appeal to natural law and framer intent is an explanation for this outcome.
324. See supra note 321.
325. See Kahn, supra note 321, at 490-506; Powell, supra note 321, at 935; cf. Nelson,
supra note 323, at 538-47 (discussing competition in private law between instrumentalism and
natural law).
326. See LOWELL, supra note 30, at 9, 182-88 (quoted infra text accompanying note 408);
CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRrTrEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
70-71, 73-77, 153 (repr. ed. 1974) (1st ed. 1890) (asserting, among other things, that the "doc-
trine reaches the extreme limits of absurdity in the social contract"; that "Etihere is no such
thing, even in ethics, as an absolute, inalienable, natural right. The so-called natural rights
depend upon, and vary with, the legal and ethical conceptions of the people"; and describing
the doctrine as "groundless"). Of course, the opponents of Lochner era constitutionalism, who
openly mocked the notion of natural law, also contributed to diminishing natural law's ability
to ground constitutional doctrine. See, e.g., OLIVER W. HOLMES, Natural Law, in COL-
LECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310-16 (1920); William Lewis, Civil Liberty as Written in the Constitu-
tion, 41 AM. L. REG. 971, 972-73 (1893); Pound, supra note 10, at 467-68. But the salient
point here is that some proponents of Lochner era jurisprudence agreed with these opponents.
327. See Siegel, supra note 107, at 1488-91.
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before the law.328 In contrast to jurists at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, 329 however, this group no longer believed natural reason was
powerful enough to dictate results in legal controversies.330 Thus, even
Lochner era jurists who maintained a personal belief in natural law ad-
mitted that their version of the tradition disabled it from providing an
ultimate grounding for constitutional doctrine.
In addition, the appeal of framer intent and natural law was blunted
because the doctrines entailed essentially static models of constitutional
law.33 1 Fidelity to framer intent required adhering to the law set down in
1787; fidelity to natural law required adhering to the law set down at the
Creation. Yet, postbellum and Lochner era jurists were aware of the nov-
elty of the task they were undertaking in substantive due process litiga-
tion-transforming the constitutional guarantee of private property from
the protection of vested rights to the protection of substantive rights. 32
They knew the task of fashioning a substantive right of property, and the
concomitant delimitation of government's "police power," had been
thrust upon them by the late nineteenth century's momentous shift in the
social and economic bases of American life.333 Postbellum and Lochner
era jurists were embarking on an elaboration of new constitutional law
for a new era of social and economic relations. Immersed in the late
nineteenth century's post-Darwin world view,334 they saw their world as
evolving, and they thought constitutional law needed an evolutionary,
not static, foundation.
Lochner era jurists, in short, recognized the tremendous physical
335
328. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 170, at *122 n.4 (annot. by Thomas M. Cooley).
329. See, eg., supra text accompanying notes 187-241, 286-300 (discussing Chief Justice
Marshall and the jurists who developed the "legislative power" doctrine).
330. The ability to decide concrete controversies was a demand of their conceptualism. See
supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
331. John Marshall's famous statement in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819), that the Constitution "is ... intended.., to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs," see id. at 415 (emphasis omitted), does not imply that framer intent and natural law,
the primary sources of Marshall's constitutional conceptualism, were anything other than es-
sentially static constitutional models. The term "adapted" may mean "suitable" as well as
"[mlodified so as to suit new conditions." I OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 101 (1933). In-
deed, the Oxford English Dictionary traces the former sense of "adapted" to 1610 and the
latter sense only to 1816. Id. Also, Marshall made this argument to support construing the
Constitution in a manner allowing Congress power to meet the unforeseeable future. He advo-
cated selecting rules and modelling a static Constitution, informed by the unimaginable variety
of circumstances in which the rules would have to function. See Epstein, supra note 109, at
1400, 1406-08.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 27-47 (discussing early Lochner era jurists).
333. See supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
334. See infra text accompanying notes 347-48, 418-20.
335. The term "physical" in this context means the economic and material bases of their
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and metaphysical336 gulf between their world and that of the founding
generation.337 They attempted to bridge this gulf by turning to a new
source for their constitutional principles: the common law.338 The com-
mon law is, of course, a curious and seemingly inappropriate source of
ultimate constitutional norms. The common law traditionally was sub-
ject to legislative control.339 In addition, drawing constitutional concepts
from the common law, rather than from natural law or framer intent,
was a departure from constitutional tradition. The Lochner era jurists'
turn to the common law, however, was consistent with, and predicated
upon, the core of the late ninteenth century's legal and social thought:
use of "historism" as the method of legal analysis and social science.34
lives. It refers to the shift from a country typified by rural communities and small-scale agri-
cultural and commercial undertakings to urban communities and large-scale industrial
enterprise.
336. The term "metaphysical" in this context refers to the abstract belief systems by which
Lochner era jurists lived. America's founding generation believed, for example, in the ability
of natural law to resolve legal disputes, while late nineteenth-century jurists, by and large, did
not. America's founding generation also was less aware that societies change over time than
were late nineteenth-century jurists. See Siegel, supra note 107, at 1437-40; infra text accom-
panying notes 343-45.
337. Antebellum jurists had attempted to grapple with the growing gulf between their
world and the world of the founders through theories of constitutional interpretation such as
Francis Lieber's theory of "construed intent." Lieber conceived "interpretation" as discover-
ing the meanings that documentary draftsmen actually intended. He contrasted this with
"construction," by which he meant determining the appropriate rule "in cases which have not
been foreseen, by the framers of those rules, by which we are nevertheless obliged... faithfully
to regulate... our actions respecting the unforseen case." FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND
POLITCAL HERMENEUTICS 17, 23, 56 (1839 & photo. reprint 1970). His widely noted theory
attempted to allow jurists to respond within a jurisprudence of framer intent to issues that did
not occur, and could not have occurred, to the framers. By the late nineteenth century, the
gulf between the world in which the jurists lived and the world of the framers had grown so
large that even Lieber's theory of construed intent could not bridge it.
338. Modem scholars correctly claim that Lochner era jurists read the concepts they
wished to see into, rather than out of, the common law. On occasion, contemporary opponents
of Lochner era jurisprudence also made this observation. See Charles Shattuck, The True
Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions Which
Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property," 4 HARV. L. REv. 365, 381-82, 391-92 (1891); Charles
Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARv. L. REv. 431, 440-
41,460-61,464 (1925). In general, contemporary opponents of the decisions conceded that the
Lochner era justices drew from the common law, but criticized them for it. What was impor-
tant, however, is that Lochner era jurists truly saw themselves as drawing from the common
law, and believed that the common law was the ultimate source of their constitutional princi-
ples in civil liberty cases. See infra text accompanying notes 426-35; infra note 504.
339. A fundamental assumption of Anglo-American law is that legislatures may alter com-
mon-law rules. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 124-25, 28 N.E. 1126, 1127-
28 (1891) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Stowell v. Flagg, 11 Mass. 364, 365-66 (1814) (finding some
antebellum limits on legislative power over the common law, but upholding extensive control);
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 170, at *160-62 (discussing omnipotence of Parliament).
340. For a discussion of historism, see Siegel, supra note 107 (discussing historism and its
influence on three leading late nineteenth century constitutional commentators); infra notes
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Historism enabled Lochner era jurists to perceive the common law as
divided into two parts--one that was subject to legislative control and
one that controlled legislatures. Historism also provided Lochner era ju-
rists with a substitute source of constitutional concepts without departing
dramatically from previously relied upon concepts of natural law and
framer intent.34' Finally, historism allowed Lochner era jurists to per-
ceive the common law as founded upon permanent principles that en-
tailed changing but sufficiently determinate results in legal controversies.
Historism reconciled the Lochner era jurists' contradictory commitments
to natural law, framer intent, and the tenets of constitutional conceptual-
ism and, at the same time, allowed new law to evolve in response to a
new era of social relations.342
A. Historism as the Basis of Nineteenth Century Legal and Social
Thought
What is meant by describing late nineteenth-century legal and social
thought as grounded in "historism" may be conveyed by contrasting it
with the rationalist method, which provided the foundation for eight-
eenth-century legal and social thought. The rationalist approach, which
originated in the work of Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, and Leibniz, holds
343-91 and accompanying text. This Article traces historism in judicial, as well as scholarly,
thought.
Historism must not be confused with a related but distinct term-"historicism." Histori-
cism is the doctrine that societies change over time through secular causes and that social
values are relative to time and place. Historicism holds that scholars may not induce "cor-
rect" moral and legal principles from studying social history. Historism, in contrast, recog-
nizes that societies evolve but holds that social evolution is determined by intrinsic principles
of social order. Historism, therefore, teaches that scholars may induce "correct" moral and
legal principles from studying social history. Historism was the first step away from static
philosophies of history, which dominated western social thought until the late eighteenth cen-
tury. It was a transitional doctrine that eased the development of the twentieth century view
that societies continually change in random ways. See Siegel, supra note 107, at 1435-36
nn.11-12, 1451-52 n.84, 1545 n.719.
341. Historism allowed the common law to replace framer intent and natural law without
denigrating their fundamental qualities by enabling Lochner era jurists to see the common law
as infused with natural-law principles and as the context within which the founding generation
wrote and understood the Constitution. See Siegel, supra note 107, at 1505-06, 1534-35, 1543-
44; infra notes 410-18, 427-35 and accompanying text.
342. In other words, although historism joined a variety of jurisprudential influences on
laissez-faire constitutionalism, it was the Lochner era's pivotal jurisprudential influence. Loch-
ner era jurists believed that the founding generation and the post-Civil War generation embed-
ded "traditional principles" in the Constitution. They believed many of the permanent
principles of the common law tracked natural law. Happily, the common law contained addi-
tional "true" principles of social order, such as the proscription of monopolies and the allow-
ance of jury trial, protections not directly deducible from right reason. Happily also, the
common law gave principles with sufficient content to direct specific decisions in close cases
and to guide evolving application of its permanent principles to America's evolving society.
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that fundamental postulates of human nature can be derived from casual
observation of oneself or others.343 In turn, these postulates and their
deductive elaboration in the manner of Euclidian geometry 3" can estab-
lish a general body of knowledge concerning individuals and society. Be-
cause the postulates reflect humanity's essential, unchanging nature, the
rationalist method claims that the conclusions derived from the postu-
lates are eternal truths. It teaches that social laws, just like physical
laws, are determinable in such fields as economics and politics and that
eternally true codes of conduct are determinable in such fields as ethics
and law. In short, the eighteenth-century rationalist method maintains
that eternal truths of social order, the application of which has no limit
in time or space, are knowable. 45
According to the originators of the nineteenth century's approach to
understanding society, the rationalist method is flawed because it consid-
ers individuals divorced from the environment in which they exist and
philosophizes about abstract humanity, not actual individuals. Historist
theorists note that humans, not humanity, exist, and that humans are
embedded in time and space, in a physical and cultural environment. In
consequence, historist theorists maintain that even if individuals have a
common nature, it interacts with the environment in which it exists.
Truth, therefore, can be determined only from a study of individuals in
society. In addition, truth can be determined only about individuals in
society. Because every society is affected by its context, which includes
the history of that society,346 historist theorists further claim that social
and moral truths are determinable not through rationalistic introspection
but through the study of history. They believe that economic principles,
343. See JOHN RANDALL, JR., THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIND 308-86 (50th anni-
versary ed. 1976); 1 PAUL VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 103-23
(1920); Hoeffich, supra note 106, at 98-102; Siegel, supra note 135, at 45-58.
344. Eighteenth-century rationalists took Euclidian geometry as a model bod.y of scientific
knowledge. Rationalists thought that Euclidian geometry deductively elaborated a small set of
certain and immutable facts into a myriad of necessarily true conclusions about the world. See
Hoeflich, supra note 106, at 96-108.
345. The rationalist view holds that the postulates of each social science are derived from
empirical observation, yet are capable of determining other truths. Rationalist social science
easily crosses the boundary between "is" and "ought."
346. See ERNST CASSIRER, THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE: PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND
HISTORY SINCE HEGEL 212 (1950) (commenting on shift from considering phenomena in iso-
lation to focusing on their interdependence); R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 90-
93 (lst ed. 1946); RANDALL, supra note 343, at 421-25, 501-07; PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLU-
TION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA 57 (1980). Unlike scholars in prior eras, those in the Enlight-
enment attempted to work out complete bodies of ethics and law from speculation about
humankind's universal nature. See HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 75-76 (4th
prtg. 1955) (1st ed. 1947). The rise of historism represented a retreat from unusually broad
claims about the power of abstract speculation.
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for example, may be discovered through studying the history of eco-
nomic phenomena; they assert that legal principles may be discovered
through studying the history of law.
Historism was so much a part of nineteenth-century thought that it
pervaded some physical sciences, particularly geology and biology.347
From these two sciences, especially from the discipline of evolution, his-
torism in social thought received tremendous reenforcement. As Sir
Frederick Pollock wrote at the end of the century:
[H]istorical method is not the peculiar property.., of... any
... branch of learning. It is the newest and most powerful
instrument, not only of the moral and political sciences, but of
a great part of the natural sciences, and its range is daily in-
creasing. The doctrine of evolution is nothing else than the his-
torical method applied to the facts of nature; the historical
method is nothing else than the doctrine of evolution applied to
human societies and institutions.348
Whatever the role of historical method in the nineteenth-century
physical sciences, it dominated the social sciences and social thought.
Sociology was founded upon it; studies as diverse as philology349 and
politics 350 were remodeled in its image. 35' Historism even challenged the
347. See JEROME BUCKLEY, THE TRIUMPH OF TIME: A STUDY OF VICTORIAN CONCEPTS
OF TIME, HISTORY, PROGRESS AND DECADENCE 6 (1966); ERICH KAHLER, THE MEANING
OF HISTORY 161-66 (1964); Edward Saveth, Scientific History in America: Eclipse of an Idea,
in ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY 3 (1960).
348. FREDERICK POLLOCK, OXFORD LECTURES AND OTHER DISCOURSES 41 (1890); see
also BUCKLEY, supra note 347, at 6; id. at 158 n.7 (quoting HANS MEYERHOFF, TIME IN
LITERATURE 97 (1955)) (in the "nineteenth century all the sciences of man... became 'histor-
ical' sciences in the sense that they recognized and employed a historical, genetic, or evolution-
ary method"); STEFAN COLLINI ET AL., THAT NOBLE SCIENCE OF POLITICS: A STUDY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 247 (1983) (quoting T.E. CLIFFE LESLIE,
ESSAYS IN POLITICAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (n.p. 1879) that "[e]very branch of the phi-
losophy of society, morals and political economy not excepted, needs investigation and devel-
opment by historical induction.").
349. Philology is the study of language-a predecessor of contemporary linguistics. See
HANS AARSLEFF, THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE IN ENGLAND, 1780-1860, at 125-36 (1967);
JOHN B. CARROLL, THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE 18-19 (1953); JOHN FORRESTER, LANGUAGE
AND THE ORIGINS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 168-71 (1980); LEON POLIAKOV, THE ARYAN
MYTH: A HISTORY OF RACIST AND NATIONALIST IDEAS IN EUROPE 189-92 (1971).
350. See, eg., I JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 3, 37-39 (Boston 1890) [hereinafter BURGESS, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW]; COLLINI ET AL., supra note 348, at 183-246; RAYMOND G. GETrELL, HISTORY OF
POLITICAL THOUGHT 389-412 (1924); FRANCIS LIEBER, ESSAYS ON PROPERTY AND LABOR
AS CONNECTED WITH NATURAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY 25-32 (New
York, Harper & Bros. 1841); 1 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS 101-20
(1838); FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 21-50, 205 (3d ed.
Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1874) (Ist ed. 1853); FREDERICK POLLOCK, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS 126-29 (rev. ed. 1911) (1st ed. 1890);
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rationalistic method in economics.35 2 In the early twentieth century,
Karl Mannheim, reflecting on the social thought of the preceding cen-
tury, described it as embodying a "Weltanschauung
' 35 3 of historism. 354
By this he meant a dominating mode of thought and understanding that
"experience[s] every segment of the spiritual-intellectual world as in a
state of flux and growth[,]... [yet] realize[s] that something more than a
mere chameleon-like variation in the elements of life takes place in his-
tory.1355 Historism, he wrote, "fulfils its own essence only by managing
to derive an ordering principle from this seeming anarchy of change-
only by managing to penetrate the innermost structure of this all-pervad-
ing change. "
356
In the late nineteenth century, not only did historism dominate legal
John W. Burgess, Political Science and History, in ANN. REP. AM. HiST. ASS'N 203, 204, 206,
210 (1896) [hereinafter Burgess, History]. Pollock comments that John Stuart Mill was the
"last considerable English writer on politics who ignored [the historical school's] importance."
POLLOCK, supra, at 126. Collini finds Mill more ambivalent. COLLINI ET AL., supra note 348,
at 144-48.
351. Other social studies that historism remodeled include ethics, e.g., HENRY SIDGWICK,
OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ETHICS 304-05 (6th ed. 1931) (lst ed. 1886); sociology, e.g.,
AMERICAN MASTERS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 177-79 (Howard Odum ed. 1927) (discussing Al-
bian W. Small's view of the history of sociology); JOHN W. BURROW, EVOLUTION AND SOCI-
ETY: A STUDY IN VICTORIAN SOCIAL THEORY (1966); 2 JOHN H. RANDALL, JR., THE
CAREER OF PHILOSOPHY: FROM THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT TO THE AGE OF DARWIN
479-80 (1965) (discussing Auguste Comte); ALBIAN W. SMALL, ORIGINS OF SOCIOLOGY
(1924); history, eg., CASSIRER, supra note 346, at 217-42; Dorothy Ross, Historical Conscious-
ness in Nineteenth Century America, 89 AM. HIST. REv. 909 (1984); and philosophy, eg.,
GEORGE W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 4-5, 16-18 (1972) (1st Ger. ed. 1821);
GEORGE W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 8-11 (1900) (lst Ger. ed. 1837); HER-
BERT W. SCHNEIDER, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 336-71 (2d ed. 1963) (discuss-
ing "genetic social philosophy" and "desperate naturalism"). On economics and law, see infra
text accompanying notes 352, 357-91. John Stuart Mill's elaboration of method in the social
sciences in his treatise on logic was something of an exception to the dominance of historism in
the social sciences. JOHN S. MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC 594-616 (8th ed., London, Longmans,
Green & Co. 1884) (lst ed. 1848).
352. COLLINI ET AL., supra note 348, at 247-75; 3 JOSEPH DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC
MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 87-98 (1949); T.W. HUTCHISON, A REVIEW OF ECO-
NOMIC DOCTRINES 1870-1929, at 18-22, 69-74 (1953); SMALL, supra note 351, at 154-66; Theo
Surnyi-Unger, Economic Thought: The Historical School, in 4 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. SCI.
454-58 (1968). English and American economics remained rooted in ahistorical, rationalistic
speculation. Historism challenged rationalism even in this stronghold, however, and Collini
recounts a rather strong challenge. COLLINI ET AL., supra note 348, at 247-75.
353. "Weltanschauung" translates to "world-view." For the importance of world views in
shaping scientific thought, see THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLU-
TIONS 111-36 (2d ed. 1970).
354. The translators used the word "historicism" rather than "historism." On the relation
between historism and historicism, see supra note 340.
355. KARL MANNHEIM, Historicism, in ESSAYS ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 84,
86 (1952). The essay was originally published in 1924.
356. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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thought,35 7 but also through the work of Savigny in Germany and Maine
in England, legal thought was at the forefront of the nineteenth century's
turn to the historical method.358 In law, historism initiated a number of
important shifts in legal consciousness. First, historist jurists began to
view law as contingent on culture. In the eighteenth century, rationalis-
tic jurists had sought to ascertain laws that were true for all people.
35 9
Some historist jurists, especially after the development of comparative
historical method, thought their methodology capable of reaching this
357. Se e.g., POUND, INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 37, passim (illustrating that most
major nineteenth-century schools of jurisprudence were interpretations of legal history);
STEIN, supra note 346, at 69-78; E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurispru-
dence, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 38, 40-46 (1985); Susan G. Gale, A Very German Science: Savigny
and the Historical School, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 123, 128-37 (1982); Stephen G. Utz, Maine's
Ancient Law and Legal Theory, 16 CONN. L. REv. 821, 822 (1984). Historism decisively
influenced legal philosophies not usually thought of as historist, including nineteenth-century
analytic jurisprudence. See, e.g., THOMAS E. HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE
2-13 (13th ed. 1924) (1st ed. 1880) (era's leading treatment of analytic jurisprudence discussing
importance of history); Siegel, supra note 107, at 1446 n.64. John Salmond, a leading analytic
jurist, in an early work, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL HISTORY (Littleton, Colo.,
F.B. Rothman 1891), said in the preface: "I have.., endeavored to... deal with legal history
... for the... assistance afforded by it to the scientific study of the first principles of law." Id.
at iii. Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism was the only major nineteenth-century legal philoso-
phy that was rationalistic.
358. BARON CHARLES L. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (1989) (1st French ed.
1748) (1st English ed. 1750), and HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1906) (lst ed. 1861), are
celebrated historist studies of legal systems that inspired legal and nonlegal scholars, Savigny's
historist writings on German and Roman law were renowned throughout the West. They not
only established him as the "greatest" European jurist of his time, but they also helped crystal-
lize the entire shift from rationalism to historism as the basic approach to Western social
theory. See, e.g., BuRRow, supra note 351, at 137-78; G.P. GOOCH, HISTORY AND HISTORI-
ANS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 47-53 (3d ed. 1920) (1st ed. 1913); STEIN, supra note 346,
at 15-19, 56-65, 87-101; Elliott, supra note 357, at 40-46; Utz, supra note 357, at 822-24, 838.
52; Paul Vinogradoff, The Teachings of Sir Henry Maine, 20 LAW Q. REv. 119 (1904), re-
printed in 2 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF PAUL VINOGRADOFF 173-89 (1928). In Professor
Beale's view,
[t]he impulse given to legal study by the work of Savigny and his school has in the
last generation spread over the civilized world and profoundly influenced its legal
thought.... In England a small but important school of legal thinkers have [sic]
followed the historical method, and in the United States it has obtained a powerful
hold.... We have abandoned the subjective and deductive philosophy of the middle
ages, and we learn from scientific observation and from historical discovery.
Joseph H. Beale, Jr., The Development of Jurisprudence During the Past Century, 18 HARV. L.
REV. 271, 283 (1905).
In referring to the work of Savigny and Maine, one must bear in mind that historism is
something broader than the particular jurisprudential school founded by Savigny and Maine.
Savigny and Maine founded a mode of thought that is known as "historical jurisprudence."
Savigny's and Maine's school of historical jurisprudence was only the original impulse toward
the approach to law this Article describes as founded upon historism. The historical school
was a particular variant of a more general phenomenon.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 343-45.
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"holy grail" of social science." 6 Other historist jurists contented them-
selves with determining the law that was appropriate for their particular
culture. Certainly, their work implicitly expressed the belief that West-
ern law was the most highly evolved and, therefore, the most correct
law.36 Nonetheless, most historist jurists conceded in theory-and in
practice when distinguishing among Western nations-that law was a
culturally bound phenomenon: a set of norms appropriate for the nation
whose history shaped it and whose history it shaped.362 -
Second, historist jurists viewed law as contingent on time. Rational-
ist jurists had claimed to determine laws that were true for all time.363
Some historist jurists also thought their methodology capable of reaching
this "holy grail," if only for a particular society.3" Yet other historist
360. COLLINI ET AL., supra note 348, at 209-46; Guy C. LEE, HISTORICAL JURISPRU-
DENCE 1-11 (1900); see generally HANNIS TAYLOR, THE SCIENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE (1908)
(contrasting various historic developments in the law with a focus on searching for the ideal
law).
361. See STEIN, supra note 346, at'59, 63, 90, 93-94 (discussing Savigny's focus on "nobler"
societies, Maine's focus on "progressive" society, and relation of historical jurisprudence to
nationalism). Professor McCurdy likened Field's egalitarian approach to "equal protection"
to a "white man's burden" ideology, and traced Field's thought to Theodore Sedgwick.
Charles W. McCurdy, Stephen J Field and the American Judicial Tradition, in THE FIELDS
AND THE LAW 5, 17 (1986). McCurdy quotes Sedgwick's view:
"It is enough for us to know, that the supreme Being has seen fit to separate his
people on this earth into various families, and that the white man stands at the head
of all these families.
... As the white people, then, are at the head of the human families, they are
bound to advance, to go forward in the race of civilization, and never backward by
amalgamation, intermarriage, or any kind of corruption of their pure blood. The
interests of humanity [and] of free government... depend upon the white man's
retaining his superiority."
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting THEODORE SEDGWICK, PART FIRST, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
ECONOMY 257-58 (1974) (lst ed. 1836)). Field's historism is discussed infra notes 441-94 and
accompanying text.
362. See EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 70-79 (rev. ed. 1974); OLIVER W.
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 164-70, 213 (Boston, Little, Brown 1881) (tracing "native
origin" of common law of bailment and possession to primitive conditions of Germanic soci-
ety); VINOGRADOFF, supra note 343, at 124-35; Herman Kantorowicz, Savigny and the Histori-
cal School of Law, 53 LAw Q. REv. 326, 332-33, 336-37 (1937); see also James C. Carter, The
Ideal and the Actual in the Law, 13 REP. A.B.A. 217, 234-35 (1890) ("Neither law nor practi-
cal morality can ever transcend a universal custom. Polygamy may be wrong in New York,
but is... right among the Turks.").
363. See supra text accompanying notes 343-45.
364. Sometimes this claim was based on the view that national legal growth is governed by
permanent principles embedded in the nation's racial inheritance-for example, individualism
and local self-government among the Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon peoples. See CARLETON K.
ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 93-95 (6th ed. 1958) (1st ed. 1927) (discussing Puchta and
Gierke); FRIEDRICH C. SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND
JURISPRUDENCE 24 (Abraham Hayward trans., London, Littlewood & Co. 1831) (1st ed.
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jurists proposed that societies evolve through substantially different
stages. Laws that are appropriate for one stage of a nation's development
are not necessarily appropriate for another stage. The "felt necessi-
ties"36 of each era in a nation's history determine its law, and "felt ne-
cessities" vary with the nation's surrounding material and ideational
environment. Thus, for some historist jurists, law became a contingent,
time-bound phenomenon.366 To be sure, these historist jurists were not
fully modem. They did not perceive law as entirely temporally contin-
gent. Embedded in each culture, many of them said, are permanent prin-
ciples that govern social and legal evolution and that distinguish
culturally correct law and legal change from culturally incorrect
change.367 Thus, in law, historism initiated a step away from the static
jurisprudence of eighteenth-century rationalism and a step towards the
fully dynamic jurisprudence of the twentieth century.
The third shift in legal consciousness initiated by historism involved
both a reconception of the nature of custom and a conflation of law with
custom. Historist jurists varied greatly in their descriptions of the ulti-
mate source of national laws. Some, like Savigny, said law develops from
each nation's "volksgeist," its common spirit.368 This spirit had been
part of the nation from its origin; it was what made the people a nation; it
1814); STEIN, supra note 346, at 59-60 (discussing Savigny's "volksgeist" or "common spirit"
as existing from the origin of a people); Siegel, supra note 107, at 1479 n.267, 1500. Usually
the claim was implicit: many historist jurists implied (and sometimes said) that the law of
contemporary Western nations had achieved its ultimate or penultimate state. See, e.g., id. at
1462, 1464-67 (discussing Pomeroy). These jurists did not deny that law had evolved to this
stage. See id. Instead, they confined their attention entirely to elaborating the principles now
perceived as permanently true and therefore, presumably, not subject to further evolution. See
id.
365. This phrase is from HOLMES, supra note 362, at I ("felt necessities" more than "syllo-
gisms" guide legal development). Holmes's view is consistent with historism. The chapters on
torts in Holmes's book contain a lengthy explication of the way law evolves unconsciously
from the people, without the willful intervention of judges, except to crystallize the people's
sentiment. See id. at 120-27, 150-52. Holmes later shifted from historism to modem positivist
jurisprudence. See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464-77
(1897); Siegel, supra note 107, at 1546-47.
366. BURGESS, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 350, at 1-40; LEE,
supra note 360, at 1-2 (Historical jurisprudence "is essentially a progressive science, inasmuch
as the law which it endeavors to comprehend and systematize is progressive and aims with
ever-closer approximation to approach the ideals of the race in which it obtains."); STEIN,
supra note 346, at 115-21 (discussing Vinogradoff's theory of stages of legal development);
VINOGRADOFF, supra note 343, at 157-60; Burgess, History, supra note 350, at 204. Indeed,
some historist jurists thought legal evolution had not ended with the development of laissez-
faire constitutionalism but had entered a more socialist stage. See VINOGRADOFF, supra note
343, at 157-59.
367. See Siegel, supra note 107, at 1455-64, 1467-69, 1492-97, 1500-02.
368. STEIN, supra note 346, at 59-60 (discussing Savigny's theory of the "volksgeist").
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was their racial inheritance.36 9 Others said a nation's laws stem from less
mystical and more variable sources, such as the customs and interests of
its ruling class,37 ° the common people's response to the practical necessi-
ties of life in their environment,371 the decisions of judges and jurists,
372
or an amalgam of all of these elements.373 The contentiousness and at-
tention lavished on the question of the ultimate source of a nation's laws
created an internecine conflict masking (and, indeed, caused by) an im-
portant commonality centered on the idea that law is embedded in na-
tional tradition.3 74 Law, historist jurists maintained, is a social product;
369. ALLEN, supra note 364, at 93-95 (discussing Puchta and Gierke); SAVIGNY, supra
note 364, at 24; STEIN, supra note 346, at 59-60 (discussing Savigny's volksgeist as existing
from the origin of a people).
370. ALLEN, supra note 364, at 89-92. Professor Gray said that only the rules judges en-
force are law, but also observed that judges are subject to "the will of the real rulers of the
State"; the identity of the "real rulers" is "a question of fact and not of form," and may vary
from "court favorites... [to] priests... [,] demagogue[s] or political boss[es]"; in rare in-
stances in "a very primitive community" it may even be the judges. JOHN C. GRAY, THE
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 121-23 (2d ed. 1921) (lst ed. 1909).
371. See ALLEN, supra note 364, at 95-101; Carter, supra note 362, at 231-33, 235-36, 239.
372. GRAY, supra note 370, at 93-105, 124-25, 308-09; Joseph H. Beale, Book Review, 20
HARv. L. REv. 164 (1906) (reviewing THOMAS E. HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRU-
DENCE (1906)) (arguing that common law is principles, not custom). Professor Beale writes:
The law of a given time must be taken to be the body of principles which is accepted
by the legal profession, whatever that profession may be; and it will b agreed that
the judges have a preponderating share in fixing the opinion of the profession. They
are, however, not the sole element in forming this opinion. Legal thinkers who are
not judges have at all times played a considerable part. The teachers of law today
have an increasing influence....
1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 40 (1935) [hereinafter BEALE,
TREATISE]. Gray is usually regarded as a protorealist. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.,
THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 76, 159 (1973); Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instru-
mentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 861, 865, 876-
77 (1981). Gray's work in property shows that he had many formalist and historist character-
istics. See Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray, Legal Formalism, and the Transformation
of Perpetuities Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 439, 446-55 (1982); infra note 374. All of Gray's
doctrinal work and much of his theoretical work fit within a historist mold. His work sits on
the historist-positivist border. See) Siegel, supra note 107, at 1525-26, 1538-39 (discussing
Christopher Tiedeman, a different jurist whose work occupied this terrain); infra note 374.
373. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 364, at 112-29 (discussing interaction of juristic and pop-
ular influence on the law); infra text accompanying note 377 (quoting James Bryce); see also
ALLEN, supra note 364, at 101-11 (discussing Tarde's analysis of the psychological force of
imitation).
374. In many ways, it was a typical internecine dispute. Historist jurists were debating the
role of the practices of the people in determining the law. In their struggle to elucidate a
source of law other than reason or will, historist jurists debated endlessly among themselves
over the correct depiction of what accounted for the existence of authoritative national cus-
toms. They did not doubt, however, the existence of such customs. See ALLEN, supra note
364, at 79, 87-107, 112-29 (discussing views on the origin and nature of custom and its place in
legal systems).
An example of the internecine conflict is that Gray disparaged both Savigny's "volk-
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it is neither the product of philosophical reason, as rationalist jurists con-
tended, nor the product of sovereign will, as positivist jurists argued.37
As James Bryce told the 1907 American Bar Association convention,
376
[L]aws are the work of the nation as a whole, framed indeed by
the ruling class, and shaped in their details by a professional
class, but to a large extent created by other classes also, because
... the rules which govern the relations of the ordinary citizen
must be such as fit and express the wishes of the ordinary citi-
zen, being in harmony with his feelings and fitted to meet the
needs of his daily life. They are the offspring of custom, and
custom is the child of the people. Thus not only the construc-
tive intellect of the educated and professional class but the half-
conscious thought and sentiment of the average man go to the
making and moulding of the law. It is the outcome of what
German philosophers call the legal mind ("Rechts Bewusst-
sgeist" theory and Carter's practices-of-the-people theory, and he seemed to reject entirely the
notion, which was the bedrock claim of the school of historical jurisprudence, that custom is
the ultimate source of law. GRAY, supra note 370, at 89-93, 150-01, 233-40, 282-94, 299-300.
Yet Gray's doctrinal work is a marvelous illustration of historist jurisprudence. See JOHN C.
GRAY, REsTRAInTs ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY iii-xiv (2d ed., Boston, Boston Book
Co. 1895) (1st ed. 1885) (criticizing a significant recent case in terms of its departure from
traditional principles); JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 5-201 (Boston,
Little, Brown 1886) (tracing slow development of "true" rule, which he induces from the
record); John C. Gray, Remoteness of Charitable Gifts, 7 HARv. L. REv. 406, 407-08 (1894)
(defending the jurisprudence of his treatises).
Gray is famous for advocating the modem, positivist theory that law is the set of rules of
conduct that the judiciary enforces, and everything judges consider in determining the rules
they enforce, such as statutes and customs, are merely sources of law. GRAY, supra note 370,
at 121-23, 287-90, 302-09. Gray also said, however, that the judiciary is limited in what it does
by the sentiments of the "rulers of society." Id. at 121-23. Most of the time, the "rulers" are
indifferent to what the judges do, and judges, by and large, are guided by their own morality.
Gray explicitly claimed that judicial treatment of all the law's sources-statutes, precedents,
expert opinion, and custom-is greatly influenced by morality. Id. at 302-09. Gray insisted
that judges are free to and should follow their own, not society's, morality. Id. at 287-90, 302-
09. Thus, Gray's historism comes out of his view that law emerges from the slow interaction
between experience and judicial morality. To the extent that judicial morality reflects common
morality, his theory blends into mainstream historism. Cf. supra note 372 (indicating a similar
position that John Henry Beale held: law is not custom but the principles, which develop over
time, adhered to by the legal profession).
375. For this reason, historist jurists maintained that natural-law jurists erred in elaborat-
ing an imaginary law-a law for a mythical state of nature, rather than an actual law for real
societies. They also contended that positivists erred by confusing the principle that nothing
can be law that the sovereign does not enforce with the actual source of what the sovereign
enforces. See GRAY, supra note 370, at 88-89; M.J. Aronson, The Juridical Evolutionism of
James Coolidge Carter, 10 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 11-12 (1953); Carter, supra note 362, at 222-23,
231-35.
376. Interestingly, this was the same convention that heard Roscoe Pound's call for a new
sociological jurisprudence. See Pound, The Need, supra note 37.
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sein," or legal consciousness) of a nation.377
For historist jurists, customary law was not customary law as under-
stood by pre-nineteenth-century jurists. Prior to the nineteenth century,
jurists regarded customary law as an unsystematic and unsystematizable
mass of rules generated by usage.378 Jurists, it is true, were divided on
the inherent worth of these rules. Rationalist jurists dismissed them as
unworthy of philosophical attention;379 traditionalist jurists, such as Ed-
mund Burke, thought them imbued with a wisdom and justice tran-
scending human understanding.8
In contrast to both these views, nineteenth-century historist jurists
saw customary law as possessing a wisdom that was accessible to human
understanding and capable of systematic exegesis and development. Cus-
tomary law was a spontaneous and evolutionary expression of the nation.
As with all natural and social phenomena, however, discoverable order-
ing principles governed its development. 381 Thus, in one of the many
ironies of intellectual history, istorist jurists seem to have discovered in
the disorderly mass of customary law not only the same structure of ab-
stract principle and concept that rationalist jurists discovered in their
inquiries into human nature, but at times even the same principles and
concepts.38 2 Accordingly, historist jurists found no contradiction be-
tween claiming custom and usage as the determinants of law and elabo-
rating highly conceptualistic legal constructs.38 3 As Savigny wrote at the
377. James Bryce, The Influence of National Character and Historical Environment on the
Development of the Common Law, 31 REP. A.B.A. 444, 449 (1907); see also JAMEs C.
CARTER, LAW: ITs ORIGIN, GRowTH AND FuNCTiON (1907) (discussing the role custom
and social progress play in shaping the law); HOLMES, supra note 362, at 1-2, 120-27, 164-70,
210-13 (discussing the "native origin" of the common law of bailment and possession and the
way law evolves unconsciously from the people); LEE, supra note 360, at 1-2 (Jurisprudence
"is essentially a progressive science, inasmuch as the law which it endeavors to comprehend
and systematize is progressive and aims with ever-closer approximation to approach the ideals
of the race in which it obtains."); Carter, supra note 362, at 225 ("[t]he social standard of
justice exists in the habits, customs and thoughts of the people").
378. See Siegel, supra note 135, at 20-39, 50-53, 56-57.
379. STEIN, supra note 346, at 69-72 (discussing Bentham's argument that the common law
was simply an arbitrary accumulation of rules).
380. JOHN PococK, Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A Problem in the History of Ideas,
in PoLrrIcs, LANGUAGE AND TIME 202, 205-12, 222-28 (1960) (discussing Burke's argument
that the rules exemplified the most basic human rights); Siegel, supra note 135, at 49-55 (dis-
cussing Hobbes, Hale, and Locke).
381. See Siegel, supra note 107, at 1460-61, 1497-1500; supra text accompanying note 356.
382. Hoeflich, supra note 106, at 106-08 (commenting on Savigny's integration of the geo-
metric method of rationalist jurists into historical jurisprudence); Pound, The Scope and Pur-
pose, supra note 37, at 598-604; Siegel, supra note 107, at 1467-69, 1502, 1540-42 (discussing
Pomeroy, Cooley, and Tiedeman).
383. Indeed, in the history of legal thought, no scholar's doctrinal work is more conceptu-
alistic and rigorously logical than the work of Savigny, the founder of the historical school.
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beginning of the rise of the historical school:
With the progress of civilization, national tendencies become
more and more distinct, and what otherwise would have re-
mained common, becomes appropriated to particular classes;
the jurists now become more and more a distinct class of the
kind; law perfects its language, takes a scientific direction, and,
as formerly it existed in the consciousness of the community, it
now devolves upon the jurists, who thus, in this department,
represent the community. Law is henceforth more artificial
and complex, since it has a twofold life; first, as part of the
aggregate existence of the community, which it does not cease
to be; and secondly, as a distinct branch of knowledge in the
hands of the jurists .... 384
Finally, drawing from their new concept of custom and its role in
establishing legal norms, historist jurists relegitimated and re-emphasized
the role of judges and jurists as the central figures in legal development
and lawmaking. By the end of the eighteenth century, rationalist jurists
were proposing the abolition of customary law and the enactment of
codes drawn from reason (on the continent) or utility (in England). This
development, which portended much liberal reform, led to the articula-
tion of the historist method by politically conservative jurists. 38- In their
argument against both rationalism and positivism, historist jurists ob-
served that legal development had always taken place, and should always
take place, through juristic activity. Lawmaking through juristic activ-
ity, they said, was better than lawmaking through legislation because it
drew from the wisdom of the ages, not the speculations of just the present
generation; it was more flexible and responsive to social needs than law-
making through legislative activity because courts are always in session
and are more accessible to the common person; and it was administered
That is true with the possible exception of his followers, the German Pandectists of the nine-
teenth century. See infra note 384.
384. SAVIGNY, supra note 364, at 28; see also ALLEN, supra note 364, at 16-17 (quoting
FRIEDRICH C. SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW passim (Westport, Conn.,
Hyperion Press 1867)) (discussing criticisms of Savigny's ideals and presenting selected
refutals by Savigny); id. at 113-29 (discussing juristic development of custom). As Savigny
later said, "The sum ... of this theory is, that all law is ... first developed by custom and
popular faith, next by jurisprudence. . . ." SAVIGNY, supra note 364, at 30. Savigny's doctri-
nal treatises, and the treatises of his closest followers, were remarkably conceptualistic. See
JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 224-27 (1964); Hoeflich, supra
note 106, at 106-08; Pound, The Scope and Purpose, supra note 37, at 598-604; see also BEALE,
TREATISE, supra note 372, at 164 (conceptualistic presentation of conflicts of law by a his-
torist); Siegel, supra note 107, at 1455-69"(discussing Pomeroy); Siegel, supra note 372, at 445-
47 (discussing Gray).
385. STEIN, supra note 346, at 59, 63, 72, 75-76, 89; Pound, The Scope and Purpose, supra
note 37, at 600-02 (commenting on the same phenomenon at the end of the century).
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by a body of individuals whose long training made them uniquely quali-
fied to focus the learning of the past on the needs of the present. In
general, juristic activity imitates the mechanism of change in nature:
large changes are accomplished by the slow accumulation of small varia-
tions.3 6 This evolution avoids destabilizing shocks to the body politic.
For these and many other reasons, historist jurists considered jurispru-
dence-the art of lawmaking through molding inherited legal principles
and concepts to the needs of the present 3 7 -a far better engine of legal
development than legislation-the willful imposition of self-interest upon
the body politic.88
In the first half of the nineteenth century, American jurists had bat-
tled codification of the common law with these same arguments.38 9
These jurists' ultimate view of law, however, was rationalistic; they saw
the common law as bottomed on "principles of equity, natural justice,
and.., good public policy."390 Natural justice, equity, and good public
policy were as accessible to legislators as to judges. Therefore, the prefer-
ence for common law over code law was only a matter of degree rather
386. See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 346, at 88, 100 (discussing Maine); Siegel, supra note 107,
at 1453-64, 1488-97 (discussing Pomeroy and Cooley).
387. As James Bryce said,
The solid and essential value of legal science begins in the manipulation of the mate-
rial presented by an actual system of law, in the moulding of the old customs so as to
reconcile them with the always changing needs of the people .... For legal science is
not merely either expository on the one hand or on the other ... corrective ... but is
also Constructive and Ameliorative, framing rules under which society may advance
steadily and smoothly, may get rid of obsolete doctrines, may find new facts ade-
quately dealt with under new rules ....
JAMES BRYCE, The Methods of Legal Science, in STUDIES IN HISToRY AND JURISPRUDENCE
607, 633-35 (1901). John Chipman Gray argued that jurisprudence considers the rules courts
have in fact adopted and the rules that "ought to be adopted in those cases which do not come
within the established rules." GRAY, supra note 370, at 140-41. Gray assigned consideration
of rules that "ought to be [adopted] in all cases" to the science of legislation, not the science of
law. Id. (In the second edition either Gray or his editor added a footnote that the new socio-
logical school ofjurists included the science of legislation in jurisprudence. Id. at 141 n.1.); see
also Aronson, supra note 375, at 27-35 (explaining the judge's function as a conduit for inter-
preting historical and current social standards and dispensing justice that meets those
standards).
388. See, e.g., SAVIGNY, supra note 364, at 30, 32; Carter, supra note 362, at 227, 242-45;
Christopher G. Tiedeman, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 3 U.L. REv. 11, 25 (1896).
389. MORTON HoRWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 257-
59 (1977).
390. Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & M. R.R., 67 Mass. (6 Gray) 263, 267 (1854) (discuss-
ing the derivation of common law from equitable principles and natural law); see also, e.g.,
HORWrrz, supra note 389, at 16-30 (discussing and illustrating "instrumentalist" concept of
common law in the first half of the nineteenth century); WILLIAM D. LEWIs, THE LAW OF
PERPETUITY 48-49, 118, 138-39, 289, 357 (Am. ed. n.p., 1846), discussed in Siegel, supra note
372, at 448.
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than a matter of kind. With the emergence of historist jurisprudence, the
separation of legislative and common-law lawmaking became one of
kind, not degree, because sufficient knowledge of the abstract legal con-
cepts embedded in the traditions of the people was inaccessible except to
the highly educated and trained minds of judges and jurists. Thus, in the
nineteenth-century historism reinvigorated the view that legislatively
made law can only be political while juridically made law can be "true."
Historism allowed nineteenth-century American jurists to ascribe all le-
gitimate lawmaking to the people, while denigrating democratically
made law in favor of law discovered by a specially trained elite.391
B. The Impact of Historism on the American Constitutional Tradition
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the assumptions of his-
torism enveloped Anglo-American law,392 transforming constitutional
tradition in three interrelated ways." 3 First, imbued with historism,
Lochner era jurists turned to the common law for their constitutional
norms. Second, they dislodged natural law and framer intent from their
traditional places as the source of constitutional concepts. Third, they
replaced the notion of a static Constitution with the notion of an evolu-
tionary Constitution.
Under the aegis of historism, Lochner era jurists did not constitu-
tionalize the common law per se; they found no constitutional right to
particular common-law rules. In their view, legislatures had general
power to amend the law "to remedy defects in the common law.., and
to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances." 394 But, consistent
with historism, Lochner era jurists thought of the mass of common-law
rules as expressions of more abstract concepts and principles. They
thought of these concepts and principles as the "'established principles
391. See HoRwrrz, supra note 389, at 252-66 (describing shift in common-law thought
from instrumentalism to formalism after the mid-nineteenth century); Nelson, supra note 323,
at 513, 558-66 (same). The shift from perceiving the common law as expressing current policy
and justice to expressing historical truths is illustrated in the development of perpetuity law.
See Siegel, supra note 372, at 446-55.
392. Implicit in the broad impact of historism on nineteenth-century jurists, see supra notes
357-91, is that historism decisively influenced private law, such as the law of torts and con-
tracts, as well as public law, such as constitutional law, in the late nineteenth century. Legal
formalism, the jurisprudence that dominated private-law discussions between 1870 and 1930,
was the expression of historism in private law. Legal formalism is insightfully discussed in
Kennedy, supra note 33. Private law is not the focus of this Article, which describes early
Lochner era jurisprudence as historism's public-law expression.
393. In turn, these changes in constitutional tradition undergirded the Lochner era's trans-
formation of substantive constitutional law.
394. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
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of private rights and distributive justice' "9' of the Anglo-American peo-
ple.3 96 Secure in the belief that common-law concepts and principles also
reflect natural law and framer intent, Lochner era jurists ensconced them
as the fundamental principles of substantive justice of the American pol-
ity,397 principles that were the inviolate "law of the land."3 9
395. COOLEY, supra note 9, at 355 (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okeley, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819)).
396. James Bryce described the common law as "the in-dwelling qualities of the race of
men who built it up," as perfect expressions of the "mind and character of [the] people," and
as "the work of the nation as a whole." Bryce, supra note 377, at 449; see also Siegel, supra
note 107, at 1460-64, 1497-1500, 1527-29 (discussing Pomeroy, Cooley, and Tiedeman).
Although he was English, James Bryce was a respected commentator on American law. See 1-
2 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONvEALTH (3d ed. 1914) (1st ed. 1888); RIChARD
A. COSGROVE, OUR LADY THE COMMON LAW: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL COMMU-
NrrY, 1870-1930, at 2-3, 7, 40-43, 59-88 (1987). Of course, Lochner era praise of the common
law also noted its concordance with natural law and common sense, but this concordance was
an outgrowth of the Anglo-American people's innate "ethnic" principles.
397. A review of Lochner era procedural due process cases shows that the Court sought to
constitutionalize not the common law's fundamental concepts and principles, but the funda-
mental traditions and principles of all free and civilized nations. E.g., Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 588 (1900); Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 531 (1884). Reflecting on a string of cases holding that due process constitutional-
izes neither grand or petit juries of the common law nor the common-law privilege against self-
incrimination, the Court concluded that as "salutary," Twining, 211 U.S. at 113, as the re-
quirements of grand juries, petit juries, and the privilege against self-incrimination "may seem
... to the great majority, [they] cannot be ranked with the right to hearing before condemna-
tion, the immunity from arbitrary power not acting by general laws, and the inviolability of
private property." Id.
The Lochner era jurists' refusal to incorporate the Anglo-Saxon people's traditional proce-
dural institutions into the Due Process Clause is compatible with the claims of this Article. In
Hurtado, the first of a string of procedural due process cases, the Court pointed out that
although due process rights
[a]pplied in England only as guards against executive usurpation and tyranny, here
they have become bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation; but, in that application,
as it would be incongruous to measure and restrict them by the ancient customary
English law, they must be held to guarantee not particular forms of procedure, but
the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property.
Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 532. In other words, deference to the "just and necessary discretion of
legislative power," id., meant that the Due Process Clause guarantees only those procedural
requirements needed to protect the norms of substantive due process. No traditional proce-
dural institution of the Anglo-Saxon people was ever found indisputably necessary to protect
fundamental substantive rights. Only the abstract concepts of jurisdiction and appropriate
notice and hearing, "two fundamental conditions, which seem to be universally prescribed in
all systems of law," Twining, 211 U.S. at 111, were incorporated as procedural aspects of due
process.
In short, Lochner era jurists saw due process as a guarantee of substantive justice. Proce-
dural norms were constitutionalized only to the extent they were required to guarantee sub-
stantive justice. This approach paralleled the nineteenth century's treatment of the
relationship of rights and remedies. For example, the Contract Clause protected contract
rights absolutely, but protected contract remedies only when infringement of the remedy
threatened impairment of the protected rights. In addition, the Court never acknowledged the
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Accordingly, in constitutional disputes pitting legislative power
against the right of private property, Lochner era jurists discovered, in
the mass of common-law rules, traditional "principles upon which [the]
power of regulation rests." '399 From time immemorial, either by common
law or under statute, English courts had supervised the exercise of com-
mon callings, abated nuisances, imposed liability for uses of property that
injured others, adjusted conflicting rights among concurrent owners, and
proscribed fraud.' The principles, concepts, and doctrines underlying
claim that the right to grand and petit juries and the privilege against self-incrimination were
universally accepted norms of due process at the time of the Constitution's adoption. See id. at
91-92, 106-11; Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 524-28. Thus, in another irony of intellectual history,
Lochner era jurists found that the Due Process Clause incorporated more substantive than
procedural law. This position might be easier to understand if the clause had been rendered
under its alternative wording, which proscribed deprivations not countenanced by the law of
the land.
398. Since these principles were the "law" of the land, "due process of law" required their
observance. See supra note 306 and accompanying text. Thus, a historically conceived com-
mon law provided principles that defined the concept of "law"; anything not countenanced by
these principles was not "law" and, necessarily, not "due process of law."
Once again, the argument is not that Lochner era jurists introduced into American law
the notion of the common law as founded upon abstract principles rather than concrete usage.
The "mass of concrete usage" concept of the common law (the concept of common-law law-
yers from Fortescue to Coke to Burke to Fearne) had been supplanted by the "abstract princi-
ples" concept in the first half of the nineteenth century. American jurists in the first half of the
nineteenth century, however, were imbued with the rationalist method. Accordingly, they
conceived the common law upon principles of natural justice, equity, and good public policy.
See supra text accompanying note 390. Rather, the argument is that in the second half of the
nineteenth century, Lochner era jurists shifted their concept of the common law's underlying
abstract principles from natural justice, equity and good public policy to the traditions of the
Anglo-American people. See Siegel, supra note 135, at 20-30, 56-58; see also supra text accom-
panying notes 389-90 (explaining the principles used by jurists in the first half of the nineteenth
century). For an example of the shift from concepts of the common law based on rationalistic
principles to concepts in private law based on historical principles, see Siegel, supra note 372,
at 446-55. One Lochner era commentator suggested that constitutionalization of the princi-
ples, rather than the rules, of the common law was a break with pre-Civil War precedent, at
least in the procedural due process cases. See Morr, supra note 61, at 244-49 (commenting on
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856), and
contrasting it with Hurtado, 110 U.S. 516). But Mott overstated the case. It is unclear which
concept of the common law-the principles concept or the mass-of-rules concept-directed
pre-Civil War constitutional adjudication.
399. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876), discussed infra text accompanying notes
473-94.
400. See generally McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 550 (1908) (deriving police power
from requirements of fraud prevention); Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 20-26 (1885)
(deriving police power from regulation of conflicting rights to things held in common); Munn,
94 U.S. at 129, 131-32 (deriving police power from law of common callings); Commonwealth
v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-88 (1851) (deriving police power from sic utere maxim of
nuisance law); Baker v. Boston, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 183, 193 (1831) (deriving police power
from abatement of nuisance at common law); Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R.R., 27 Vt. 140, 149-51
(1854) (deriving police power from sic utere maxim of nuisance law); supra text accompanying
notes 29-34, 39-47 (describing strict and moderate laissez-faire constitutionalists).
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these precedents delimited the right of property as understood by the
common-law tradition and established the correlative sphere of govern-
ment's "police power." New legislation compatible with the principles
embodied in common-law doctrines regulating property was valid; new
law incompatible with those principles was proscribed. As Thomas Mc-
Intyre Cooley concluded in his landmark treatise published in 1868:
When the government... interferes with the title to one's prop-
erty, or with [one's] independent enjoyment of it, and its act is
called into question as not in accordance with the law of the
land, we are to test its validity by those principles of civil liberty
and constitutional defence which have become established in
our system of law, and not by any rules that pertain to forms of
procedure merely.4 1
Thus, for example, when the question of regulating railroad and
utility rates arose, Lochner era jurists determined that common-law pre-
cedent countenanced regulation of the prices and charges of businesses
"affected with a public interest." 2 Having made that determination, all
that mattered was whether the business at bar was "within... [or] with-
out" that abstract concept." 3 If the business was within that concept, its
rates were regulable. It did not matter that the specific business was un-
known to the common law or that its charges had not previously been
regulated.' Similarly, when the question of liquor prohibition arose,
Lochner era jurists determined that the common law always had regu-
lated liquor closely because of its effect on public health and morals." 5
Therefore, all that mattered was whether prohibition was a reasonable
means to control the deleterious effects of liquor or a "mere pretext" to
accomplish an objective not properly within the sphere of governmental
power. If prohibition was a reasonable means to accomplish the permit-
ted objective, it did not matter that prohibition had never before been the
common law's regulatory technique." 6 In sum, in turning to the com-
401. COOLEY, supra note 9, at 356.
402. See, e.g., Munn, 94 U.S. at 126 (supporting regulation of "property... 'affected with a
publick [sic] interest'" (quoting Lord Chief Justice Hale, De Portibus Maris, in 1 A COLLEC-
TION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 45, 77-78 (Francis Hargrave ed.,
London, T. Wright 1787))); Finkelstein, From Munn v. Illinois to Tyson v. Banton: A Study in
the Judicial Process, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 769 (1927) (reviewing the history of the concept
without using this phrase); W. Frederic Foster, The Doctrine of the United States Supreme
Court of Property Affected by a Public Interest and Its Tendencies, 5 YALE L.J. 49 (1895)
(discussing the implications of Munn).
403. Munn, 94 U.S. at 125.
404. Id. at 125, 133.
405. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887); FREUND, supra note 21, at 192-93, 201-
02.
406. See Mugler, 123 U.S. 623. But see TIEDEMAN, supra note 22, at 305-07 (arguing that
1991)
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mon law as the source of their notions of substantive due process, Loch-
ner era jurists conceived that mass of doctrines and rules as an expression
of abstract principles and concepts that formed the traditional norms of
the Anglo-American people. Because the common law's principles and
concepts were the traditional norms of the Anglo-American people, they
were the "law of the land"-the norms the founding generation intended
the Constitution's Due Process Clause to protect.
Concomitant with their drawing constitutional concepts from the
common law, Lochner era jurists dislodged natural law and framer intent
from their traditional place as the sources of constitutional concepts.
Certainly, Lochner era treatises and opinions contain many references to
natural rights and framer intent.4°7 Some of these references came from
laissez-faire constitutionalists who regarded the theory of natural rights
as an "exploded doctrine."'"° These jurists believed that through the ex-
ploded theory, certain rights had passed into the Anglo-American tradi-
tion.' For these jurists, common-law acceptation, not illusory natural-
law origin, determined a right's constitutional status.
Most Lochner era references to natural law came, however, from
Lochner era jurists who maintained abelief in that jurisprudence. Natu-
ral rights were a fundamental aspect of many Lochner era jurists' con-
cepts of political science and morality.410 But even for them, what
constitutionalized the right of private property, the right to pursue all
lawful callings, the right to equal laws, and the right to liberty of contract
was not their status as natural rights. Rather, as Justice Bradley, a natu-
ral-rights enthusiast, wrote in his path-breaking dissent in The Slaughter-
House Cases,411 it was their status as "traditionary rights and privileges
... which had been wrested from English sovereigns at various periods of
the nation's history [and] established and secured by long usage and by
various acts of Parliament." '412 Thus, although many Lochner era jurists
because sale of liquor does not necessarily trespass on the rights of others or damage health,
the legislature may regulate it but not prohibit it).
407. See, eg., Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concur-
ring); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 105 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting);
WILLIAM S. PATTEE, THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF LAW passim (1909); TIEDEMAN, supra
note 22, at 1; see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 170, at *122 n.4 (annotation by Thomas M.
Cooley).
408. LOWELL, supra note 30, at 9; see also supra note 326 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing decline of natural-law theory in late nineteenth century).
409. See LOWELL, supra note 30, at 9, 182-88; TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at 73, 76-78; see
also Lewis, supra note 326, at 972-73 (opponent of Lochner era constitutionalism expressing
same theory).
410. Nelson, supra note 323, at 551-52, 565.
411. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
412. Id. at 114-15 (Bradley, J., dissenting); see also Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S.
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believed in natural law, they nevertheless drew from it not as a source of
constitutional norms but as confirmation of rights they thought were em-
bedded in common-law tradition.413 For these jurists too, a right's con-
stitutional status followed from common-law acceptation, not natural-
law descent.
Lochner era references to framer intent served a similar function. In
general, references to framer intent were fairly rare in Lochner era opin-
ions. Lochner era jurists never claimed fidelity to the founding genera-
tion's specific intent. The claims made are only leitmotifs resonating as
claims of fidelity to some original abstract societal intent.414 Indeed, in a
book elaborating America's "unwritten constitution," which is wholly an
application of the insights of historist jurisprudence, Professor Christo-
pher Tiedeman, the leading strict laissez-faire constitutionalist, con-
cluded that the framers' Constitution endured solely because they had
divined the "legal consciousness" 415 of the people for whom they wrote:
9, 20-21 (1884) (using the common-law principle of legislative regulation of conflicting rights
to commons to deny that the Mills Acts are exercises of eminent domain); Loan Ass'n v.
Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 663-65 (1874) (Miller, J.) (mentioning natural rights and the
social compact but deciding the case on "the course and usage of the government"); Slaughter-
House, 83 U.S. at 86-87, 104-08, 109-10 (Field, J., dissenting) (mentioning natural rights but
resting on common-law tradition); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-79
(1871) (Miller J.) (employing historical arguments to define a "taking" of property); COOLEY,
supra note 9, at 533 ("[T]he settled practice of free governments must be our guides [sic] in
determining what is ... a public use."). In Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141
(1872) (Bradley, J., concurring), Justice Bradley's appeal to the "law of the Creator" func-
tioned as collateral support for the claim that, as a matter of tradition, the right to pursue all
lawful callings had not been regarded as a fundamental right of the female sex. Professor
Nelson has noticed this use of "higher law" in late nineteenth-century private law. See Nelson,
supra note 323, at 565-66. Professor McCurdy has noted that higher law complemented tradi-
tion in the public law of that era. Charles W. McCurdy, The Roots of "Liberty of Contract"
Reconsidered: Major Premises in the Law of Employment, 1867-1937, in 1984 Sup. Cr. HisT.
Soc'Y Y.B. 20, 26-30.
413. An explanation for natural law's reduction to a secondary role in the thoughts of
Lochner era jurists who believed in these rights perhaps lies in their view that natural law
cannot resolve disputes, see supra text accompanying notes 327-30, and that common law in-
corporated and supplemented natural-law norms. See infra text accompanying notes 441-94
(discussing Justice Field); supra text accompanying note 382 (commenting on tendency of his-
torical jurists to rediscover in tradition the concepts that rationalist jurists fashioned); supra
note 342 (discussing view that the common law supplemented the shortcomings of natural
law).
414. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876) (holding that the right of property that
.the Constitution protects comes from the common law); Ives v. Southern B. Ry., 201 N.Y.
271, 293, 94 N.E. 431, 439 (1911) (fault principle was the law of the land when the Constitu-
tion was adopted); LOWELL, supra note 30, at 125-26, 129 (saying the framers did not specify
clearly the principles they set above legislative powers); TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at 77-78.
For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 416-21.
415. Tiedeman did not use the term "legal consciousness." He used an equivalent expres-
sion earlier in discussing his general jurisprudence. In that discussion he described the basis of
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The . .. American constitution[] work[s] well, and chal-
lenges[s] the admiration of political students not because of [its]
inherent and abstract excellences-for it would be no arduous
or insuperable task to point out several glaring defects, but be-
cause [it is] in complete correspondence with the political senti-
ment of the... nation[], and ... [is] the natural product[] of
Anglo-American civilization ....
... It is the complete harmony of its principles with the
political evolution of the nation, which justly challenges our ad-
miration, and not the political acumen of the convention which"
promulgated it.
416
Moreover, in a clear break with the previous treatment of the framers,
Abbott Lawrence Lowell-laissez-faire constitutionalist, political scien-
tist, and future president of Harvard University-observed that the fram-
ers "ha[d] no distinct idea" of the meaning of due process as a limit on
legislative discretion.417 "[R]egarding [due process] very much as the
Italian does the talisman which keeps off the evil eye, the American
statesmen of a hundred years ago put it into the Bill of Rights, and left it
as a puzzle for posterity to solve." '418 Specifying its meaning through a
consideration of Anglo-Saxon traditions regarding government and the
individual seemed the closest approximation to an intent that was all too
indeterminate. Lochner era jurists, in other words, were positivists who
believed that only "sovereign will" ordains constitutional norms. Histor-
ism, however, taught them to look to the common law to discover the
intent of the generation that wrote and ratified the Constitution.
Finally, consonant with historism, Lochner era jurists replaced the
image of the static constitution, premised upon natural law and framer
intent, with the image of an evolutionary constitution premised upon na-
law as "the prevalent sense of right. The Germans call it Rechtsgefuehl." TIEDEMAN, supra
note 326, at 7.
416. Id. at 20-21 (footnote omitted); see also LOWELL, supra note 30, at 126-28 (discussing
Constitution as the "symbol... of our national existence" together with the doctrines embod-
ied in the document).
417. LOWELL, supra note 30, at 86.
418. Id. Although Lochner era jurists generally did not ground themselves in framer in-
tent, they never claimed that what they were doing was contrary to it. Tiedeman, in his book
on the unwritten constitution, does give instances of departure from framer intent, and, during
the pressure of the Civil War, even from the letter of the Constitution. TIEDEMAN, supra note
326, at 44, 46-50, 83-90. At one point he even says that framer intent is not the ultimate
consideration of constitutional interpretation. Id. at 151. Nonetheless, he saw Lochner era
substantive due process decisions as instances of continuity with framer intent because the
framers made natural rights part of the American tradition. Id. at 77-78; see also Christopher
G. Tiedeman, The Income Tax Decisions as an Object Lesson in Constitutional Construction, 6
ANNALS 268 (1895) (analyzing The Income Tax Cases as a return to original intent, which
earlier precedents had ignored).
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tional or racial4 19 tradition. The federal Constitution's Fourteenth
Amendment "will hereafter be regarded as the American complement of
the Great Charter," Judge Dillon predicted in his 1891 Storrs Lectures at
Yale.a20 He went on to quote Sir James Mackintosh:
"It was ... a peculiar advantage that the consequences of [the
Magna Charta's] principles were, if we may so speak, only dis-
covered gradually and slowly. It gave out on each occasion
only so much of the spirit of liberty and reformation as the cir-
cumstances of succeeding generations required, and as their
character would safely bear. For almost five centuries it was
appealed to as the decisive authority on behalf of the people,
though commonly so far only as the necessities of each case
demanded." '421
Lochner era jurists conceded, of course, that legislatures occupy a
vital role in the progress of the law. Legislatures have the power, along
with the courts, to specify what common-law principles remain vague.
Legislatures have power, even greater than that of the courts, to change
the law by applying the system's principles in light of an understanding
of current conditions. Legislatures alone have power to anticipate and
419. For claims of racial tradition, see for example COSGROVE, supra note 396, at 76-84;
LEE, supra note 360, at 1-2; Bryce, supra note 377, at 449-51; see also 1 WILLIAM STUBBS,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1-11 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1880) (com-
menting on English constitutional development).
420. JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 212
(Boston, Little, Brown 1894).
421. Id. at 212 n.1. (citation omitted). Of course, Lochner era jurists differed on the con-
tent of tradition and the direction of its evolution. For moderate laissez-faire constitutional-
ists, constitutional evolution tended to justify expansion of the proper subjects of legislative
concern. For example, Justice Harlan wrote:
[The police power] has doubtlessly been greatly expanded in its application[s] during
the past century, owing to an enormous increase in the number of occupations which
are dangerous, or so far detrimental to the health of the employ6s as to demand
special precautions for their well-being and protection, or the safety of adjacent
property.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 66 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see Holden v. Hardy,
169 U.S. 366, 385-98 (1898). For more conservative laissez-faire constitutionalists, constitu-
tional evolution tended to justify contraction of the subjects of legislative concern:
[Jurists must] take notice of the steady growth of the free principles which have come
from common-law rules and usages, and of their gradual expansion with the general
advance in intelligence and independent thought and action among the people. The
gradual transition from despotism to freedom has been mainly accomplished by the
dropping out one by one of obnoxious and despotic powers, and by the recognition of
the changes effected as permanent modifications of the constitutional system.
Cooley, supra note 108, at 269; see In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 431, 58 P. 1071, 1077 (1899);
People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1, 45-48, 22 N.E. 670, 680-82 (1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting),
aff'd, 143 U.S. 517 (1892); LOWELL, supra note 30, at 13-15 (reaching the conclusion that
society has progressed from basing obligations on status to basing them on contract).
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interdict what the principles hold wrongful.422 Legislatures even have
power to proscribe what merely tends to be wrongful.423 With regard to
legislative activity, Lochner era jurists held that the role of the courts is
to enforce all legislative declarations that are reasonably faithful specifi-
cations, anticipations, applications, or reappliecations of common-law
principles to reasonably believable understandings of current conditions.
To allow legislatures more would be to allow them to act upon "mere
pretexts" of fidelity to common-law principles, and effectively to allow
legislatures to refashion those principles.424 Legislative alteration of the
principles, however, was impermissible. As Justice Brown, the Lochner
era moderate, wrote in Holden v. Hardy, "the methods by which justice
is administered are subject to constant fluctuation," but "the cardinal
principles of justice are immutable." '425
In sum, Lochner era jurists envisioned constitutional evolution, but
limited its scope.426 They thought reapplication of common-law princi-
422. For example, nuisance law was limited to abating nuisances after they occurred.
Courts allowed legislatures to anticipate nuisance conditions and prohibit activities that might
bring them about. Zoning laws are an example.
423. See, eg., McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 550 (1908); Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co.,
113 U.S. 9, 20-25 (1884); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-88 (1851).
424. The requirement that judges engage in "rationality" review follows from this require-
ment. Rationality review determines that the legislative exercise of a certain power is not a
pretext for the exercise of another, impermissible power. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S.
678, 695-98 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887); The
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 538-39 (1870); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 603, 611-12, 615 (1869); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819);
Exparte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 508-09 (1858); Toledo, W. & W. Ry. v. City of Jacksonville, 67
Ili. 37, 40 (1873); Austin v. Murray, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 121, 125 (1831).
425. Holden, 169 U.S. at 387 (context makes it clear that by "methods" Justice Brown
meant substantive laws as well as procedural rules). For other expressions of evolution and
immutability, see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) ("while the
meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand
or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the
field of their operation"); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908) (in procedural due
process context); Thomas M. Cooley, Comparative Merits of Written and Prescriptive Constitu-
tions, 2 HARV. L. REv. 341, 354-55 (1889).
426. See LOWELL, supra note 30, at 125, 129; Cooley, supra note 425, at 353. But see JOHN
N. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
97 (10th ed., Boston, Houghton Mifflin 1888) (1st ed. 1868); TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at
150-54, 164. For examples of the opponents of Lochner era constitutionalism who agree with
Tiedeman's and Pomeroy's view that post-founding evolution is desirable, see Hand, supra
note 35, at 498-500, 509; Lewis, Social Sciences, supra note 37, at 533, 535-37; Lewis, Civil
Liberty, supra note 37, at 1070-71. Professor Chafee, the early twentieth century's leading
First Amendment scholar and a liberal constitutionalist, wrote:
[T]he meaning of the First Amendment did not crystallize in 1791 .... "[L]iberty of
speech" is no more confined to the speech (the framers] thought permissible than
"commerce" in another clause is limited to the sailing vessels and horse-drawn vehi-
cles of 1787. Into the making of the constitutional conception of free speech have
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pies was permissible (even necessary), but variation was proscribed.427
Central to an understanding of Lochner era constitutionalism, and its
historistic blend of positivism and natural law, is acknowledgment that
Lochner era jurists believed, on the one hand, that Anglo-American rec-
ognition of the specific fundamental principles they enforced through
substantive due process428 had evolved over centuries,429 but, on the
other hand, that the principles either became part of the common-law
tradition before the nation's founding or were crystallized by it.430 Loch-
gone, not only men's bitter experience... before 1791, but also the subsequent devel-
opment of the law of fair comment in civil defamation, and the philosophical specula-
tions of John Stuart Mill. Justice Holmes phrases the thought with even more than
his habitual felicity. "The provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical for-
mulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions trans-
planted from English soil."
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REv. 932, 954-55 (1919)
(quoting Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1916)); see also id. at 958 n.84 (noting
that not everything old is good; therefore, the Bill of Rights should not be interpreted to crys-
talize antiquity).
427. For an extreme illustration of this claim, see Thomas M. Cooley, Correspondence, 2
MICH. L.J. 334, 334 (1893) [hereinafter Cooley, Correspondence] and Thomas M. Cooley,
Power to Amend the Federal Constitution, 2 MICH. L.J. 109, 118-20 (1893) [hereinafter Cooley,
Power]. These articles argue that although the people have ultimate power to rebel and impose
revolutionary changes, Article V amendments departing from the original Constitution's prin-
ciples are invalid because the word "amendment" connotes change consistent with an original
plan.
428. Examples of these principles include proscription of wage and price control, see Coo-
ley, supra note 108, at 269; infra text accompanying notes 473-94; the right to pursue all
ordinary employments subject to reasonable and equal restraints, see infra text accompanying
notes 453-72; and the fault principle in tort law, see Ives v. Southern B. Ry., 201 N.Y. 271,
293, 94 N.E. 431, 439 (1911).
429. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 114-51 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting); THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTrUTIONAL LAW IN
THE UNIrrED STATES OF AMERICA 234-35 (Boston, Little, Brown 1880); Cooley, supra note
425, at 346-49; supra text accompanying note 421; see also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 528-32 (1884) (discussing evolution in the procedural due process context).
430. See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 114-15, 119-21 (Bradley, J., dissenting);
Ives, 201 N.Y. at 293, 94 N.E. at 439 (stating that fault principle was the law of the land when
the Constitution was adopted); People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1, 45-48, 22 N.E. 670, 686-87 (1889)
(Peckham, J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892); COOLEY,
supra note 429, at 234-35; Cooley, supra note 108, at 269; see also Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78, 117, 121, 123 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that at the time of the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, immunity from self-incrimination was one of the privileges be-
longing to citizens); Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 556-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that one
should look to 1868, the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, to determine the
accepted principles of procedural due process). The result of Harlan's insight, of course,
would have been to restrict the states further, substantively and procedurally.
Under this principle, some Lochner era jurists excepted paternalistic legislation from con-
stitutional proscription if it was a traditional type still accepted at the time of the founding.
Usury laws were the most frequent example. See Budd, 117 N.Y. at 45-48, 22 N.E. at 686-87;
COOLEY, supra note 429, at 234-35; Cooley, supra note 108, at 269; Frederick N. Judson,
Liberty of Contract Under the Police Power, 25 AM. L. REv. 871, 894 (1891) ("Usury laws,
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ner era jurists depicted themselves as evolving only the application of
principles extant at the founding, principles they took as the intended
definitions of such ambiguous constitutional terms as "legislative
power, '431 "property, '4 32 "cruel and unusual punishment, 4 33 "freedom
of speech," 34 and "due process of law."
4 35
however objectionable in principle, are admitted in the judicial discussions of the general sub-
ject to rest upon such a traditional policy of the race, antedating the constitutions, as to make
any question useless in the present state of public opinion."); infra text accompanying notes
491-94 (discussing Justice Field's approach to usury laws). Yet as Judge, later Justice,
Peckhanm said in Budd,
The fact that certain rules of the common law have come down to us unimpaired,
although based upon a view of the relations of government to the people which ob-
tained in the seventeenth century, should certainly furnish no reason for extending
those rules to cases which, but for such extension, would be regarded as clearly
within the protection of the constitutional limitations contained in our bill of rights.
Budd, 117 N.Y. at 45-48, 22 N.E. at 686-87; see also State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 185, 10
S.E. 285, 287-88 (1889) (Usury laws "existed at the time the Constitution was adopted.... The
power to pass usury laws exists by immemorial usage; but such is not the case with such acts as
we are now considering."), overruled by White v. Raleigh Mining Co., 113 W. Va. 522, 168
S.E. 285 (1933). Opponents of laissez-faire constitutionalism were always arguing that the
existence of proscriptions accepted at the time of the founding established principles that
should be recognized. The most important debate centered on the use of usury laws to estab-
lish a principle that legislation may protect individuals from "oppression," or economic coer-
cion. See, for example, the use of usury laws in FREUND, supra note 21, at 308 ("it is difficult
to see the difference between truck and usury legislation"); Pound, supra note 10, at 473, 483-
84.
431. See, eg., COOLEY, supra note 9, at 87-88, 175-76 (discussed in Siegel, supra note 107,
at 1508-09).
432. See, eg., infra text accompanying notes 477-79, 486-87.
433. See, eg., COOLEY, supra note 9, at 329-30.
434. See, eg., id. at 416-17.
435. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 399-406. Modern revisionist scholarship
suggests that Lochner era jurists enforced principles crystallized not at the founding but in
Jacksonian America. See, e.g., HoRwrrz, supra note 389, at 85-99 (discussing fault principle);
McCurdy, supra note 412, at 26-30 (tracing free labor ideology to Jacksonian and abolitionist
principles); Treanor, supra note 169 (tracing protection of property to post-founding shift from
republicanism to liberalism). An implication of this scholarship, however, is that the Lochner
era's principles were gestating in antebellum America and had crystallized by mid-century.
Thus, even if Lochner era jurists were not true to the norms of the founding generation, they
were true to views that were traditional among the judiciary by the late nineteenth century.
This judicial tradition, if not historic fact, gives great plausibility to the Lochner era jurists'
claim that they were faithful to constitutional norms. See also Riggs, supra note 319 (arguing
that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause was intended to have substantive content).
Consider, in this regard, the force of Justice Harlan's insight, discussed supra note 430,
that the Due Process Clause constitutionalized common-law principles as developed at the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Current scholarship indicates that the
opinions of Lochner era jurists were normally consistent with the common law of that time.
Also, proponents of laissez-faire constitutionalism generally did not claim that Lochner era
jurists' substantive views were not faithful to framer intent or to traditional Anglo-American
values. Professor Pound, in criticizing Lochner era decisions, found one basis for the judicial
espousal of liberty of contract in the fact that natural law was "the theory of our bill of rights."
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Thus imbued with the historist method, which conceived the flux of
human events as founded on "ordering principles," Lochner era jurists
embarked on their task of articulating the crystallized fundamental rights
of Anglo-American liberty and developing the application of such rights
to newly emerging social conditions.436 From the perspective of future
development, Lochner era jurists' transformation of constitutional law
from a static framework based on natural law and framer intent to an
evolutionary model based on the common law was momentous because it
was a decisive step toward the more evolutionary, social consensus-based
constitutionalism of the post-New Deal Court.437 From the perspective
of contemporary thought, however, the Lochner era transformation of
constitutional jurisprudence was easily blended into extant tradition.
Lochner era jurists, after all, kept "original intent" as the touchstone of
constitutional law. Seeking original intent, not in the intent of the Phila-
delphia convention, but in the traditions of the people as evidenced by
their common law, seemed a sensible shift within tradition.43 Natural
law, too, remained a significant part of constitutional discourse.
Although the relevance of natural law changed from ideas directly shap-
ing framer intent to ideas shaping the common law (and only then shap-
ing framer intent), this seemed a subtle shift with little revolutionary
import. Indeed, seen through the prism of nineteenth-century historist
thought, the shift to constitutional law based on common law only served
to better realize the traditions of framer intent and natural-law
constitutionalism.
Lochner era encomia to constitutional evolution, of course, were too
Pound, supra note 10, at 457. Another basis for the doctrine, he admitted, was that individual-
ism and liberty of contract were theories of the common law. Pound, Philosophy of Law, supra
note 37, at 345-47; see also Lewis, Social Sciences, supra note 37, at 537 (describing pre-Loch-
ner era legal principles as centered on "the liberty of the individual" and "free contract"). But
see Shattuck, supra note 338 (arguing Lochner era expanded common-law concepts). Pound
did argue that traditional equitable principles supported governmental interference with capi-
tal's oppressive economic power over labor. Pound, supra note 10, at 457, 482-83.
436. Opponents of Lochner era constitutionalism implicitly argued for evolution of the
Constitution's principles. See infra notes 504-08.
437. See infra text accompanying notes 509-48.
438. Given that the common law was more generally known than the convention's secret
proceedings, the common law seemed a better place to seek the people's understanding of
constitutional terms. It seemed better to consult the people's, not the convention delegates',
understanding because the people, not the delegates, are the national sovereign that ordained
the Constitution. Finally, many terms, such as "property" and "due process," that were im-
portant in the Lochner era, simply were not discussed in Congress or the state legislatures
when the Fifth Amendment was added to the Constitution in 1791. See Riggs, supra note 319,
at 987, 995-99. The common law was arguably the only place to turn for a historical under-
standing of such terms' content.
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distinct to be missed.439 Their modernity, however, was masked by the
belief that permanent principles of social order governed constitutional
evolution." 0 To be sure, these governing principles were not principles
of traditional natural law; they were principles of a historistically con-
ceived common law. Nonetheless, the historistically conceived common
law was itself perceived as a product of nature, not arbitrary social con-
sensus. Discovering nature in history, not reason, seemed an improve-
ment upon, not a departure from, tradition. The same may be said of the
belief that constitutional doctrine evolves according to the constant oper-
ation of static principles. The notion of change according to permanent
principles allowed Lochner era jurists to envision a Constitution that was
static, as tradition required, yet evolutionary, as the times demanded.
C. Historism Illustrated in Justice Stephen Field's Seminal Dissents in
The Slaughter-House Cases and Munn v. Illinois
Justice Stephen Field, who sat on the United States Supreme Court
from 1863 to 1897, was the nation's leading early judicial proponent of
laissez-faire constitutionalism." 1 Even though the Court did not em-
brace fully that jurisprudence until shortly after his resignation,44 2 schol-
ars have documented amply Field's central role in the Court's movement
into the Lochner era.44 While Field's constitutional philosophy may not
represent the philosophies of all Lochner era jurists, it is the philosophy
of a major figure-a justice who featured prominently in the Court's
decisionmaking, influencing his colleagues and inspiring the following
generation of justices. 4' Focusing on Field's thought complements the
439. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 385-89 (1898); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 528-32 (1884); supra notes 395-96, 399, 421 and accompanying text.
440. But see infra text accompanying notes 509-48 (discussing latent radical implications
of Lochner era evolutionism).
441. For prior discussions of Field's jurisprudence and his role in the rise of laissez-faire
constitutionalism, see CARL B. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 362-
434 (paperback ed. 1969) (1st ed. 1930); Howard J. Graham, Justice Field and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 52 YALE L.J. 851, 874-88 (1943); Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the
Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constltu-
tionalism, 1863-1897, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 246 (Lawrence
M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds. 1988). See generally MCCURDY, supra note 361 (dis-
cussing Field's jurisprudence and his role in the rise of laissez-faire constitutionalism).
442. Field left the Court in 1897. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), marks the
Court's clear adoption of "liberty of contract" principles.
443. See, eg., McCurdy, supra note 361, at 8-12, 17-18.
444. Id. Professor Fiss, for example, reports that "Felix Frankfurter ... saw Brewer [, who
was Field's nephew,] and his colleagues, particularly Rufus Peckham, Brewer's constant ally
and the author of Lochner v. New York, as doing little more than writing into law Field's
Slaughter-House dissent." Owen M. Fiss, David J Brewer: The Judge as Missionary, in THE
FIELDS AND THE LAW 53, 54-55 (paperback ed. 1986).
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general study of Lochner era jurists undertaken in the prior parts of this
Article by tracing its conclusions into the opinions of a prominent justice.
Substantively, Field advanced moderate laissez-faire principles.
44 5
Unlike strict laissez-faire constitutionalists, who argued that "liberty of
contract" proscribes all paternalistic legislation, Field consistently up-
held legislation preventing individuals from harming their own health,
safety, or morals." 6 Jurisprudentially, Field believed in a Christian God
and natural law; he thought, however, that the Court was empowered to
protect only those norms that the Revolutionary and Civil War genera-
tions had positively enshrined in the Constitution. He sought the intent
of those generations through a study of the Anglo-American tradition,
encapsulated in the common law. Historism not only underlay his con-
cept of the common law, but also mediated his diverse commitments to
natural law and framer intent. Illustrative of Field's historism are his
445. See supra text accompanying notes 39-47 (describing moderate laissez-faire
principles).
446. While on the Supreme Court of California, Field supported the validity of a general
Sunday closing law, writing:
The legislature possesses the undoubted right to pass laws for the preservation of
health and the promotion of good morals. It is no answer.., to say that mankind
will seek cessation from labor by the natural inclination of self-preservation. The
position assumes that all men are independent, and at liberty to work whenever they
choose.... The relations of superior and subordinate, master and servant, principal
and clerk, always have and always will exist. Labor is in a great degree dependent
upon capital, and unless the exercise of the power which capital affords is restrained,
those who are obliged to labor will not possess the freedom for rest which they would
otherwise exercise. The necessities for food and raiment are imperious, and the exac-
tions of avarice are not easily satisfied. It is idle to talk of a man's freedom to rest
when his wife and children are looking to his daily labor for their daily support. The
law steps in to restrain the power of capital. Its object is not to protect those who can
rest at their pleasure, but to afford rest to those who need it, and who, from the
conditions of society, could not otherwise obtain it.... It gives one day to the poor
and dependent; from the enjoyment of which no capital or power is permitted to
deprive them.... Authority for the enactment I find in the great object of all govern-
ment, which is protection. Labor is a necessity imposed by the considerations of our
race, and to protect labor is the highest office of the laws.
Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 520-21 (1858) (Field, J., dissenting). His continued adherence
to this position after his elevation to the Supreme Court is illustrated in Soon Hing v. Crowley,
113 U.S. 703 (1885), in which he wrote:
Laws setting aside Sunday as a day of rest are upheld, not from any right of the
government to legislate for the promotion of religious observances, but from its right
to protect all persons from the physical and moral debasement which comes from
uninterrupted labor. Such laws have always been deemed beneficent and merciful
laws, especially to the poor and dependent, to the laborers in our factories and work-
shops and in the heated rooms of our cities.
Id. at 710. On Field's general balance of public power and private property, see McCurdy,
supra note 441, at 264-65.
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dissents in The Slaughter-House Cases44 7 and Munn v. Illinois."8
Although Field dissented in these two cases, his opinions are founding
texts of Lochner era constitutionalism. 449 They are, in this regard, like
Justice Holmes's classic dissents in Lochner v. New York 410 and United
States v. Adair 451-seminal statements of the philosophical basis of the
coming era of constitutional law. Just as Holmes's famous dissents show
the role of judicial deference in the founding of New Deal constitutional-
ism, Field's seminal dissents place historism at the inception of Lochner
era jurisprudence.45 2
1. Justice Field's Dissent in The Slaughter-House Cases
In 1869, the reconstructed Louisiana legislature incorporated the
Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company, and
granted it the exclusive right to establish facilities for landing and butch-
ering animals for New Orleans and its environs, an area encompassing
1154 square miles and over 200,000 people.4 3 In The Slaughter-House
Cases, an association of butchers454 challenged this grant of monopoly
privilege, claiming it interfered with their liberty "to pursue.., any of
the known established trades and occupations of the country, subject
only to such restraints as equally affect[] all others."45 The Court re-
447. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83-111 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting).
448. 94 U.S. 113, 136-54 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting).
449. Field's Slaughter-House and Munn dissents are so important that Professor Fiss says
that "Field's fame was largely due to [them]." Fiss, supra note 444, at 54.
450. 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
451. 208 U.S. 161, 190-92 (1908) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
452. Tracing historism in the opinions of Justice Field tends to confirm the results of the
study of late nineteenth-century constitutional commentators presented in Siegel, supra note
107 (discussing John Pomeroy, Thomas Cooley, and Christopher Tiedeman).
453. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 38, 43 (1872); id. at 85 (Field, J.,
dissenting).
454. The Slaughter-House Cases combined three lawsuits, one by the butchers' association
challenging the statute, one by the state attorney general seeking to enforce the act against
stock dealers and butchers, and one by the corporation attempting to prevent competitors from
infringing on its privileges. Id. at 36; id. at 85 (Field, J., dissenting). Only 17 men held shares
in the corporation, and their grant affected about 1000 people engaged in the butchering trade
in New Orleans. Id. at 39, 43. The statement of the case says that hundreds of suits were
brought by butchers as individuals and in various combinations. Id. at 43. Perhaps the sim-
plest account of the background is the statement by the Court that the cases "arise out of the
efforts of the butchers of New Orleans to resist the Crescent City Livestock Landing and
Slaughter-House Company in the exercise of certain powers conferred by [its] charter." Id. at
57.
455. Id. at 105 (Field, J., dissenting); see also id. at 88 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoted infra
text accompanying note 460) (furthering Justice Field's argument); id. at 106 (Field, J., dis-
senting) (same). Much of the butchers' and Field's argument focused on whether constitu-
tional law proscribes the grant of monopoly privileges over the common trades. See id. at 49-
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jected the association's claim largely on the ground that pre-Civil War
precedent firmly allocated the definition and protection of civil liberties
to state law.456 According to the majority, the Civil War amendments
altered this fundamental aspect of American constitutional law only to
the extent of guaranteeing the newly freed slaves equal treatment with
whites. The substance of civil liberties remained a matter of state law;
the newly amended Constitution forbade only racially motivated distinc-
tions in their provision and protection.457
Justice Field and three other justices dissented.458 Field argued that
the Fourteenth Amendment's first section was intended to nationalize
the definition and protection of fundamental civil liberties.4 59 He also
argued that the right to "pursue ... the ordinary trades or callings of
life" 4" equally with other citizens was among the liberties guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause.461 The
57; id. at 88, 101-05 (Field, J., dissenting). Field conceded that monopolies can be established
over trades that require governmental sanction for entry. Id. at 88 (Field, J., dissenting)
(describing these enterprises, such as ferries and turnpikes, as occupations "of a public charac-
ter appertaining to the government ... [and] usually requir[ing] the exercise of the sovereign
right of eminent domain"). Thus, the claim was that civil liberty encompasses the right to be
free of governmentally established monopolies over the ordinary and common trades. This
claim is the obverse of the statement that civil liberty encompasses the right to pursue those
callings, subject to reasonable and equal regulations. I have chosen to phrase the claim this
way, even though it was less frequently described in this manner in the case, because it shows
the connection between the argument here and the claim that evolved into the Lochner era
doctrine of "liberty of contract." Liberty of contract stemmed from the right to pursue ordi-
nary callings.
The butchers also claimed the law violated the Thirteenth Amendment's proscription of
"involuntary servitude." Id. at 49-51. Justice Field toyed with this claim but did not rest his
dissent on it. Id. at 91-93 (Field, J., dissenting).
456. Id. at 77; id. at 94-95 (Field, J., dissenting); see generally Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833) (holding Bill of Rights not applicable to the states); NELSON, supra
note 9, at 104-09. There were, of course, exceptions to this statement, such as protection
against bills of attainder and impairments of contract contained in the Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
457. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78-83.
458. All the dissenters joined in Field's opinion, id. at 111 (Field, J., dissenting), even
though two of them filed separate opinions also. Id. at 111-30 (Bradley, Swayne, JJ.,
dissenting).
459. Id. at 95-96 (Field, J., dissenting). Field's assertion was that "[tihe fundamental
rights, privileges and immunities" that Americans possess as "free m[e]n" and "free citizen[s]"
no longer "derive their existence from [state] legislation, and cannot be destroyed by [their]
power." Id. (Field, J., dissenting).
460. Id. at 88 (Field, J., dissenting).
461. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."). Field's opinion dis-
cussed a variety of topics. He first dismissed the idea that the exclusive privileges that the
Louisiana law granted were valid police-power measures designed to promote the public
health. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 86-89 (Field, J., dissenting). He then focused
on the argument that the law violated the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery and
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state-created monopoly on slaughtering, Field concluded, violated these
liberties. In his argument, Field recognized that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's text forbids the states from abridging the "privileges and immuni-
ties" of national citizenship but does not "enumerate or define" those
rights.46 2 Yet Field was certain that the right to engage in ordinary em-
ployments, subject to reasonable and equal police-power regulations,
46 3
was among the fundamental civil liberties for which the clause granted
federal protection. No doubt Field's view was buttressed by his belief
that the right to pursue ordinary occupations was a natural right; he sug-
gested as much at the outset and at the conclusion of his discussion.",
But natural-law reasoning is wholly absent from the core of his analysis.
Rather, Field fleshed his answer from Anglo-American history, from the
fact that "[a]ll monopolies in any known trade or manufacture ... en-
croach upon the liberty of citizens to acquire property and pursue happi-
ness, and were held void at common law in the great Case of Monopolies,
decided during the reign of Queen Elizabeth."46
involuntary servitude. Id. at 89-93 (Field, J., dissenting). Only after these discussions did
Field focus on the core topics of whether the Fourteenth Amendment generally places civil
liberties under national protection, id. at 93-96 (Field, J., dissenting), and whether the law at
bar infringed those liberties, id. at 96-111 (Field, J., dissenting).
462. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting) ("The amendment
does not attempt to confer any new privileges or immunities upon citizens, or to enumerate or
define those already existing. It assumes that there are such privileges and immunities which
belong of right to citizens as such, and ordains that they shall not be abridged by State
legislation.").
463. "Police-power regulations" were laws restraining liberty to promote the public health,
safety, morals, or welfare. Field took an expansive view of the state's police power, see supra
notes 445-46 and accompanying text, but he thought the monopoly grant at bar had no credi-
ble police-power justification. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 86-89 (Field, J.,
dissenting).
464. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 86, 96, 105 (Field, J., dissenting) (unselfcon-
sciously shifting from discussion of the right to engage in common employments to discussion
of natural rights).
465. Id. at 101-02 (Field, J., dissenting). Field also noted that both the King and Parlia-
ment subsequently ratified the judiciary's decision in a famous statute. Id. at 104 (Field, J.,
dissenting). See An Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with Penal Laws, and the
Forfeitures Thereof, 1623, 21 Jac., ch. 3. Field continued:
The common law of England, as is thus seen, condemned all monopolies in any
known trade or manufacture, and declared void all grants of special privileges
whereby others could be deprived of any liberty which they previously had, or be
hindered in their lawful trade. The statute of James I... only embodied the law as it
had been previously declared by the courts of England, although frequently disre-
garded by the sovereigns of that country.
Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 104 (Field, J., dissenting).
Former Justice Campbell, counsel for the butchers, said in regard to the importance of
common-la* (rather than natural-law) principles in the definition of civil liberties: "Now,
what are '[privileges and immunities' in the sense of the Constitution? They are undoubtedly
the personal and civil rights which usage, tradition, the habits of society, written law, and the
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In short, Field viewed the "common law of England [as] the basis of
the jurisprudence of the United States," '4 66 and thought that jurists
should look to that tradition in defining the "indubitable rights and liber-
ties" that Americans claimed as fundamental at the time of the Revolu-
tion.4 67 Thus, despite Field's belief that "the Creator ha[s] endowed all
men 'with certain inalienable rights,' "468 he turned to common-law tra-
dition to determine the specific rights the Constitution's framers and ra-
tiflers deemed fundamental and intended to be encompassed by the
ambiguous clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Field was so devoted
to history as the source of constitutional principles that, after establishing
that the common law proscribes monopolies, he turned to discuss
whether this finding was relevant to the case at bar because Louisiana
traces its jurisprudence to the civil law.4 9 His answer is historical. The
civil law, he argued, adopted the antimonopoly principle in a decree by
Louis XVI in 1776 before Louisiana became a part of the American com-
monwealth.470 Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
impose on the citizens of Louisiana the traditional rights of the citizens
of the other states.47 1
In his Slaughter-House dissent, Field clearly and presciently as-
common sentiments of people have recognized as forming the basis of the institutions of the
country." Id. at 55.
466. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 104 (Field, J., dissenting).
467. Id. at 104-05 (Field, J., dissenting). Again, Field's ultimate point is that the common-
law tradition clearly proscribes governmental grants of monopoly over common employments.
He drove the point home in his conclusion that
when the Colonies separated from the mother country no privilege was more fully
recognized or more completely incorporated into the fundamental law of the country
than that every free subject in the British empire was entitled to pursue his happiness
by following any of the known and established trades and occupations ... subject
only to such restraints as equally affected all others.
Id. at 105 (Field, J., dissenting). Field argued that because this proscription was part of the
common-law tradition, it was part of the American law of civil liberty.
468. Id. (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S.
1776)); see also id. (Field, J., dissenting) (referring to "inalienable rights, rights which are the
gift of the Creator, which the law does not confer, but only recognizes").
469. Id. (Field, J., dissenting).
470. Id. (Field, J., dissenting).
471. Id. (Field, J., dissenting). Note the easy shift from natural-law to common-law rights
in Field's remark that
[the Fourteenth] Amendment was intended to give practical effect to the declaration
of 1776 of inalienable rights, rights which are the gift of the Creator, which the law
does not confer, but only recognizes. If the trader in London could plead that'he was
a free citizen of that city against the enforcement to his injury of monopolies, surely
under the fourteenth amendment every citizen of the United States should be able to
plead his citizenship of the republic as a protection against any similar invasion of his
privileges and immunities.
Id. at 105-06 (Field, J., dissenting).
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serted that the Civil War amendments made the substance of American
civil liberties a matter of federal constitutional law. Having taken that
position, Field just as clearly and presciently turned to common-law
principle, not natural law, to discern the rights newly placed under fed-
eral protection. Happily, in Field's view, the common law is consonant
with natural law. Nonetheless, for Field, it was the common law that
defines and supplements the specific rights the framers intended to en-
shrine in the nation's Constitution. 472
2. Justice Field's Dissent in Munn v. Illinois
Field's historism is illustrated also in his famous dissent in Munn v.
Illinois,4 73 the Court's first rate-regulation case. Rate regulation was
among the most controversial forms of late-nineteenth-century industrial
regulation.474 The Supreme Court adjudicated its constitutionality in
Munn,475 which considered the validity of a schedule of maximum
charges that the Illinois Legislature had imposed on the fourteen grain
elevators bordering the Chicago River in Chicago.476 The Court upheld
the schedule. Chief Justice Waite, writing for the majority, noted that
although the Fourteenth Amendment ordains that no state shall "'de-
prive any person of ... property without due process of law,'" it no-
where defines the phrase's pivotal word "deprive. '47 7  He turned,
therefore, to "usage"4 7 8 and proposed to determine "the principles upon
which [the] power of [rate] regulation rests" by "[l]ooking ... to the
common law, from whence came the right which the Constitution pro-
472. Field returned to the subject of his Slaughter-House dissent in a subsequent case when
the company that prevailed in Slaughter-House sought to invoke the Contract Clause to enjoin
the legislature's revocation of its monopoly privilege. Butchers' Union Co, v. Crescent City
Co., 111 U.S. 746, 754-60 (1884) (Field, J., concurring) (arguing that legislative revocation of
law that granted exclusive rights and created monopoly, upheld in Slaughter-House, is valid
despite clause that it should last for 25 years). The opinion sounds in natural law rather than
history. Field's discussion in Butchers' Union, however, is more conclusory than his discussion
in Slaughter-House; it does not derive constitutional rights so much as assert them and their
accordance with natural rights. Perhaps this difference reflects Field's assumption that com-
mon and natural law accord, rather than the theory that natural law is the source of constitu-
tional principle. See supra note 471. Unlike in Slaughter-House, no other justice joined in
Field's concurrence in Butchers' Union, although Harlan and Woods did join in Bradley's
concurrence, drawing exclusively from common-law precedent and history. Butchers' Union,
S11 U.S. at 760-66 (Bradley, J., concurring).
473. 94 U.S. 113, 136-54 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting).
474. Late nineteenth-century rate regulation is discussed in Siegel, supra note 9, at 187-232.
475. Munn is discussed in the context of rate regulation in Siegel, supra note 9, at 194-215.
476. The elevators were owned by approximately 30 people and controlled by nine business
firms. Munn, 94 U.S. at 131.
477. Id. at 123 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
478. Id.
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tects."479 Surveying common-law history, Waite not only discovered a
principle allowing government to regulate the rates of any business "'af-
fected with a publick [sic] interest,' "480 but also found that the granaries
along the Chicago River were within the principle because of their" 'vir-
tual' monopoly" of the grain trade between the Midwestern States and
the Eastern Seaboard.4"'
Justice Field and two other justices dissented.482 Field opened his
opinion with an extended analysis arguing that the majority's principles
imposed a disastrous policy denying property any viable constitutional
protection.483 Field did not, however, use these opening remarks, or any
other remarks drawn from policy, affirmatively to establish his own ap-
proach.484 Neither did he draw from natural law.485 Instead, to estab-
lish the correct principle delimiting the power of rate control, Field-like
Waite-turned solely to the common law.486 Indeed, he turned to
largely the same sources from which Waite drew.487 Field, however, dis-
479. Id. at 125-26.
480. Id. at 125-30 (quoting Lord Chief Justice Hale, De Portibus Maris, in 1 A COLLEC-
TION OF TRAcTs RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 45, 77-78 (Francis Hargrave ed.,
London, T. Wright 1787)).
481. Yd. at 130-35; see supra note 476 and accompanying text (detailing facts on concentra-
tion of ownership). But see Edmund W. Kitch & Clara A. Bowler, The Facts of Munn v.
Illinois, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 313, 316 (saying "whether or not this collusive pricing reflected a
monopoly is doubtful," since competition did exist at the level of railroads with which each
elevator was affiliated).
482. Munn, 94 U.S. at 154 (Story, J., dissenting). Justice Strong wrote a one-paragraph
dissent saying he concurred in all Justice Field said. Id. (Strong, J., dissenting).
483. Id. at 139-45 (Field, J., dissenting).
484. The function of Field's opening remarks is to convince the reader that a wise constitu-
tional system would not contain Waite's principle. Field wanted to prepare the reader for his
claim that the common law wisely contains a different principle. See id. at 136 (Field, J.,
dissenting).
485. Field neither attacked Waite's principle nor defended his own in terms of natural law.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine any nineteenth-century jurist claiming that natural law credibly
addresses rate regulation beyond suggesting that private property be protected. Id. (Field, J.,
dissenting).
486. Id. at 144 (Field, J., dissenting). Field quoted approvingly Justice Miller's view that
another key constitutional clause protecting property, the Takings Clause, U.S. CONST.
amend. V, "'has received the commendation of jurists, statesmen, and commentators, as plac-
ing the just principles of the common law on that subject beyond the power of ordinary legisla-
tion to change or control them."' Munn, 94 U.S. at 144 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177 (1871)). This argument surely evi-
dences a notion that constitutional provisions enshrine common-law principles. In the main,
the claim that Field turned to the common law is premised not upon any comment by Field
saying he was doing so, but on what he did. See id. (Field, J., dissenting). Note that Justice
Miller, who penned the quotation from Pumpelly, wrote for the majority in The Slaughter-
House Cases. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 57 (1872).
487. Compare Munn, 94 U.S. at 126-29 (citing Lord Hale as authority) with id. at 139-40,
149-52 (Field, J., dissenting) (same). The similarity of Waite's and Field's approaches in
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tilled a common-law principle different from Waite's. Field reviewed the
precedents at length to show that Waite misread them and that the com-
mon-law concept of business "affected by a public interest" encompassed
only enterprises upon which government had conferred special rights or
privileges.4"' Rate regulation, Field said, is an "implied condition" of
the grant of special privilege; in regulating rates, the state "only deter-
mines the conditions upon which its concession shall be enjoyed."489 At
common law, Field insisted, enterprises exercising only common rights
were not subject to the uncommon power of rate control.490
Munn shows that historism was a widely shared jurisprudence that allowed its adherents to
differ substantially on important issues. See, eg., 1 PAUL VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF His-
TORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 157-58 (1920) (historist jurist suggesting the further evolution of
law from "individualistic jurisprudence" to "socialistic jurisprudence"); infra text accompany-
ing notes 514-29 (discussing interpretive amendments). Thus, although most historist jurists
were laissez-faire constitutionalists, the point of this Article is not that historism required that
stance. Jurisprudence, like any ideology, influences and constrains policy choices but does not
determine them. Although a particular jurisprudence may imply some policy choices more
readily than others, ultimately a jurisprudence's practical implications are a matter of social
construction, not logical deduction. See J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1133, 1137-38, 1141-45 (1991) (reviewing ANDREW ALTmAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A
LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990)). From the perspective of Lochner era jurisprudence, Field's dis-
sent in Munn, not Waite's majority opinion, is important for pioneering, indeed constituting,
the association between historism and laissez-faire constitutionalism. See Munn, 94 U.S. at
136 (Field, J., dissenting).
488. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 139 (Field, J., dissenting). Instances of special privileges in-
cluded entrance into occupations that were public functions (such as turnpikes and railroads),
grants of special assistance (such as eminent domain and tax exemptions), and use of public
property (such as streets). Id. (Field, J., dissenting). Field's theory exemplified the property/
privilege distinction. See Siegel, supra note 24, at 57-66; see also Siegel, supra note 9, at 189-94,
202-06 (discussing specific application of the property/privilege distinction to the controversy
over rate regulation by Field and others).
489. Munn, 94 U.S. at 146-47 (Field, J., dissenting) (concluding that "[wihen the privilege
ends, the power of regulation ceases"). Field also wrote:
[No one, I suppose, has ever contended that the State had not a right to prescribe
the conditions upon which [its] privilege[s] should be enjoyed. The State in such
cases exercises no greater right than an individual may exercise over the use of his
own property when leased or loaned to others .... The recipient of the privilege, in
effect, stipulates to comply with the conditions. It matters not how limited the privi-
lege conferred, its acceptance implies an assent to the regulation of its use and the
compensation for it.
Id. at 149 (Field, J., dissenting).
490. Id. (Field, J., dissenting). Had Chicago's grain elevators been legal monopolies, they
would have been subject to rate regulation. See id. at 151 (Field, J., dissenting) (recognizing
that English common law required that monopolies subject themselves to regulation). In
Field's view, even assuming they were "virtual monopolies," they had established their posi-
tion through exercise of common rights. Id. (Field, J., dissenting). They were exempt from
rate control although they were subject to common-law antitrust principles for abuse of their
position. Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of
American Corporation Law, 1869-1903, 53 Bus. HIST. REV. 304, 314-23 (1979) (discussing
state antitrust law in the late nineteenth century).
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Field's exclusive reliance on the common law to delimit the power
of rate control tellingly evidences his historist approach to the issue. So
too does his analysis of the one facet of common-law precedent he did
not think clearly evidenced his theory: usury laws.491 Usury laws regu-
late the prices charged by money lenders even though money lenders
seem to exercise no governmentally granted rights or privileges. Yet a
knowledge of history, Field said, teaches that money lenders do have a
governmentally granted right. Field observed that
[b]y the ancient common law it was unlawful to take any
money for the use of money: all who did so were.., exposed to
the censure of the church; and if, after the death of a person, it
was discovered that he had been a usurer whilst living, his chat-
tels were forfeited to the king, and his lands escheated to the
lord of the fee. No action could be maintained on any promise
to pay for the use of money, because of the unlawfulness of the
contract. Whilst the common law thus condemned all usury,
Parliament interfered, and made it lawful to take a limited
amount of interest.492
Consequently, Field asserted, "[t]he practice of regulating by legislation
the interest receivable for the use of money, when considered with refer-
ence to its origin, is only the assertion of a right of the government to
control the extent to which a privilege granted by it may be exercised and
enjoyed.
493
To modem eyes, this is a curious way to argue matters of constitu-
tional law. Field's focus on serendipitous history, not rational principle,
seems to show him grasping at straws. Certainly it flies in the face of
Holmes's aphorism that "lilt is revolting to have no better reason for a
rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV." 494
Nonetheless, its curiosity only highlights Justice Field's historist deriva-
tion and defense of constitutional principle.
491. Munn, 94 U.S. at 148-49 (Field, J., dissenting). Field indicated that only usury laws
troubled him. Id. (Field, J., dissenting).
492. Id. at 153 (Field, J., dissenting).
493. Id. (Field, J., dissenting); see also id. at 153-54 (Field, J., dissenting) (discussing regu-
lation of grist mills). Usury laws troubled many laissez-faire constitutionalists. See supra note
430.
494. Holmes, supra note 365, at 469. Holmes continues with these remarks: "It is still
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." Id. For an example of a laissez-faire
constitutionalist who took this injunction to heart and therefore argued that usury laws were
unconstitutional, see TIEDEMAN, supra note 22, at 240-41.
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V. THE TRANSITIONAL NATURE OF LOCHNER ERA JURISPRUDENCE
The analysis thus far is but a prologue to establishing the transi-
tional nature of Lochner era constitutionalism. The Lochner era's strong
links to the past have been demonstrated,495 but only the groundwork for
its anticipation of the future has been laid. If the Lochner era's moder-
nity was merely that it developed a substantive right of property and
evolved constitutional doctrine according to permanent principles of so-
cial order, the era would have to be pronounced hardly emerged from
tradition. Yet the Lochner era's belief in constitutional evolution and
substantive property rights was more innovative and allied with the fu-
ture than has appeared, as a review of the debate between the proponents
and opponents of laissez-faire constitutionalism will show.
Almost as soon as Lochner era jurisprudence moved from the trea-
tise literature 96 and Justices Field's and Bradley's seminal dissents49 to
state court precedents,49 it was criticized as a substantive and method-
ological break with constitutional tradition. Charles Shattuck, for exam-
ple, attacked the substance of Lochner era decisions by arguing that
Lochner era notions of "liberty" expanded the traditional common-law
concept.499 James Thayer issued a famous condemnation of the method
of Lochner era decisions, claiming they departed from the traditional
norm of judicial restraint.500 These attacks were easily answered, how-
495. The links to the past include conceptualism, the protection of property through limi-
tations implied by constitutional terms (particularly the term "legislative power" in antebellum
America and the term "due process of law" in the Lochner era), the conviction that the com-
mon law was suffused with natural law norms, the use of the common law as a means to divine
original intent, and the belief that permanent principles of social order govern doctrinal
evolution.
496. See COOLEY, supra note 9, at 351-413; TIEDEMAN, supra note 22, at 137-93.
497. See supra text accompanying notes 447-94 (discussing Field); supra text accompany-
ing notes 411-12 (discussing Bradley).
498. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 320,22 S.W. 350, 353 (1893); In re Jacobs, 98
N.Y. 98, 115 (1885); Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 437, 6 A. 354, 356 (1886).
499. Shattuck, supra note 338, at 366-67, 369-70, 380; id. at 382 (tracing the common-law
concept of liberty from its Teutonic origins to conclude that as known to the founding genera-
tion it "mean[t] nothing more or less than freedom of the person from restraint"). Shattuck
did not disagree with the Court's jurisprudence, for his paper was also a work of historism, in
which he noted that "the law is not a manufacture, but a growth, and that it is, therefore,
impossible thoroughly to comprehend its true scope and meaning, without at least some
knowledge of its history and development," id. at 365, and that "it is reasonable to suppose
that the makers of our constitutions used [the terms 'life,' 'liberty,' and 'property'] with [their
clear common-law meaning]," id. at 379-80. Shattuck's opening remarks are a precis of his
historist approach to legal studies. Id. at 365-66. Interestingly, his thoughts were awarded the
Harvard Law School Association prize for 1890. Id. at 365. The following year another his-
torist essay won the Association's prize. See Ezra R. Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its Legiti-
mate Function in the Development of the Common Law, 5 HARV. L. REV. 172 (1892).
500. Thayer, supra note 1, at 156. Thayer's article is perhaps the most famous and influen.
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ever, by both proponents and opponents of Lochner era constitutional-
ism.50 ' The American Law Register and Review responded to Thayer
with an editorial faulting judicial restraint for its inability to preserve
"the rights of individuals as it was intended they should be preserved by
the constitution."' 2 Dean Pound criticized Shattuck for not distinguish-
ing between the common law's narrow precedents and its broader princi-
ples, chiding that "the term 'liberty' is broader than Coke's use of it."503
In general, opponents of Lochner era constitutionalism felt they
could not criticize the departure of Lochner era decisions from constitu-
tional tradition because they supported even greater departure.504 In at-
tial essay ever written on American constitutional law. Richard McMurtrie also wrote an
early series of articles attacking Lochner era precedents, in which he claimed there had been a
shift from strict textual positivism to natural-law jurisprudence. See Richard McMurtrie, A
New Canon of Constitutional Interpretation, 41 AM. L. REG. & REV. 1 (1893); Richard
McMurtrie, Comments on Recent Decisions: Constitutional Law, 41 AM. L. REG. & REv. 594
(1893); Richard McMurtrie, The Jurisdiction to Declare Void Acts of Legislation- When Is It
Legitimate and When Mere Usurpation of Sovereignty, 41 AM. L. REG. & REV. 1093 (1893).
501. See infra text accompanying notes 502-08; see also William D. Lewis, Civil Liberty
and a Written Constitution (pts. 1-3), 41 AM. L. REG. & Rnv. 782, 971, 1064 (1893) (an
opponent of Lochner era constitutionalism refuting the first two articles in McMurtrie's 1893
tripartite analysis, supra note 500, on grounds that courts should enforce contemporary con-
sensus values).
502. Editorial Notes and Comments, 42 AM. L. REG. & REv. 73, 75 (1894). The editorial,
which distinguishes between government structure cases and civil liberties cases, accepts judi-
cial restraint for the former but not the latter. The editorial does not discuss whether re-
strained review is traditional or not. Considering Marshall's treatment of state legislation in
Contract Clause and Commerce Clause litigation, there are good grounds for viewing re-
strained review as untraditional. In any event, Thayer grounded his argument for judicial
restraint in the political principle that courts and legislatures are equal branches of govern-
ment. Thayer, supra note 1, at 150. He admitted his argument did not apply to federal review
of state laws. Id. at 154-55. William Draper Lewis, an opposition jurist, see supra note 37, was
one of the review's three editors. He wrote a number of signed pieces for the review on consti-
tutional law at this time, all consistent with the remarks in this editorial. See, e.g., Lewis,
supra note 501, at 782-85, 1064-71. It is plausible that an opposition jurist wrote the editorial
rebuking Thayer.
503. Pound, supra note 10, at 467-68. In Pound's view the framers
laid down principles, not rules, and rules can only be illustrations of those principles
so long as facts and opinions remain what they were when the rules were announced.
For instance: The cases agree that the term "liberty" is broader than Coke's use of it;
that the fact that Coke confined it to freedom of physical motion and locomotion
does not exclude a broader interpretation to-day.
Id. Frequently Pound admitted that Lochner era constitutionalism reflected tradition. Id. at
457, 465. When he denied it, his claim was that common-law precedents contained conflicting
principles and choosing between them was a discretionary/political, not a scientific/neutral,
act.
504. See infra text accompanying notes 505-08. As Dean Pound wrote,
the same courts that recognize that 'liberty' must include more to-day that [sic] it did
as used in Coke's Second Institute, lay it down that incapacities are to remain what
they were at common law; that new incapacities of fact, arising out of present indus-
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tacking Lochner era substantive due process decisions, liberal
constitutionalists argued for a shift from a judicial method premised
upon conceptualism to a method premised upon functionalism."' They
espoused a change from a method premised upon fidelity to the tradi-
tional values of the race (which at least encompassed the founding gener-
ation) to a method premised upon fidelity to the values of the present
generation. 6 Opposition jurists also argued for a shift in substantive
premises from individualism to a moderate collectivism. 0 7 Opposition
trial situations, may not be recognized by legislation. This is, in truth, but another
illustration of the purely personal character of all natural law theories.
Pound, supra note 10, at 468. Opposition jurists frequently conceded that Lochner era consti-
tutionalism was faithful to framer intent, traditional Anglo-American values, and jurispruden-
tial norms. For Professor Pound's views, see supra note 435. When Pound and other
opposition jurists argued that Lochner era decisions were departures from tradition, their typi-
cal argument was not that the opposition wanted to restore tradition but that there was no
tradition. See, eg., Pound, supra note 10, at 482-83 (arguing that traditional equitable princi-
ples support governmental interference with capital's oppressive economic power over labor,
and thus provide a fund of analogies in opposition to common-law precedents).
Thus, opposition jurists argued not for a restoration of pre-Lochner constitutionalism but
for a more complete abandonment of it. It is ironic that opponents of laissez-faire constitution-
alism eventually came to identify their position as protesting the substantive and methodologi-
cal innovations of Lochner era jurists, and as arguing for a restoration of pre-Lochner era
norms. See Horwitz, Republicanism, supra note 1, at 61-63 (arguing that the shift to the inno-
vation/restoration argument was a tragedy).
505. See, eg., Chafee, supra note 426, at 957-60 (drawing First Amendment doctrine from
balancing of interests, not rights); Pound, supra note 9, at 610-11, 615-16, 622-23 (arguing for
"jurisprudence of ends"); Pound, supra note 10, at 462-64, 467 (claiming, in part, that the
founders did not "intend[] to impose the [then current common-law] theory upon us for all
time.... What they did intend was the practical securing of each individual against arbitrary
and capricious governmental acts."). Functionalism appraises rules of law based not on their
analytical symmetry, but on the way they work in practice.
506. See Chafee, supra note 426, at 954-55, 958-60; Hand, supra note 35, at 498-500, 509;
Lewis, Civil Liberty, supra note 37, at 1070-71; Lewis, Social Sciences, supra note 37, at 531-39.
Pound was the first to argue that the framers did not intend to "dictate philosophical orjuristic
beliefs and opinions to those who were to come after them." Pound, supra note 10, at 467; see
also Chafee, supra note 426, at 954-55 (considering postfounding development in determining
content of First Amendment). Professors Levy and Powell recently have returned to this
theme. See LEONARD LEvy, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 1-29
(1988); Powell, supra note 321, at 885-923. The most that proponents of Lochner era constitu-
tionalism argued was the impossibility of the framers dictating their opinions to the future.
See TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at 43-45, 150-51, 161-65; infra text accompanying notes 515-
21.
507. Dean Pound, for example, called for a shift to "a sane individualism." Pound, supra
note 10, at 482; see also COMMONS, supra note 36, at 11-64, 71-73, 288-93 (developing the
economic and ethical justification for more social control of private property); Lewis, Social
Sciences, supra note 37, at 531-32, 537-38 (emphasizing groups, not individuals); Richard Ol-
ney, Discrimination Against Union Labor-Legal?, 42 AM. L. REv. 161, 164 (1908) (arguing
that it was archaic for labor to deal with employers individually); Pound, supra note 10, at 454-
58, 466-68, 482-83, 500 (arguing that an individual's concept of justice exaggerates private
rights at the expense of public rights). The point is that opposition jurists saw the importance
of group organization and activity; they thought the law should not treat people as equal
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jurists, in short, argued that Lochner era constitutionalism was not suffi-
ciently evolutionary. They grounded their protest in the claim that social
evolution had not ceased at the nation's founding or at the middle of the
nineteenth century with the rise of Jacksonian democracy and the perfec-
tion of classical liberal society.08
Lochner era jurists, in turn, felt the vitality of this claim, and it put
an edge of urgency in their writings."0 9 Lochner era jurists agreed with
their opponents that public opinion is the basis and touchstone of law. I°
Indeed, their historism implied the ultimate sovereignty of public opin-
ion, even in societies that are not formal democracies. ,But whatever the
situation under despotic governments, Lochner era jurists were certain
that in a democracy the people's de facto power over law is also their de
jure right.511 Thomas McIntyre Cooley, the doyen of the late nineteenth-
century bar and an advocate of moderate laissez-faire principles, exulted
in speaking of "our law-makers, the people." '12 Christopher Tiedeman,
the leading strict laissez-faire constitutionalist, concluded his study of
constitutional theory by saying:
individuals but as members of unequal groups, or as unequal individuals until represented by a
group. See generally JOHN LUSTIG, CORPORATE LIBERALISM: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN
AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY, 1890-1920 (1982) (discussing impact of development of
large-scale enterprise on classical liberalism).
By "moderate collectivism," this Article means a policy of allowing state power to pro-
mote the interests of society at some expense to individual property rights.
508. See, e.g., Lewis, Social Sciences, supra note 37, at 537-38; Pound, Philosophy of Law,
supra note 37, at 345-46; Pound, The Need, supra note 37, at 920-26.
509. See, e.g., LOWELL, supra note 30, at 8-19; ARNOLD PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS
AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATITrUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895, at 19-82 (paperback
ed. 1969) (describing judges' and lawyers' speeches, particularly, before bar associations);
TIEDEMAN, supra note 22, at vi-viii; TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at 80-81.
510. See LOWELL, supra note 30, at 127-28 (discussing constitutional law and saying "no
court can hinder a people that is determined to have its way"); POMEROY, supra note 426, at
97 (discussing constitutional law); JOHN N. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MUNICIPAL
LAW 7-11, 174, 176 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1864) (discussing private law);
TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at 150, 161-62, 164 (discussing constitutional law); Carter, supra
note 362, at 231-37 (discussing private law); Cooley, supra note 425, at 352 (discussing consti-
tutional law); Thomas M. Cooley, Labor and Capital Before the Law, 139 N. AM. REV. 503,
503-08, 516 (1884) (discussing public and private law); Judson, supra note 430, at 898 (discuss-
ing constitutional law). Arguably, the importance of public opinion to Lochner era jurists
accounts for Lowell's pioneering interest, as a political scientist, in studying public opinion.
See A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, PUBLIC OPINION AND POPULAR GOVERNMENT (1913). Oppo-
sition jurists are, of course, noted for their devotion to this view. See, e.g., Tyson & Bro. v.
Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (law is anything that "has a suffi-
cient force of public opinion behind it"); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Every opinion tends to become a law."); Lewis, Social Sciences,
supra note 37, at 532-34; Pound, The Need, supra note 37, at 925-26.
511. See POMEROY, supra note 426, at 4-6; Cooley, supra note 425, at 352.
512. Cooley, supra note 510, at 516. For Cooley's general analysis of the relation of public
sentiment and law, see id. at 503-08; Siegel, supra note 107, at 1492-97.
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If one professes any faith at all in popular government, [one]
must confess to a desire that the popular will shall prevail ....
And even if... [one] does not have any faith in popular gov-
ernment, [one] must admit that, with an enlightened and spir-
ited people, who know their strength, and who know that the
living power in all municipal law proceeds from them, it is an
absolute impossibility to suppress the popular will.
5 13
Recognizing the suzerainty of public opinion, some Lochner era ju-
fists, typically those who held judicial appointment, limited the legiti-
mate means by which public pressure changes constitutional law to
formal amendment." 4 Scholarly commentators, however, went further.
Lochner era commentators pointed out that the political branches of gov-
ernment possess the power of judicial appointment; they said judges are
themselves subject to imbibing the opinions around them; they suggested
that judicial views endure only if they harmonize with public senti-
ment . 15  Lochner era commentators concluded, therefore, that public
opinion transforms itself into constitutional law through judicial inter-
pretation. John Pomeroy, for example, defended the institution of judi-
cial review from the charge that it renders the Constitution "fixed,
unchangeable, unyielding to the demands of the people's progressive de-
velopment" by saying that "[t]he courts do yield to the pressure of the
popular will, do move with the popular progress, slower perhaps than
legislatures and Presidents, but as certainly and as efficiently." '16 Chris-
topher Tiedeman went further and argued that the Court rapidly accom-
513. TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at 164.
514. See, eg., COOLEY, supra note 429, at 55; Cooley, supra note 425, at 351, 353; Thomas
M. Cooley, The Federal Supreme Court-Its Place in the American Constitutional Scheme, in
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES As SEEN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AMERICAN LAW: A COURSE OF LECTURES BEFORE THE POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 29, 31 (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1890). Cooley
went further and limited the amendment power to changes consistent with the original Consti-
tution's principles; but by this he did not mean to deny the ultimate power of the public,
because he recognized the concept of revolutionary change. See Cooley, Correspondence, supra
note 427; Cooley, Power, supra note 427. Cooley was a judge on the Michigan Supreme Court.
Most judges spoke of the Constitution as imposing unchangeable principles with a changing
application. See supra text accompanying note 425. It seems appropriate to interpret these
remarks as expressing the belief that constitutional change is possible through formal amend-
ment but not judicial exegesis. See also Ives v. Southern B. Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 294-95, 94 N.E.
431, 440 (1911) (holding that people, not legislatures, may change constitutions).
515. See LOWELL, supra note 30, at 128; POMEROY, supra note 426, at 97; TIEDEMAN,
supra note 326, at 161-62, 164; Judson, supra note 430, at 898; see also Lewis, Social Sciences,
supra note 37, at 536 (an opposition jurist expressing this view). Lowell also stressed the
importance of public self-restraint in constitutional development, which implies the ultimate
power of public opinion. LOWELL, supra note 30, at 89, 106.
516. POMEROY, supra note 426, at 97. Significantly, Pomeroy never gives a clear example
of interpretive change. This illustrates the stunted modernism of the historist constitutional-
ists. See infra note 518; infra text accompanying notes 522-29.
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modates itself to public sentiment. Analyzing judicial treatment of the
Constitution's indeterminate Contract, Due Process, and Citizenship
Clauses; its very specific habeas corpus and direct taxation provisions;
and its Tenth Amendment," 7 he asserted that through judicial interpre-
tation "American constitutional law follows and registers all material
changes in public opinion, as unerringly as the needle follows the mag-
netic meridian." ' He commended the Court's course of decision on the
grounds that
[n]o people are ruled by dead men, or by the utterances of dead
men ....
... [A]s soon as we recognize the present will of the people
as the living source of law, we are obliged, in construing the
[Constitution], to follow, and give effect to, the present inten-
tions and meaning of the people.519
Lochner era commentators may not have been the first to note the power
517. See TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at 51-110, 129-45; Tiedeman, supra note 418, at 268.
518. TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at 41. Frederick Judson, a practitioner from St. Louis,
concluded his enthusiastic review of the initial substantive due process precedents with the
warning that "whatever our written constitutions. may provide, it is inevitable that our juristic
conception must harmonize with the subtle yet all-powerful influences of public opinion, and
with the conception of individual liberty which that public opinion sustains." Judson, supra
note 430, at 898; see also Cooley, supra note 510, at 503-09 (jurist denying the propriety of
interpretive changes yet noting one with approval); infra text accompanying notes 522-29 (out-
lining the view of A. Lawrence Lowell, who also denied the propriety of interpretive changes,
yet ambiguously asserted the power of public sentiment to control the Court).
Tiedeman and Pomeroy also disagreed on whether the Court's interpretive shifts were
conscious. Drawing from Pomeroy's private-law jurisprudence, it is proper to assume he
thought the process unconscious. See POMEROY, supra note 510, at 177 (describing judicial
change of private law as unconscious). Tiedeman described judicial interpretation of the Con-
stitution as "unconscious[ly]" tracking public opinion. Tiedeman, supra note 418, at 271. Yet
he all but shows that there was conscious control. See TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at 102-03,
106-09 (discussing The Slaughter-House Cases); Tiedeman, supra note 418, at 275-78 (discuss-
ing The Income Tax Cases). Yet, like Pomeroy, Tiedeman was not fully modem. When dis-
cussing matters of current controversy, Tiedeman always concluded that the Court was
adhering to the framers' original principles. See TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at 77-78 (discuss-
ing due process and natural rights); Tiedeman, supra note 418, at 274 (discussing voiding
income tax law).
519. TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at 150-54; see also Tiedeman, supra note 418, at 278
("The American people are not, and should not be, ruled by the commands of dead men,
however distinguished they may be, and however much they and their political wisdom chal-
lenge and deserve our veneration."). Tiedeman did find that interpretive changes usually were
limited to choices between permissible shades of meaning of the letter of the text. TIEDEMAN,
supra note 326, at 141, 151. He did give at least one example in which public pressure forced
the Court to disregard even the literal meaning of the text. Id. at 83-90 (discussing the Consti-
tution during the Civil War); see generally Siegel, supra note 107, at 1527-39 (discussing
Tiedeman's constitutional jurisprudence).
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of the Court to amend the Constitution through interpretation,5 20 but
some of them were the first to assert its inevitability and legitimacy. 21
Thus, Lochner era jurists agreed that constitutional law evolves
through formal amendment and through application of traditional prin-
ciples to new conditions, but they divided on the issue of interpretive
amendments. Perhaps no one better represented the intellectual tensions
and emergent modernism of his generation than Abbott Lawrence Low-
ell, who maintained the Court "attempt[s] to carry out the popular will
only so far as it has found its expression in the instrument [it] inter-
pret[s,]' 522 and that constitutional change is limited to formal amend-
ment.523 Yet at the same time, he thought that the framers had no clear
notion of the "effect" of the Due Process Clause or any other Bill of
Rights provision other than "prevent[ing] ... legislature[s] from becom-
ing despotic and tyrannous"; 524 that the Court necessarily "shaped" the
meaning of the Bill of Rights;5 2 and that its rulings could survive only
with public support.126 One hears the voice of Holmes, 27 as well as Coo-
520. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400-25 (1819); see also
JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED, AND CoNsTITUrTIONS VINDICATED i, 79-202
(repr. ed. 1970) (1st ed. 1820) (states' rights advocate responding to John Marshall's interpre-
tation of the Necessary and Proper Clause); JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND 52-77, 106-54 (Gerald Gunther ed. 1969) (same). Tiedeman referred to Jeffer-
son's view that "John Marshall and the Supreme Court were engaged in making a constitution
for the government." TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at 44.
521. Professors Ackerman and Levinson have returned to this theme. See Ackerman,
supra note 1, at 546-47; Sanford Levinson, "Veneration" and Constitutional Change: James
Madison Confronts the Possibility of Constitutional Amendment, 21 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 2443,
2455-60 (1990).
522. LOWELL, supra note 30, at 96; see also id. at 125-26 (legal profession has duty of
"developing, explaining, and defending" principles founders embedded in Constitution).
523. Id. at 104, 124-25 (referring only to formal amendment as "safety-valve" and saying
that when the Court voids legislation it "declares, in effect, that the present wishes of the
people cannot be carried out, because opposed to their previous intention, or to the views of
their remote ancestors").
524. Id. at 87; see supra text accompanying note 418.
525. LOWELL, supra note 30, at 86-87 ("[Wlithout precedent in the history of the world, a
body of constitutional law has been formed which is not yet completely crystallized, but is
being daily shaped by the decisions of the courts.").
526. See infra text accompanying note 529.
527. Holmes, the great opponent of Lochner era jurisprudence, is famous for saying that
"[w]e do not realize how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change
in the habit of the public mind." Holmes, supra note 365, at 466. This sounds like Lowell. Cf.
infra text accompanying note 529 (Lowell arguing that the power of the judiciary and the
existence of the Constitution are dependent on public opinion). Yet Holmes, unlike Lowell,
prefaced his remark with the observation that the principles that ground legal decisions "really
are battle grounds where the means do not exist for determinations that shall be good for all
time, and where the decision can do no more than embody the preference of a given body in a
given time and place." Holmes, supra note 365, at 466. Lowell seemed to point toward more
permanent and intrinsically correct principles. See infra text accompanying note 529.
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ley,528 in Lowell's ultimate claim:
[I]f at any time the people conclude that constitutional law, as
interpreted by lawyers, is absurd or irrational, the power of the
judiciary will inevitably vanish, and a great part of the Consti-
tution will be irretrievably swept away. Our constitutional law
depends for its force upon the fact that it approves itself to the
good sense of the people; and the power of the courts is held
upon condition that the precedents established by them are
wise, statesmanlike, and founded upon enduring principles of
justice which are worthy of the respect of the community.
5 29
Despite disparate views on the fact and propriety of interpretive
amendment, from their analysis of the relation of public opinion to con-
stitutional evolution the proponents of Lochner era jurisprudence drew
the same theory of the Court's institutional role. The written Constitu-
tion and judicial review, they said, empower the Court to act as a drag on
fundamental social change.5 30 Judicial adherence to traditional princi-
ples steadies the course of reform, but cannot (and should not) thwart
it.5 31 It assures that constitutional change will reflect "the thought of the
528. Cooley, the leading proponent of Lochner era jurisprudence, opposed the theory of
interpretive amendment, thought the Constitution was based upon proper principles, and said
the masses could (and must) be taught them if the Constitution was to survive. See Cooley,
supra note 510, at 512-16; supra text accompanying note 512.
529. LOWELL, supra note 30, at 128; see also supra notes 516, 518 (discussing Pomeroy on
interpretive amendment and Tiedeman on controversial issues as other examples of Lochner
era jurists' blunted modernism on the issue of interpretive amendment).
530. POMEROY, supra note 426, at 97; TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at 163-64; Cooley, supra
note 425, at 353-54.
531. In discussing the Court's response to shifts in public opinion, Pomeroy remarks:
[I]t is true that the movement of the Judiciary will be generally more slow and uni-
form than that of legislatures and executives. This fact, instead of being an objection,
is a consideration of great weight in favor of giving to the national Supreme Court
the function of interpreting the Constitution. That instrument, as the organic law of
the whole people, is the source of all other legislation. Its meaning should be measur-
ably fixed and certain. Congress may readily and frequently change its policy; its
work may be done under the influence of a momentary pressure; it may commit
mistakes which require speedy amendment; and the consequences, though evil, are
transitory; they do not reach to the very foundation of the political structure. But
rapid and sudden alterations in the construction of the organic law, assumptions of
powers one day which are denied the next, affect the entire body-politic; they place
every citizen in a state of constant uncertainty as to his rights and duties; they pro-
duce a condition of partial anarchy. England has its traditions, its social classes, its
reverence for the past, to give steadiness to political progress. We have rejected these
as inconsistent with our republican institutions. If we also reject the Judiciary as a
controlling element in our civil polity, we shall be left without any thing to give
stability to the administration of affairs, to render the growth which all desire,
healthy and permanent, the progress continuous and sure.
POMEROY, supra note 426, at 97-98; see also Cooley, supra note 425, at 353-54 ("no maxim of
statesmanship can be wiser than to make haste slowly").
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people; not ... the thought evolved in excitement or hot blood, but the
sober second thought; '532 that constitutional evolution realizes "the peo-
ple's will, . . . [not] their whim."
533
Clearly, Lochner era jurists realized the importance of public opin-
ion in the evolution of constitutional law. In propounding laissez-faire
constitutionalism, they believed public opinion was on their side. 34
They saw the courts and the legal profession as defenders of the nation's
traditions and as educators of public opinon.535 They saw the written
Constitution and the power of judicial review as the ultimate bulwark of
their views,536 a bulwark that was vincible through formal and interpre-
tive amendment.
From this perspective, Lochner era jurisprudence may be seen as
having much in common with the jurisprudence of its opponents and as
being a transitional concept, forming a bridge from early to modem
American constitutional theory. 317 On the one hand, the Lochner era
532. Cooley, supra note 425, at 350.
533. JAMES R. LOWELL, DEMOCRACY AND OTHER PAPERS 24 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin
1898), cited and paraphrased in TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at 164, and quoted in Judson,
supra note 430, at 398. Cooley referred to the need to avoid "yield[ing] ... to the whim of the
people." Cooley, supra note 425, at 350. For similar sentiments expressed in other phrases,
see GRAY, supra note 370, at 290 (in Carter's private-law jurisprudence "the judge is appealing
from Philip drunk to Philip sober"); LOWELL, supra note 30, at 22 ("to make it clear that the
popular feeling is not caused by temporary excitement, but is the result of a mature and lasting
opinion"); id. at 127 ("sober good sense of the people themselves").
534. See LOWELL, supra note 30, at 76-77, 126, 132; TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at 70-71,
78-81 (recognizing both popular approval for traditional principles and spreading protest);
TIEDEMAN, supra note 22, at vii (same); Cooley, supra note 510, at 503-09, 516. Pound agreed
that the early Lochner era cases overruled statutes for which public opinion was not prepared.
See Pound, supra note 10, at 457-58, 487. Thus, Lochner era jurists believed not only that their
understanding of Anglo-American tradition had been crystallized by the time of the nation's
founding, but that it was still adhered to by the people. Certainly some jurists thought this was
so because it had to be so. Laissez-faire constitutionalism was the fruit of the germs of the
Anglo-Saxon race; it was the present application of principles of social organization that traced
back to the Teutonic tribes in the German forests.
535. See LOWELL, supra note 30, at 126, 134-35; TIEDEMAN, supra note 22, at vii-viii;
Thomas M. Cooley, Sources of Inspiration in Legal Pursuits, 9 W. JURIST 515, 527, 529-34
(1875). Hence the bench and bar began an outpouring of speeches to bar and civic organiza-
tions. See PAUL, supra note 509, at 19-103.
536. See, e.g., LOWELL, supra note 30, at 125 (attributing written Constitution to "[t]he
truth ... that our fathers ... believed that there were principles more important than the
execution of every popular wish, and rights which ought not to be violated by the impulse and
excitement of a majority"); POMEROY, supra note 426, at 97-98; TIEDEMAN, supra note 326, at
81, 163-64 (asserting that Constitution legalizes resistance to popular will).
537. Dean Pound and Professor Stone believed that the historical school of jurisprudence
was a bridge concept in private law from rationalistic jurisprudence to sociological jurispru-
dence. The contribution of the historical school in private law is that it initiated the notion of
law as a product of social development rather than reason (natural law) or will (positivism,
analytic jurisprudence). See ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 141-51
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jurists' historism and their notion of substantive due process protection
of property-which was imbued with individualism and refused to allow
the state to address directly the relations between labor and capital-
constitutionalized a past that was fading beyond retrieval, and created a
doctrine that eventually was overthrown. 538 On the other hand, the same
method and doctrine eventually articulated other supposedly traditional
values, such as family autonomy5 39 and freedom of speech,540 which were
the substantive beginning of the next constitutional order.541 Opposition
jurists joined in542 and, in the time of their dominance, developed these
(1923); STONE, supra note 19, at 446-84; Pound, The Scope and Purpose, supra note 37, at 604-
09; see also Siegel, supra note 107 (discussing three late nineteenth century constitutional
commentators).
538. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), in an opinion written by
Justice Holmes, the Court granted property a type of substantive due process protection that is
still respected today. Id. at 416. Under the regime of New Deal constitutionalism, however,
the protections of Pennsylvania Coal have been minimal to nonexistent. See, eg., Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122-28 (1978). Thus, substantive due process
protection of property lives to some degree, and some have argued for its revival. See, e.g.,
EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 331-50. Perhaps a revival is occurring. See, eg., Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 839 (1987); see also Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Con-
ception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667,
1671-84 (1988) (discussing increasing tendency to find takings in acts isolating physical or
conceptual parts of the property); Terry Rice, What Property Interests Merit Takings Protec-
tion?, 43 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (Feb. 1991) (same).
539. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923); Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 663 (1875) (discussing
choice of marital partner as nontextual constitutional right); People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 287-
88 (1870) (voiding reform school act on grounds of natural right of parents to custody of
children); TIEDEMAN, supra note 22, at 554-56 (plenary state power over parent and child
relationship "as long as the limitations upon the parental control are confined to the ordinary
ones, with which long usage has made us familiar").
540. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (first case in which the Court's
majority discussed First Amendment as a due process limitation applicable to the states); Coo-
LEY, supra note 9, at 414-66 (arguing for substantial press and speech protections).
541. The Lochner era origins of significant constitutional protection of these rights is more
than simply temporal. For example, "liberty of contract" reasoning is mixed into the family
autonomy precedents. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 533, 535-36; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400; see also
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (although opposing
the notion of substantive due process, stating that as long as the doctrine exists it should
protect speech as well as property), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449
(1969); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (Holmes's dissenting opinion accompa-
nies the following case, Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923)); cf. MARK A. GRABER,
TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH 17-50 (1991) (describing conservative Lochner era jurists' de-
fense of free speech).
542. On opposition jurists' participation in the development of substantive rights, even in
substantive protection of property, see Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415-16 (Holmes, J.)
(voiding safety regulation of property for going "too far"); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (offering to void laws that "a rational and fair man necessar-
ily would admit ... infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law"); Chafee, supra note 426, at 960 (arguing for enlarged
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and other doctrines543 because of something proponents and opponents
of the Lochner era shared: a view of constitutional law as ultimately the
expression of the culture that shapes it and that it shapes. Lochner era
jurists bequeathed to their victorious opponents the notion that constitu-
tional law must evolve because society evolves. Lochner era jurists,
therefore, also bequeathed to their successors the conundrums inherent
in the notion-not of a judicially elaborated constitution in a democratic
state; that conundrum has always been with us--of a judicially elabo-
rated constitution that of necessity can have little or no true mooring in
the timeless verities of moral truth or framer intent.
The break with the static constitution of natural law and framer
intent, and the elaboration of an evolutionary constitution, were commit-
ments shared by the proponents and opponents of Lochner era constitu-
tionalism. Their shared commitments arose from their common ground:
they were the first generation of jurists to live in the modem world, a
world whose economic, social, and philosophical bases differed markedly
from the world of the founders. Their responses to the challenges of
their times diverged. Substantively, the proponents and opponents of
Lochner era constitutionalism differed over the extent to which govern-
ment should redistribute wealth to redress the inequities of the new or-
der. 45 Substantive dispute gave fire to their jurisprudential debate over
the correct approach to constitutional evolution. Methodologically,
what separated the proponents and opponents of Lochner era jurispru-
dence was the conceptualism of the former and the functionalism of the
latter, and the former's search for fundamental values in the traditions of
the past as compared to the latter's search in the values of the present.
5 46
In sum, the Lochner era's defense of property, conceptualism, and
protection of speech). But see Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) (saying he dissented in Bartels and Meyer because "it appears to me to present a question
upon which men reasonably might differ and therefore I am unable to say that the Constitu-
tion of the United States prevents the experiment being tried"); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403
(Holmes J., dissenting).
543. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (pro-
tecting symbolic speech); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (recognizing right to
procreate). The importance of protecting substantive, rather than vested, rights in the modem
era is tellingly illustrated by the role "expectations" play in the law of warrantless searches.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). I thank Professor Levinson for bringing
this view of Katz to my attention.
544. See COVER, supra note 136, at 134-35.
545. Horwitz, Republicanism, supra note 1, at 58-63; Horwitz, History and Theory, supra
note 1, at 1827-30; Lewis, Social Sciences, supra note 37, at 533 ("law must change with
changes in social ideas").
546. This difference involved a metaphysical dispute: is social evolution governed by im-
manent principles of social order or by shifting power relations?
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belief in permanent principles of constitutional law link it to the antebel-
lum past. Its development of substantive rights, its evolutionary con-
sciousness," 7 and its view that public opinion ultimately determines the
content and growth of constitutional law, link it to the post-Depression
future. Indeed, the Lochner era commentators' view of the governing
force of public opinion was so advanced that modem constitutionalism
has yet to assimilate it. 4s
547. One thinks of Richard Hofstadter's comment on social Darwinism: "We may wonder
whether, in the entire history of thought, there was ever a conservatism so utterly progressive
as this." RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 8 (1944).
548. Witness the continued and growing commitment to a jurisprudence of moral truth
and framer intent. See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)
(framer intent); RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS (1989) (framer intent); EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 3-31 (moral truth and implication of
framer intent); RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 313-92 (1990) (quali-
fied support for corrective justice and wealth maximization as ends of law); Richard Epstein,
The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 254 (1980) (moral truth);
Douglas Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak nor Ob-
tuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1655 (1988) (original intent); Edwin Meese III, Toward a
Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 10 (1988) (original intent);
Michael Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 871, 903 (1989) (criticizing antifoundationalist theories); Michael Moore, Moral Reality,
1982 Wis. L. REv. 1061, 1153-55 (moral truth); see also William Rehnquist, The Notion of a
Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693, 696-99, 706 (1976) (framer-intent constitutionalism
advocated by the present Chief Justice). Although the Court disclaims both the ability to
discern moral truth and the power to impose it through constitutional interpretation, its recent
interest in the nation's "specific historical tradition" reflects the commentators' renewed inter-
est in framer intent. It also suggests the survival of the Lochner era technique of using the
traditions of the Anglo-American people (as encapsulated in the common law) to define the
Constitution's vague protections of civil liberty. See also Justice Harlan's remark, in Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), that in adjudicating substantive due process cases the Court
should reflect
the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.
That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs
from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is
likely to be sound.
Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

